No one is disagreeing with that. What we're awaiting is your providing some fresh thinking. Thus far, as Van said; "This reads like a "best practices" approach to Small Wars (COIN, low intensity conflict, SASO, pick your buzzword). You are trying to assemble the concepts that have worked in Latin America in the 1930s, Malaysia in the 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s-70s, the hords of Middle Eastern expats that are employed by the U.S. Army National Training Centers right now, etc? If so, you've put together a good framework.". To cap that, you even provide a link to the US army Combined Arms Center for backup of your position even though you offered several criticisms of US practices.
You did make this valid statement:I can't speak for others but I do not question that. My guess is that most here would agree. Thus my comment above; ""Seems to me that the object should be to get the Politicians educated so that they do not have to commit armed forces to three block wars because sensible diplomacy and aid applied by well educated and trained civilian specialists in their fields obviate the need for or desirability of a war. War brings in folks who are specialists in their field and that field is the conversion of urban blocks to rural terrain..."""For the last part. The only thing I like to stress is that we have to get a broader view at conflicts, the "hardware" aproach is just a (minor) part of conflicts."I would be happy to comment on anything new that is the sum of any parts. Thus far, you have provided nothing new that I have seen and no sum.And dear Ken and William, I would appreciate it that you do not to lift words out of a sentence to react on.
The whole is more than the sum of its parts.I though I had supplied some constructive comment which apparently you missed. Let me sum up my comments:Ready for some constructive and additional coments.
You so far as I can tell offer nothing new or innovative, instead say we need to incorporate best practices identified by many over the years -- and which are already being applied. No one has disagreed with that, many merely pointed out that is being done.
You propose to retrain military forces for a stabilization role. My experience and observation over a good many years and involving troops from many nations tells me this is an acceptable plan if there is no alternative; if there is any way to preclude such a military commitment, it should be pursued because military forces NEVER do a good job at stability operations; there are better ways.
My view is that the problems cited in that last statement will not change regardless of training UNLESS you completely move the force away from combat operations; I doubt this is a good idea.
Stabilization of problematic nations will without be required. Identification and evaluation of such a problem should be followed by rapid and adequate application of civilian efforts to preclude the necessity of a military deployment.
Two comments to add to all that; rapid and timely civilian intervention has been precluded and deterred by several factors. It worked for Colonies; it works less well in a post-colonial world where sensitivities to 'help' are a major problem that does not change the fact that civil is better and a military effort can create as many problems as it solves. Secondly, Europeans live in smaller, more homogeneous nations with strong central governments and have a colonial history and thus are more adept at providing such aid than are Americans. We know that and we accept it. We cannot for several reasons adopt European practices in totality. Size and breadth of necessary view being but two.
That's my summation, If I'm wrong in my assessment of your proposals, please tell me precisely what is wrong and I'll adjust.
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