McKiernan replaced

[Entropy]

Interesting development.

Replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

Reason given was "fresh thinking" and "fresh eyes" on the Afghanistan for a "new approach."

[Bob's World]

Perhaps the tide is finally turning. SOF surrendered senior leadership in what is largely a SOF operation to a series of highly qualified artillery shooters, tank drivers, and Infantrymen so that we could run up into the mountains and conduct a grand hunting expedition.

Time to drag SOF down out of the mountains and get senior SOF leadership in overall command of these operations to set the larger operational tones for the Campaigns. My first pick would have been a FID and COIN expert like LTG David Fridovich, but a McCrystal is a fine choice as well.

Will be interesting if this shift to "IW" will affect choices for service leadership as well as campaign leadership...The Air Force got its wakeup call when the Fighter Jock community got swept aside in favor of Gen Schwartz (A brilliant, and highly respected GO with solid SOF credentials).

I was briefing ADM Olson a few months ago on a separate topic, and asked him then about getting senior SOF generals into these Theater Command positions. He paused, and said calmly: "Frankly there isn't much appetite for that."

Looks like tastes have changed. That often happens as one grows up...

[wm]

Looks like a victory for light/SOF over heavy, which may well be the right answer in AF.

A more interesting question to me is whether this speaks to settling the conventional vs. IW "conflict" that some might characterize as the "Nagl-Gentile Debate" in other venues.

[MikeF]

Can we get the Seals back into the water?

Mike

[Bob's World]

Anyone who does not think that Secretary Gates is not deadly serious about IW is whistling past the proverbial cemetary.

In a shrinking budget/ POM cycle the services are scrambling to sort out how to hold to what they see as their core capabilities while addressing emerging requriements. Result so far has been thinnly disguised half-measures.

I understand the debate, and can't clearly stake out what right should look like, but regardless of right or wrong, this is going to happen. If the Generals try to slow roll the secretary like the Army staff tried to slowroll Shinseki, they will get run over.

[Bob's World]

Can we get the Seals back into the water?

Mike

Give them something to shoot and they'll be there in a second!

[IntelTrooper]

This is very good for Afghanistan. I know a lot of people who will be very happy to hear this news.

[selil]

I keep wondering how a force build up will look, if it will happen, if the mix will be substantially different, and how leadership will effect change in the "Afghanistan is like a poor version of Iraq" narrative being played in the press.

[BayonetBrant]

FYI - there is the inevitable criticism...

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009...n-afghanistan/

[Entropy]

So what on-the-ground changes can we expect to see in Afghanistan? I haven't followed Astan as closely as I used to, but it didn't seem like Gen. McKiernan was doing a terrible job, expecially since there were a lot of assets not under his direct command.

[jcustis]

I was briefing ADM Olson a few months ago on a separate topic, and asked him then about getting senior SOF generals into these Theater Command positions. He paused, and said calmly: "Frankly there isn't much appetite for that."

When he mentioned appetite, did he mean that not enough guys with the experience would want the job?

[Uboat509]

I have been doing some reading about Lt. Gen McChrystal. He is JSOC guy. He apparently did the minimum time as a Team Leader in SF before "moving on." Given his background I would not be surprised see a lot of emphasis on a kinetic approach. I would rather see an SF officer rather than a SOF officer moved into that command.

SFC W

[RJ]

I picked this off the Marine Corps Times today.

JACKSONVILLE, N.C. — Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is redesignating two of its companies as battalions, officials said in a news release.

During a ceremony Monday at Camp Lejeune, N.C., Companies A and B of the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group will be renamed 3rd and 4th Marine Special Operations battalions. The battalions will become the group’s two primary subordinate commands.

This redesignation is part of the command’s overall plan to standardize its four battalions, the release said.

Could this expansion of two MARSOC Companies to Battalions coming out of units that were designatied Marine Special Operations Advisor Group indicate the Marines are expanding their Advisory Role to do a lot more Training for special operations units in the Afgani Army?

There was a story in the NY Times on May 1 (front page and page A-10) about a Marine E-4 Cpl. and a E-3 Lance Cpl. advising a 30 Man Afgan Arimy platoon.

The firebase they are defending in the middle of a controlled Taliban region in Afganistan has beaten back 70 assualts in the past few months.

An interesting application of Marine frugality? Or an indication they are getting into the Advisory business big time. I found a copy of it in my local library. Tough duty and two gutsy young men.

[Bob's World]

When he mentioned appetite, did he mean that not enough guys with the experience would want the job?

quite clear the powers that be had not up to that point been willing to recognize the need for SOF leadership for such operations.

[Ken White]

quite clear the powers that be had not up to that point been willing to recognize the need for SOF leadership for such operations.

Based on what you said, ADM Olson could've taken over Afghanistan...

I'm with U Boat509. The DA stuff is over emphasized and it's as much about spaces and flags as it about missions and campaign success. Putting a SOF guy in there is no different that putting in a Light Infantry guy -- who would be a better choice than a Heavy Infantry Guy, a Tanker or an Artillerist.

I understand what you mean in the SEAL comment. Both your and their enthusiasm is to be commended (though I know a couple and they aren't that enthusiastic about a mission that is not their bag of worms...) but pinniped out of water and all that...

[wm]

The DA stuff is over emphasized and it's as much about spaces and flags as it about missions and campaign success. Putting a SOF guy in there is no different that putting in a Light Infantry guy -- who would be a better choice than a Heavy Infantry Guy, a Tanker or an Artillerist.

I make distinction betweem SOF and SF like UBoat. I don't think a SOF guy is just like a light infantry guy. I'd rather have light infantry work than some direct action covert ops.
I fear the change is reflective of "thinking" like the following by some of the newer senior "leadership" in the national capital region:
"We just need to get UBL and Mullah Omar. Then we can declare victory and bring the troops home. Look how quickly things turned around in IZ after the operation that took out Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. That's just the ticket for AF too."

[Mark O'Neill]

quite clear the powers that be had not up to that point been willing to recognize the need for SOF leadership for such operations.

clarify in an objective sense what you mean by 'SOF Leadership'. Compared to what?

Notwithstanding your claim for Fridovich (which I concur with), what is it that you think SOF leaders will bring that big Army guys (such as Petraeus, Odierno recently,and further back Kitson) cannot? One of the best COIN thinkers I have ever met was a SANDF/ SADF Brig Gen who was a 'conventional' para.

If we go by the recent record of SF in Iraq, at least whilst I was there, I am even less sure why we would think that SF leadership is necessarily a 'COIN winner'. An overwhelming focus on DA, with a trg focus on indigenous units that will execute further DA, does not equate to COIN 'best practice' - it is, at best, only an element of it. Fridovich (and Krawchuk) pointed this out in an article about OEF-P in JQF in '06. Your doctrine (FM 3-24) confirms this view.

If the SF are the solution, why is it that one of primary LOO - develop indigenous capacity, has, for the most part been filled by a 'heinz variety' of elements from across the US services, rather than SF elm? (For god's sake, in Basra during Charge of the Knights I met a Navy O6 nuclear dude on a MiTT task ...). Why is the JCISFA at Leavenworth largely a big army org?

Please don't take this the wrong way - I am not at all critical of the SF or its efforts, I am just trying to understand why your posts suggest that the recent appointment reflects a 'SF' thinking triumph rather than , perhaps, the appointment of a good GO who has the confidence of the Secretary and others.

Cheers

Mark

[wm]

An interesting read is the assignment histories/resumes of Petraeus, McChrystal, and Rodriguez. A lot of overlap/working with/for relationships among the three. For example: USMA Classmates, 3-75 Ranger Co Cdrs at same time; XVIII Corps G3 and XVIII Corps Chief of Staff (CoS); Acting CG 82d and ADC(O) 82d; back to back XVIII Corps CoS. While this may indicate that the "triumvirate" can get along, I worry about "group think."

[Pragmatic Thinker]

I picked this off the Marine Corps Times today.

JACKSONVILLE, N.C. — Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is redesignating two of its companies as battalions, officials said in a news release.

During a ceremony Monday at Camp Lejeune, N.C., Companies A and B of the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group will be renamed 3rd and 4th Marine Special Operations battalions. The battalions will become the group’s two primary subordinate commands.

This redesignation is part of the command’s overall plan to standardize its four battalions, the release said.

Could this expansion of two MARSOC Companies to Battalions coming out of units that were designatied Marine Special Operations Advisor Group indicate the Marines are expanding their Advisory Role to do a lot more Training for special operations units in the Afgani Army?

There was a story in the NY Times on May 1 (front page and page A-10) about a Marine E-4 Cpl. and a E-3 Lance Cpl. advising a 30 Man Afgan Arimy platoon.

The firebase they are defending in the middle of a controlled Taliban region in Afganistan has beaten back 70 assualts in the past few months.

An interesting application of Marine frugality? Or an indication they are getting into the Advisory business big time. I found a copy of it in my local library. Tough duty and two gutsy young men.

Perhaps this has more to do with the Marines desire to form a SOTF like organization more in line with the SF battalions? Anyone know what the Marines are planning along those lines? I heard rumor MARSOC wanted to form a SOTF in RC South for OEF but there was push back from the Army regarding endurance. Seems the Marines could only do two turns (rotations) for a SOTF and then would need to step down to recover and refit based on USMC deployment regulations? I don't have all the facts but recall hearing this back in March while in theater.

PT SENDS

[Pragmatic Thinker]

An interesting read is the assignment histories/resumes of Petraeus, McChrystal, and Rodriguez. A lot of overlap/working with/for relationships among the three. For example: USMA Classmates, 3-75 Ranger Co Cdrs at same time; XVIII Corps G3 and XVIII Corps Chief of Staff (CoS); Acting CG 82d and ADC(O) 82d; back to back XVIII Corps CoS. While this may indicate that the "triumvirate" can get along, I worry about "group think."

There seems to be a lot talk reference COIN/IW but my experiences tell me that McChrystal and Rodriguez are more counter-terrorist (CT) direct action focused vice "winning hearts and minds" and other COIN talents. I am not criticizing either of them because they are both brillant leaders but not sure COIN is going to fit into the plan short term. Perhaps we are going to see a summer of tough actions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. My fear is we lag so far behind the TB/AQ in IO that we are one or two bad CNN, Al Jazeera, and other media outlet cover stories from Karazai demanding a halt to offensive actions inside "his country". Currently, Karazai might just get re-elected but his political popularity seems to come more from his anti-US rhetoric than actual leadership. I am not confident this administration will stand the test of another Mogadishu-like incident inside or outside Pakistan. Also I am waiting to see what President Obama will do in the face of tough media criticism as bodies of women and children continue to stack-up on the evening news this summer. The TB/AQ get it and they will continue to use women and children as martyrdom shields and IO tools for their campaign. We continue to lag 48 hours behind the bad guys IO strategy and 24 hours behind Karazai to the point we look reactionary... The next few months will be interesting indeed...

PT SENDS