Anbar Awakening Council: Friends Close Enemies closer?

[Danny]

Cavguy and others on this subject,

I know we have gone a few rounds on this issue before, but it bears repeating. In the end I will defer to your authority, but I think that the "Awakening" as a narrative for all of Anbar is mistaken and simplistic.

I think it is accurate for Ramadi and that AO, but for example in Al-Qaim the situation relied on a very strong single person named Abu Ahmed (and his family) who had begun the fight against AQ before U.S. forces engaged him. After losing, he approached U.S. Marines who assisted him in the fight, thus driving them from Al-Qaim. It had little to do with tribe.

In Haditha it similarly relied on a strong police chief, but also sand berms around the city to keep undesirables from Syria out.

After being pushed from Ramadi, AQ mostly landed in Fallujah, and from April - October 2007 the U.S. Marines had one hell of a fight cleaning up Fallujah. it didn't rely on tribes or any awakening, but rather gated communities, biometrics, block Mukhtars and heavy kinetic operations and agressive dismounted patrolling.

The narrative is complicated, and reference to a single thing, person, group, plan, strategy or approach is wrong. It was an intricate confluence of events and things happening that probably will never be repeated anywhere on earth.

[Cavguy]

Herschel,

You're right, of course. Much nuance is omitted above, and I unthinkingly excluded some other critical errors.

My key point remains - if the "awakening" is a bad thing, what should have been done instead? The critics owe a (realistic) answer.

Niel

[MikeF]

The narrative is complicated, and reference to a single thing, person, group, plan, strategy or approach is wrong. It was an intricate confluence of events and things happening that probably will never be repeated anywhere on earth.

Does Anbar= Diyala= Afghanistan = Vietnam?

In terms of monetary cost to us, yes.

In terms of approach, no.

In the end, it all boils down to money and our children's future whether that be COIN, CT, nuclear war, hybrid war, regular war, fill in the blank.

v/r

Mike

[Danny]

Cavguy,

I know that you know all of the rest of the details.

Roger that. As you know I was a strong supporter of the Awakening and concerned citizens (SOI) program. It's exactly what I would have done if I had been smart enough. No one can offer a better solution because there was no better solution.

MikeF, it always concerns be when I see dumbed-down versions of a particular narrative being promulgated as the solution somewhere else. We must be smarter than that in how we conduct whatever warfare we are in.

Best and V/r,

H

[MikeF]

MikeF, it always concerns be when I see dumbed-down versions of a particular narrative being promulgated as the solution somewhere else. We must be smarter than that in how we conduct whatever warfare we are in.

I found I'm simply better at execution. I'll implement the policy...Sometimes, I ask to many questions

v/r

Mike

[Danny]

MikeF, um, just to make clear, I didn't mean to imply that your version of anything was dumbed down, or for Cavguy either. Just that I've seen this floating around in the made-for-public-consumption media, and it always makes me grind my teeth.

[MikeF]

MikeF, um, just to make clear, I didn't mean to imply that your version of anything was dumbed down, or for Cavguy either. Just that I've seen this floating around in the made-for-public-consumption media, and it always makes me grind my teeth.

If I've learned anything in life, it's that I don't know anything

Minzberg calls this approach ad hoc. He also felt that mid-level managers were the only ones that could effectively change bureaucracies outside dynamic leaders in simple structures...In that way, it is Rob Thorton, Niel, and my time

So, sometimes I opine, but I always listen...Particularly to Ken, Goethe, and Wilf.

Made for consumption media is just that....That is why I turned off my tv...too much fear-mongering.

v/r

Mike

[Cavguy]

H,

Agree you can't transfer directly 1 to 1:

In a "small footprint" occupation (which both IZ and AFG are, despite our numbers), there is a transitive principle - identify the functioning (real) power structures, and either leverage or neutralize them. But don't work directly against them, especially as a foreigner. It will generate problems.

Now if you can allocate resources and authority enough to control (aka Chechnya), you have a chance with a direct challenge strategy. This can backfire, as Afghanistan's problems are partially the result of the destruction of its traditional power structures from the 1970s to the present, which facilitated the rise of the Taleban.