Negotiating with the Taliban—who are convinced military victory is within sight—is the worst possible approach to stabilizing Afghanistan, and one that would fail. The author warns that U.S. signals of impatience and a desire for an early exit could motivate insurgents to maintain a hard line and outlast the international coalition. Though costly, a long-term commitment to building an effective Afghan state is the only way to achieve victory and defend U.S. national security objectives.
Key Conclusions:
- Negotiation with the Taliban is premature and unnecessary.
- A lasting peace in Afghanistan and defeat of the Taliban can only come from a political-military victory that diminishes the rewards for continued resistance.
- The United States must reaffirm the goal of building a democratic and stable Afghan state.
- Although counterterrorism cooperation by Pakistan is desirable for U.S. success in Afghanistan, American goals in Afghanistan can be—and if necessary must be—attained without Islamabad’s assistance.
- Portending coalition defeat in the “graveyard of empires” is an inadequate analogy. Neither the British nor Soviet experience mimics the current situation.
- President Obama’s recently announced “Af-Pak” strategy is courageous and responsible, but still incomplete.
Bookmarks