@moatandbailey,

Rather than re-hash my arguments, I would start by reading the blog post and relevant threads here:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...-west-was-won/

On the origins of the Awakening:

Debate over whether it was a good idea (1)

Debate over whether it was a good idea (2)

Here is my summary. There was no functioning government in Anbar. None. There was no one to legitimize or reinforce. You couldn't pay people enough to become officials.

The ONLY reasonable option (other than continuation of the status quo) was to leverage the existing power structure and bring them to our side. As long as violence was out of control nationwide no reconciliation was possible and there would be little chance of gaining a legitimate, effective central government.

The Awakening was not an end. It was a means to reduce violence to create the opportunity for a common settlement. Whether that works or not was up to the Iraqis.

Critics of the Awakening owe the answer to two questions:

1) What else could have been done (in reality, given constraints in 2006) to reduce violence in Anbar?

2) Did the support of the Awakening enhance or reduce Iraq's chances of forming an effective central govt vs. the situation in summer 2006? -or- Did the awakening enhance or constrain our operational and strategic flexibility?

Niel