True and has been since the 1916 Easter Uprising. It's not counter-intuitive at all. That's actually pretty well covered, and widely recognised.Originally Posted by Marauder Doc
On COIN/HIC procurement
Since it was mentioned earlier, I was just going to jump in here with something crazy in regards to procuring equipment for HIC and COIN.
It seems to me that, contrary to what would be intuitive, armor requirements for COIN work can exceed those of a HIC.
Why were we able to conduct OIF I with so many units in unarmored vehicles, or lacking SAPI plates, then all of a sudden when we settle in to the nation building effort personal and vehicle armor become a huge issue? Why does the MBT continue to have a valuable role in stabilization operations, long after conventional wisdom would suggest that its use had reached the point of diminishing returns?
In HIC, you have options, concealment and mobility play a huge role in force protection. You can blitz the enemy and get inside their OODA loop with overwhelming force. But in Phase IV, where do you move to? Where do you hide your guys when you are guarding a conference of tribal elders? In a dumpster? Your stuck, exposed, whether it's at a checkpoint or a reconstruction project, everyone knows where it is, and that they might get a chance to shoot at Americans if they show up.
For COIN I want armored everything, Abrams with TUSK upgrades, up armored HMMWV, the Strykers can come play if they've got their cages on, etc. They have to be able to shrug off a ton of hurt when they're stuck watching an intersection.
For HIC I want light and deployable. Recent HICs have been absurdly fast, measured in days. If we wanna play in those we gotta be able to get in there fast. Not maritime prepositioning fast, C-17 fast. Or else it'll be settled in the UN before we even get there.
True and has been since the 1916 Easter Uprising. It's not counter-intuitive at all. That's actually pretty well covered, and widely recognised.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Welcome to the board.
Glad to have you. it would be nice if you'd go to this LINK and add a little about yourself to that thread.Exceed is perhaps not a good word but there's no denying the benefit if not 'need.'It became a huge issue because we had lost our COIN experience and knowledge and blundered about for 18 months, thus giving the opponents time to mount an intensive campaign of attacking with the tons of explosives that Saddam had deliberately scattered all over the nation for just that purpose. Those conditions may or may not ever prevail again.Why were we able to conduct OIF I with so many units in unarmored vehicles, or lacking SAPI plates, then all of a sudden when we settle in to the nation building effort personal and vehicle armor become a huge issue? Why does the MBT continue to have a valuable role in stabilization operations, long after conventional wisdom would suggest that its use had reached the point of diminishing returns?You may want to consider what real value the Tanks offer in an urban setting and contemplate their vulnerability in a city before you spend $5M a pop to buy a bunch. I'd also suggest that you take, there are many better vehicles -- the up armored HMMWV exists because it was relatively cheap and rapidly available, not because it's good for much of anything. There are a great many far better vehicles available. I'd also ask why you want to watch an intersection.For COIN I want armored everything, Abrams with TUSK upgrades, up armored HMMWV, the Strykers can come play if they've got their cages on, etc. They have to be able to shrug off a ton of hurt when they're stuck watching an intersection.You might also consider that the recent HIC involving the West (or Russia) have also been a major state attacking a comparatively fifth rate opponent instead of a near peer. Desert Storm was a total aberration; OIF 1 was close to being the same and the Russian incursion in Georgia was a political effort; a great FSB operation that just happened to use the Russian Armed Forces. Those are all very poor examples to use in determining what future HIC will be like. Lebanon in 2006 is probably closer than any of the others I cited.For HIC I want light and deployable. Recent HICs have been absurdly fast, measured in days. If we wanna play in those we gotta be able to get in there fast. Not maritime prepositioning fast, C-17 fast. Or else it'll be settled in the UN before we even get there.
Great Caeser's Ghost!
COL Gentile interview at Antiwar.com, by Crom!To the rest of the world, the mainstream media included, Col. Gentile is kind of a ghost. Persistent and clever, sometimes noisome and everywhere. That he might remain invisible to people inside-the-beltway is only a problem in that information gatekeepers like the aforementioned journo, craft narratives about the war — about future wars — without the consistent insight of the contrary view. As consumers of the news — as Americans — we should demand the whole scoop.
http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2...nterfeit-coin/
Last edited by Backwards Observer; 05-07-2009 at 08:32 AM. Reason: syntax or something
I don't think Col Gentile could have said it better. I don't agree with all he says, but Gian Gentile, stands as a "antidote" to a lot of the verbiage and silliness the current myopic infatuations pumped to us by those who have suddenly discovered that not all enemies ride around in tanks.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
In what may fit into your discussion here I ran into last night some back and forth between/among the few highly educated (by inference) intellectuals among the so-called Pakhtun "movement" wherein their "core" model, revolving around religionIslam, is uniquely debated among themselves. Will try to clip some key comments/disussions and also try to cite the total discussion citation for you, but bearing in mind that as with SWJ when dealing with same type format (exactly) of Global Hujra Online in recent write ups by me I have goofed and overlooked fact that at present I am the "only" non-Muslim, non-Pakhtun member of that site and my research and so-called total access does not always equate to you guys getting direct access to full articles I read and then try to citation-paste up for you.
I think it was a great article. I don't agree with several points but it seems consistent with Col. Gentiles views and like it or not he has a point. I think the tension between LIC and HIC camps is funny. The number of HIC operators is much larger and LIC/COIN is still struggling for a foothold in the Army. So, a narrative that LIC is preeminent is a bit silly. Growing perhaps but top dog I don't think so.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
Dialogue about how to pacify Islam among Pakhtuns
...but that isn't the tension. The tension between the Nagl mob, and Gentile, my friend Doug MacGregor, me and probably a few others (Ken White?) is the perversion of the military mission, by moving towards the nation building bit. To quote:
John Nagl, author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, is so cocksure of the efficacy of Army combat power that he believes it will have the ability not only to dominate land warfare in general but also to ‘change entire societies’… We are organizing ourselves around the principle of nationbuilding rather than fighting.
Fighting should be the foundation of an Army. Anything that detracts from that is dangerous and stupid.
For example, instead of having Intelligence and Recon teams, you have "Human Terrain Teams".
Large portions (not all) of the US COIN-club approach is "history free." They know it exists, but ignore the bits they want to invent and change the bits they need as evidence. What is more a great many of the COIN clubs' assertions about the future, past and present are wonderfully evidence free.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
And the same can be said of the "anti-COIN" crowd. Point by point. Too many of them remain locked in a Cold War view of the world, obsessed with mythical peer competitors and the notion that conflicts will only occur on their terms. In many ways they're quite similar to the more radical COIN advocates: both are convinced that they've seen the shining light of future conflict truth.
MacGregor's an interesting guy, but some of his ideas are just as flawed as the COINistas' concepts. I tend to consider both groups to be historical distortionists at best.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
In Re to Gentile Article and discussion
Gian is an important public voice and good friend...
Unlike some, I would guess Gian is somewhat ill at ease with the elevated public profile... I do know that his position is based solely on what he views as the need for intellectual honesty (for that matter John Nagl is cut from the same cloth) and he has always been a bulldog when he feels that principle is being subjugated...
However intellectual honesty is in the eyes of the beholder and like several other folks I don't agree with Gian on some things, especially the notion that COINistas are taking over the DoD... I'd argue quite the opposite...
A healthy portion of serving officers accept the COIN doctrine for what it is... a helpful tool for adjusting their mindset/aimpoint in the missions they are currently DIRECTED to execute... I don't for a minute think the majority view COIN/LIC as end all be all... I know for a fact that senior officers charged with preparing forces have already begun to work through how to bring the training centers back to full-spectrum...
However, and this is where Nagl is correct, there is a fight to be won today... and if our training centers aimpoint is directed elsewhere it would amount to criminal negligence...
That's all I have to say about that...
Anyone else under the impression that the author had a crush on Gian... he prose was very heroic
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
...but who are the anti-COIN crowd? No one I know says "we don't do COIN." What I'm against is the "nation building, armed social work," stuff. Securing a population is warfare. It is based in fighting skill.
Interesting and extremely smart. I strongly disagree with him on many things, but I also agree on a lot. Doug and I are like tracks versus wheels (Doug is tracks!)MacGregor's an interesting guy, but some of his ideas are just as flawed as the COINistas' concepts. I tend to consider both groups to be historical distortionists at best.
About 18 months ago I had a serving senior US Army officer come up to me and say "don't mention you are friend of Doug MacGregor. It'll damage your credibility." - so I now say it whenever I can!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Tragically, where we lack the greatest capacity currently is at the strategic senior leadership level to better understand that nature of the threats we face, how to modify our behavior as a nation to be more effective in an emerging world order, and how to best use our tremendous military capacity to enable all of the above.
Too much politics; too much shaping of perspectives of what "right" looks like by our long and successful Cold War efforts; too much confusion of what the attacks of 9/11 really signafied and therefore how to best respond; too much inertia in certain directions by multi-billion dollar procurement programs and those with vested interests in the same, etc.
If this were training, the OC probably needs to call for a pause, and circle everyone in for a little enroute AAR to talk about whats happening, actions, reactions, whats working and what isn't, etc prior to continuing on to the objective. The problem is that this is real, and there is not pause to regroup.
Our biggest areas in need of repair are at the Strategy and Policy level. Those repairs are underway, but are being accomplished in the same messy environment described above.
The military is ok. Not perfect, but powerful, flexible, adaptive, mission oriented and filled with an unprecedented quality of highly experienced personnel. We don't start wars and we don't end wars, but our lot will always be to wage wars in their midst, and deter them in between.
Between Gentile and Nagle lies the force we need; and simple economics, human nature and realm of political compromise will probably make it the force we shape. Not the best force for Irregular Warfare, nor the best force for high-end conventional warfare, but one prepared to take on either one and succeed. I don't worry much about the "war wagers" I know they'll come through.
I worry about the guys and gals in suits that are in the "war starting / war ending" business. Arming them with the best possible strategies and policies for the emerging world is what matters most toward determing where America stands 100 years from now, and how many brave young men and women were dedicated to that end.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
While no one may say "we don't do COIN" (although Dunlap has come mighty close, IMO), if you look at the historical record it is routinely allowed to drop off the face of the training and planning map. And then it comes up and bites us in the ass with surprising regularity.
My point has always been that you have to preserve the lessons and training for ALL levels and aspects of combat, not just the one you really WANT to do. The Army has historically done a poor job of that, and it's gotten worse in the aftermath of World War 2. I suppose that might be considered acceptable by some, but I wouldn't call it ideal.
And as for "armed social work," although a great deal of the writing on this is overblown and clogged with social science jargon, I think that it's overdue recognition of one of the roles that an army often HAS to assume in the aftermath of a conflict or in a situation that might fall short of full-scale war. The more the West wants to conduct humanitarian aid and other such operations, the more we're going to be drawn into "armed social work." And political realities (even if we don't agree with them) indicate that such aid operations will remain at their current levels if not rise in the next decade or two.
We may just have to agree to disagree here, which is fine. I'm not in favor of an "all COIN" Army, but I also don't want to see us continually relearning the same lessons at a higher cost each time we roll out of the gate.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Concur. Why the US neglected COIN is a fascinating question. It was gross professional negligence by any standard.
Personally I have very clear ideas about what forms a military mission and what does not. This does not preclude the use of Armed Forces in humanitarian assistance, as concerns the saving of life, or the prevention of harm.
It does excluded any form of social or welfare service, and especially anything to do with religion or education.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Good comments...
Wilf:True on all counts.[B}Hacksaw:[/B]:"...The tension between the Nagl mob, and Gentile, my friend Doug MacGregor, me and probably a few others (Ken White?) is the perversion of the military mission, by moving towards the nation building bit."Yep. The training issue is the elephant -- and it need not be, train the basics better and go for outcomes instead of looking at minutia through 'Standards' and that will satisfy both camps. Hacksaw also said:However, and this is where Nagl is correct, there is a fight to be won today... and if our training centers aimpoint is directed elsewhere it would amount to criminal negligence...I don't think back to full spectrum will do it as I don't believe we were full spectrum in any of the TCs or Schools before -- or now. We're headed that way and that's good. For, as Bob's World says:I know for a fact that senior officers charged with preparing forces have already begun to work through how to bring the training centers back to full-spectrum...True. We've had this disagreement in this country for over 200 years -- but that's always been true. We come up with a flaky compromise and make it work. Or rather, the Troops make it work...Between Gentile and Nagle lies the force we need; and simple economics, human nature and realm of political compromise will probably make it the force we shape. Not the best force for Irregular Warfare, nor the best force for high-end conventional warfare, but one prepared to take on either one and succeed. I don't worry much about the "war wagers" I know they'll come through.
Haven't we had this discussion before?Did we learn anything new?
Just thinking that some of the SWC discussion recently has been running in circles. Seems like we need a new COL Gentile to come in here and at least challenge the two-sided orthodoxy (COIN vs. MCO) in a unique and stimulating way other than saying we just need to do both.
BTW, some pithy humor over at Abu M related to the thread:
P.S. It's not all sticks and stones for Gian, though. Granted, a site called "AntiWar.com" is probably not the best place to go for sober-minded discussion of military strategy. And this line was a peach:
It really shouldn’t be a surprise, that members of the elite news media — particularly the ones who don’t necessarily focus on a national security beat — fasten easily onto the conventional narrative and "move on" condescendingly, satisfied their knowledge is au courant and complete. ... To the rest of the world, the mainstream media included, Col. Gentile is kind of a ghost.
Uh, ma'am, Gian was the subject of a prominent article by elite news media journalist Yochi Dreazen (C '99) in the elite news media Wall Street Journal. I don't know a single defense policy journalist for a major U.S. news organization who doesn't know Gian either by name or personally. And for goodness sake, just do a Google News search for Gian's name. But when, I want to know, is regular Abu Muqawama commenter SNLII going to get the credit he deserves for coming up with the phrase "COINdinista"? Is there no justice, AntiWar.com?
To my mind there never was a COIN v Something else debate. I can't speak for COL Gentile, but I don't think anyone has ever spoken against COIN. They spoken about biasing training and resources so heavily towards COIN (Security Operations) that Combat Operations skills and resources suffer.Haven't we had this discussion before?
Just thinking that some of the SWC discussion recently has been running in circles. Seems like we need a new COL Gentile to come in here and at least challenge the two-sided orthodoxy (COIN vs. MCO) in a unique and stimulating way other than saying we just need to do both.
Add to that the perversion of the "Security mission" into a "nation building mission" and I think you have still think there is a lot left unresolved.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I was going to say "Reality is SO bo-o-ring..."
However, Wilf came in with "there's a lot left unresolved." True but there always will be as long as there more than two people in the debate.
What does not need resolution is that we do have to be able to do both (which may be why so many say that we need to do that...) and that's not nearly as hard as some seem to think. We have the doctrine (not perfect but adequate), we have smart dedicated kids that are willing for the most part to do more than they are asked -- they're also able to do much more. We have the equipment. All we need is the training piece and that's better than it's ever been and is improving.
Now we just have to (a) await the QDR and see what it brings; and (b) see if Congress gets a lot smarter and more concerned about their Oaths than they seem to be...
What's the problem?
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