|
|
#61 | |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Jun 2008
Posts: 384
|
Quote:
http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2...nterfeit-coin/ Last edited by Backwards Observer; 05-07-2009 at 08:32 AM. Reason: syntax or something |
|
|
|
|
|
|
#62 | |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 3,947
|
Quote:
__________________
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
|
|
|
|
|
|
#63 |
|
Former Member
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: South of Mason Dixon Line
Posts: 485
|
In what may fit into your discussion here I ran into last night some back and forth between/among the few highly educated (by inference) intellectuals among the so-called Pakhtun "movement" wherein their "core" model, revolving around religionIslam, is uniquely debated among themselves. Will try to clip some key comments/disussions and also try to cite the total discussion citation for you, but bearing in mind that as with SWJ when dealing with same type format (exactly) of Global Hujra Online in recent write ups by me I have goofed and overlooked fact that at present I am the "only" non-Muslim, non-Pakhtun member of that site and my research and so-called total access does not always equate to you guys getting direct access to full articles I read and then try to citation-paste up for you.
|
|
|
|
|
|
#64 | |
|
i pwnd ur ooda loop
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: The DC
Posts: 2,054
|
Quote:
__________________
Sam Liles Selil Blog Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives. All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
#65 |
|
Former Member
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: South of Mason Dixon Line
Posts: 485
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#66 | ||
|
Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 3,947
|
Quote:
Quote:
Fighting should be the foundation of an Army. Anything that detracts from that is dangerous and stupid. For example, instead of having Intelligence and Recon teams, you have "Human Terrain Teams". Large portions (not all) of the US COIN-club approach is "history free." They know it exists, but ignore the bits they want to invent and change the bits they need as evidence. What is more a great many of the COIN clubs' assertions about the future, past and present are wonderfully evidence free.
__________________
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
||
|
|
|
|
|
#67 | |
|
Moderator
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Montana
Posts: 3,074
|
Quote:
MacGregor's an interesting guy, but some of his ideas are just as flawed as the COINistas' concepts. I tend to consider both groups to be historical distortionists at best.
__________________
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare." T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War |
|
|
|
|
|
|
#68 |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: Lansing, KS
Posts: 361
|
Gian is an important public voice and good friend...
Unlike some, I would guess Gian is somewhat ill at ease with the elevated public profile... I do know that his position is based solely on what he views as the need for intellectual honesty (for that matter John Nagl is cut from the same cloth) and he has always been a bulldog when he feels that principle is being subjugated... However intellectual honesty is in the eyes of the beholder and like several other folks I don't agree with Gian on some things, especially the notion that COINistas are taking over the DoD... I'd argue quite the opposite... A healthy portion of serving officers accept the COIN doctrine for what it is... a helpful tool for adjusting their mindset/aimpoint in the missions they are currently DIRECTED to execute... I don't for a minute think the majority view COIN/LIC as end all be all... I know for a fact that senior officers charged with preparing forces have already begun to work through how to bring the training centers back to full-spectrum... However, and this is where Nagl is correct, there is a fight to be won today... and if our training centers aimpoint is directed elsewhere it would amount to criminal negligence... That's all I have to say about that... Anyone else under the impression that the author had a crush on Gian... he prose was very heroic
__________________
Hacksaw Say hello to my 2 x 4 |
|
|
|
|
|
#69 | ||
|
Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 3,947
|
Quote:
Quote:
About 18 months ago I had a serving senior US Army officer come up to me and say "don't mention you are friend of Doug MacGregor. It'll damage your credibility." - so I now say it whenever I can!
__________________
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
||
|
|
|
|
|
#70 |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Nov 2008
Location: Florida
Posts: 2,421
|
Tragically, where we lack the greatest capacity currently is at the strategic senior leadership level to better understand that nature of the threats we face, how to modify our behavior as a nation to be more effective in an emerging world order, and how to best use our tremendous military capacity to enable all of the above.
Too much politics; too much shaping of perspectives of what "right" looks like by our long and successful Cold War efforts; too much confusion of what the attacks of 9/11 really signafied and therefore how to best respond; too much inertia in certain directions by multi-billion dollar procurement programs and those with vested interests in the same, etc. If this were training, the OC probably needs to call for a pause, and circle everyone in for a little enroute AAR to talk about whats happening, actions, reactions, whats working and what isn't, etc prior to continuing on to the objective. The problem is that this is real, and there is not pause to regroup. Our biggest areas in need of repair are at the Strategy and Policy level. Those repairs are underway, but are being accomplished in the same messy environment described above. The military is ok. Not perfect, but powerful, flexible, adaptive, mission oriented and filled with an unprecedented quality of highly experienced personnel. We don't start wars and we don't end wars, but our lot will always be to wage wars in their midst, and deter them in between. Between Gentile and Nagle lies the force we need; and simple economics, human nature and realm of political compromise will probably make it the force we shape. Not the best force for Irregular Warfare, nor the best force for high-end conventional warfare, but one prepared to take on either one and succeed. I don't worry much about the "war wagers" I know they'll come through. I worry about the guys and gals in suits that are in the "war starting / war ending" business. Arming them with the best possible strategies and policies for the emerging world is what matters most toward determing where America stands 100 years from now, and how many brave young men and women were dedicated to that end.
__________________
Robert C. Jones Intellectus Supra Scientia "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired) |
|
|
|
|
|
#71 | |
|
Moderator
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Montana
Posts: 3,074
|
Quote:
My point has always been that you have to preserve the lessons and training for ALL levels and aspects of combat, not just the one you really WANT to do. The Army has historically done a poor job of that, and it's gotten worse in the aftermath of World War 2. I suppose that might be considered acceptable by some, but I wouldn't call it ideal. And as for "armed social work," although a great deal of the writing on this is overblown and clogged with social science jargon, I think that it's overdue recognition of one of the roles that an army often HAS to assume in the aftermath of a conflict or in a situation that might fall short of full-scale war. The more the West wants to conduct humanitarian aid and other such operations, the more we're going to be drawn into "armed social work." And political realities (even if we don't agree with them) indicate that such aid operations will remain at their current levels if not rise in the next decade or two. We may just have to agree to disagree here, which is fine. I'm not in favor of an "all COIN" Army, but I also don't want to see us continually relearning the same lessons at a higher cost each time we roll out of the gate.
__________________
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare." T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War |
|
|
|
|
|
|
#72 | |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 3,947
|
Quote:
Personally I have very clear ideas about what forms a military mission and what does not. This does not preclude the use of Armed Forces in humanitarian assistance, as concerns the saving of life, or the prevention of harm. It does excluded any form of social or welfare service, and especially anything to do with religion or education.
__________________
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
|
|
|
|
|
|
#73 | ||||
|
Council Member
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Florida
Posts: 8,058
|
Wilf:
Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
#74 |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Honolulu, Hawaii
Posts: 1,120
|
Haven't we had this discussion before?
Did we learn anything new?Just thinking that some of the SWC discussion recently has been running in circles. Seems like we need a new COL Gentile to come in here and at least challenge the two-sided orthodoxy (COIN vs. MCO) in a unique and stimulating way other than saying we just need to do both.
__________________
Who is Cavguy? |
|
|
|
|
|
#75 | |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Honolulu, Hawaii
Posts: 1,120
|
BTW, some pithy humor over at Abu M related to the thread:
Quote:
__________________
Who is Cavguy? |
|
|
|
|
|
|
#76 | |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 3,947
|
Quote:
Add to that the perversion of the "Security mission" into a "nation building mission" and I think you have still think there is a lot left unresolved.
__________________
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
|
|
|
|
|
|
#77 |
|
Council Member
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Florida
Posts: 8,058
|
However, Wilf came in with "there's a lot left unresolved." True but there always will be as long as there more than two people in the debate.
What does not need resolution is that we do have to be able to do both (which may be why so many say that we need to do that...) and that's not nearly as hard as some seem to think. We have the doctrine (not perfect but adequate), we have smart dedicated kids that are willing for the most part to do more than they are asked -- they're also able to do much more. We have the equipment. All we need is the training piece and that's better than it's ever been and is improving. Now we just have to (a) await the QDR and see what it brings; and (b) see if Congress gets a lot smarter and more concerned about their Oaths than they seem to be... What's the problem?
|
|
|
|
|
|
#78 | |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Honolulu, Hawaii
Posts: 1,120
|
Quote:
I've stated this about ten times on other similar threads but it bears repeating to your observations. Much of what COL G is saying is true, but what I am about to say is true as well - Our TRAINING and OPERATIONAL forces are near 100% focused on COIN/SO/SFA. That is because the Army is fully committed to OIF and OEF for at least the next 2 years. It is irresponsible not to train them for the environments they are directly heading to. Our LEADER DEVELOPMENT and EDUCATION has not significantly changed. Tweaked, but not changed. You can find numerous observations here on SWJ and on BCKS commenting about that our schoolhouses are generally focused on HIC. I have a paper which will be published in a few months outlining the whole case, but the bottom line is that COIN is not currently mandated or integrated as a subject of military professional education. The educational system is a greater threat because right now it leads us to a repeat of our 1973-2003 educational deficit for this spectrum of war. So in a sense, Gian is right, but so are many of the COIN crowd in stating that the institution has not changed for the long term. As soon as we have non-deploying combat brigades, HIC skills will resurrect. Niel
__________________
Who is Cavguy? |
|
|
|
|
|
|
#79 |
|
Council Member
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Rocky Mtn Empire
Posts: 471
|
Anybody else find irony in the fact that "antiwar.com" is defending MCO?
|
|
|
|
|
|
#80 | |
|
Moderator
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Montana
Posts: 3,074
|
Quote:
![]() I look at it from the historical standpoint, and it's discouraging to note that the bi-polar orthodoxy has existed in American military history more or less from the beginning. It's also discouraging to note that many truly adaptable leaders within the army have been historically ignored or marginalized in many cases (I'm thinking mainly of the post-Civil War period, which was a great testing ground to see who could make the transition from MCO to what was effectively COIN, although there are other periods that certainly deserve study). One good first step would involve overhauling the personnel system. Until we scrap that draft-age relic I'd say we're stuck tilting at the same windmills to at least some degree.
__________________
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare." T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War |
|
|
|
|
![]() |
| Bookmarks |
| Thread Tools | |
| Display Modes | |
|
|
Similar Threads
|
||||
| Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
| Inside the Surge: 1-5 Cavalry in Ameriyah | SWJED | Who is Fighting Whom? How and Why? | 0 | 10-27-2008 01:40 PM |