How HTS is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence
Military Review, Mar-Apr 09: All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence
Field-experienced warfighters and other experts in operational art have identified a range of weaknesses in military cultural training, education, and intelligence. Each “culture gap” has been painstakingly codified in military journals and official publications, most notably in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (COIN). Finding an effective and lasting solution to these shortcomings has framed the latest phase of an ongoing debate over how to meet operational cultural requirements.
One approach argues for comprehensive change. This method would take all the criticism of military cultural training and intelligence analysis to heart, applying recent doctrine to long-term knowledge and cultural terrain analysis programs. Forcing the services to view the cultural terrain as a co-equal element of military terrain—without abandoning core warfighting capabilities—would ensure the kind of all-inclusive focus on culture that the Army and Marine Corps applied to maneuver warfare theory in the 1990s.
The other side of the debate, represented by the advocates of the Human
Terrain System (HTS), calls for an immediate solution in the form of nonorganic personnel, new equipment, and the direct application of external academic support. HTS essentially adds a quick-fix layer of social science expertise and contracted reachback capability to combatant staffs. This “build a new empire” proposal is based on the assumption that staffs are generally incapable of solving complex cultural problems on their own.....
The thesis of this paper offers a false choice: Having HTS does not negatively impact the Army's ability to fix it's cultural awareness problem one iota. In fact, smart Army leaders should be able to integrate HTS into their cultural awareness improvement plans.
I suspect that there is a confusion going on as to the levels (and types) of cultural knowledge used by the various programs - HTS included.
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
I came across this on a totally unrelated site dedicated to the process of becoming a Marine Corps officer. Good reading that shows the knuckle-draggers are thinking. It also shows, I would argue, that we are seeing a new breed of hero to some degree. Bhatia died and that makes it somewhat more poignant, but still heroic:
Found this excellent story at MarineCorpsTimes.com about another academic who was killed while serving with the HTT.
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news...sman2_031509w/
--------------
After seven nights sleeping on the ground, and seven days without a hot shower, Master Sgt. Rachael Ridenour was beat.
But when the Black Hawk helicopter touched down at Forward Operating Base Salerno, Afghanistan, Ridenour and teammate Tom Garcia shouldered their packs and headed straight for the plywood hut with plywood furniture that served as the Human Terrain team's office. It was time to meet their new colleague.
They expected a jetlagged and lost-looking newbie. But the man in the button-down Oxford shirt who rose from behind a computer to shake their hands talked in overdrive. He used vocabulary that made clear he was no soldier. In the two days he’d spent waiting for them to return from their mission, Michael Bhatia told them, he’d already begun two research projects.
PART ONE
• 1 man’s odyssey from campus to combat
Heading back to the barracks, Ridenour and Garcia assessed the new guy.
“He needs to hurry up and get tired or it’s going to be a long year keeping up with him,” she said.
Last edited by jcustis; 03-17-2009 at 10:52 AM.
Purely for information, am I to understand that the following are indicative of the normall HTT mission, and can anyone tell me why they do not fall under the normal G2 staff and Provost Marshall responsibilities?
Garcia — was working to make himself an expert on the theft of goods from military convoys, interviewing drivers and others to figure out what was stolen, why and where....and...Ridenour — was working to become the team’s expert on the local economy, tracking the price Afghan locals paid for cooking oil, flour and other staples.
Additionally, from whom did these people receive their tasking? Someone other than G2?Meanwhile, Bhatia was zeroing in on his own line of research — gauging the insurgency by tracking attacks not on the military, but on local leaders who were combatants’ rivals for power.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
That's a really, really good question. I suspect I may know the answer
but since I haven't been there and am woefully out of date, I could be wrong so I'll let someone who's more current answer.
G-2
While I agree that answering these questions is a part of the core tasks of a G-2/S-2 section, the tactical (Div. and below) Military Intelligence corps is simply not aligned to collect and analyze the information to provide accurate answers. In Afghanistan, the CJTF-101 CJ2 and perhaps even the Brigade S-2s (depending on the Brigade) are almost entirely threat focused. Even within the focus on the enemy, they are largely oriented toward personality targeting and other of what I term distracters, such as foreign fighters and "the border". While the Division CJ-2 operates a small "Non-Lethal Analysis" section, I would be surprised if a single person in that shop ever talked to an Afghan other than at the Bagram Bazaar.
This isn't fundamentally a criticism of the CJ2, as they generally respond to the demands of their command and must work within the trained competencies of the personnel assigned as analysts and collectors and the MTOW. However, I am strongly critical of the general orientation of the MI Corps itself, looking largely away from the tactical fight at the Company level and below. The Division CJ2 section has hundreds of personnel on its Joint Manning Document, most of whom will never impact even the Battalion fight.
The most experienced HUMINT collectors are filling the CJ2X bureaucracy, managing Division and above requirements often meaningless to the actioning units and shuffling paperwork. Tens of all source analysts are dedicated to simply doubling the efforts of Battalion and Brigade analysts, only operating with less information and exposure to the fight.
All of this amounts to a large section of smart, talented and experienced personnel whom through their isolation in windowless rooms at Bagram will simply never understand the battlespace about whom they claim to be able to produce "intelligence." (sorry if I sound bitter) Thus leaving a massive void to be filled. The HTT is manned and missioned to be among the people, conducting the research on the ground where the vast majority of MI personnel will never go. Smart Battalions and Brigades have of course recognized this and have made the necessary adjustments to compensate without a HTT. Until Battalions and below are resourced with the personnel and training to answer these questions themselves or there is a realignment in the priorities of work among collectors and analysts, the void will remain for the HTT to fill.
Last edited by Meinertzhagen; 03-17-2009 at 06:43 PM. Reason: sp
You confirmed my worst fears but I do have a question
My perception was that possibly (or more likely probably) the Bn / Bde S2 crews were understaffed (as likely was the 4 while while the 1 and 3 were probably overstaffed...) and that aside from that adverse impactor, two other things hit. You confirmed that one is excessively large and perhaps misemployed higher level staffs and I sense that another is an insistence by the chain of command on focusing on the 'kinetic' * slash 'real warfighting' aspects as opposed to the human factors -- which is what we're supposed to be all about...
Is that sensing correct in your view?
* I'm beginning to dislike 'kinetic' almost as much as I disliked 'target servicing' and 'H&I Fires.'
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
These don't ordinarily sound like an HTT "core" mission, but they certainly would be peripheral to judging the Human Terrain "Map". Understand that the reporter could be completely off, but it sounds like this particular team go off into G2 territory, as you point out.
HTTs should co-exist, but not receive any "tasking" from G2. By my understanding, the HTT Leader should go directly to the commander to mutually work out his/her boundaries, and what kind of product he can/is tasked to produce.
If I were a Brigade Commander, I would have my HTT working on ways to accomplish my Brigade mission without applying military force/applying minimum military force. Kind of like a POLAD and staff. I'd also like them playing devil's advocate on my kinetic ops, having them research and lay out the consequences of those ops within the community at large.
In addition to their core mission of mapping who is related to whom, in what ways and how.
Well that's insightful in many ways because if we assume (and I am assuming because the practice does not support my assumption) that there is a Human Terrain to map, then the implication is that like a cartographic survey, specialist skills are required - BUT - that should be the limit of their employment.
Seems to me that, if the article is accurate, - and I do not assume it is, - then there are some serious question marks over what HTTs do and more critically, why experience military personnel with relevant and usable military skills (military police) and being farmed out to them.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I think the answer is because "experienced military personnel" will ignore any information that doesn't apply directly to them. Or see it only in ways that fit their own, rather narrow paradigm.
It's been my experience, in the care and feeding of American military personnel that they will a) stay in their lane and b) slap down anyone who appears to be out of their lane. This prevents anything approaching creativity and thought from happening.
This, I think, is a weakness of the military mind. Academics have roughly similar weaknesses, but in a different way. I think they'd make a good devil's advocate tool for a commander smart enough to use them as such.
And I don't think Human Terrain is a good term at all. More likely that Human Weather Map would be a better term.
Just thought I'd post that the last couple weeks I've been working in the vicinity of a highly effective HTT in Afghanistan. Frankly, they need to clone these guys, and send them with every Army Brigade.
They are severely depleted in strength, however, and no hiring of new HTT members in sight.
And no, they are not targeting the enemy, and yes, they work quite well with the BDE POLAD. CA and SPECOPs assets are basically doing "not much" in the Human Terrain category in the AO. At least relevant to this BDE.
Maybe the HTS is the answer to a real problem, hmmm?
Commander's Guide: Employing a Human Terrain Team in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom
AKO Log-In and BCKS registration required to access the link.
All been done before without Anthropologists
Just reading this - thanks to finding a cheap-copy, and a recommendation from Jedburgh.
It contains an extract from the Middle-East 1918 Intelligence Handbook,
The Arab Bureau was really a Tribal Department where all the information about tribes was recorded, and which also compiled and issued various analyses of tribes, genealogical tables, tribal maps, personalities and who's who and so on...
...so basically given that this is provably a military G2 area, and, as I have said, always has been, so why the HTT route?
...and as one reviewed notes here, HUMINT can be massively over played.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Isn't publishing the three shieks names and titles setting them up to be murdered by the terrorists?
On a related note
During WW II, Margaret Mead wrote a proposal for a two year training program to make soldiers into "regional ethnogeographic specialists". Does anyone know where I could locate an e-copy of it?
Thanks.
Van
I'd respond to that by stating that the military (G2, CA, SF) are focussing on other things, and have abdicated that mission. So the HTT occupies the vacuum.
Our local HTT does a pretty good job of evaluating the things that don't normally figure into the G2 "loop". They evaluate how ops affect public opinion and work to integrate US/Afghani "soft" issues, such as engagement with not only local leaders, but also some of the rank and file citizenry.
I recently attended an "Afghan Night" where the local leaders/citizens were able to mix fairly freely with ISAF soldiers in a secure environment. This event was conceptualized, researched and executed by the local HTT. In the 8th year of US presence here, it was the first time done, and was wildly popular with both the Afghans and the ISAF personnel.
The so-called "G2 channels" in the US army are primarily concerned with finding doors to kick in and people to shoot/arrest. HTT should be concerned with advising the Commander what the consequences are IF they kick in the door and arrest those people.
As an addendum, one of the problems with US G2, is that it has its own branch. As a non-MI officer who has spent 10 out of 26 years in an MI billet, I have found that good MI officers are fairly rare. And by "good" I mean the kind of well-grounded, outside the box thinkers who really understand their craft.
The best intelligence officers I've ever met were generally not MI branch, or were branch transfer types. Of course, the vagaries of the evaluation system and branch loyalty has tended to be rough on the careers of detailed-branch officers, and the current policy of excluding non-MI officers from MI billets has just about guaranteed something less than mediocrity within G2.
Not really. The bad guys know who they are and what they're doing.
120 mate. I do get it. My "so why the HTT route" is rhetorical.
From my perspective, the US using HTTs is addressing a problem that should not exist, IF someone had
- thought through the problem, from a real staff functions perspective
- understood the real history and enduring conditions of "small wars."
Clearly no one did and I think FM3-24 may not have dealt with it - long time since I bothered to look at it.
Point being, now you have HTTs there is never going to be a fix to the problem, and thus the problem will get worse. For example, making the differentiation, as you have articulated it, blows huge holes in the conceptual teaching of MI.
I am not saying HTTs are not good and brave men. They assuredly are, but that should not be seen as justifying their existence.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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