Bob, Some good points,
I did show it to several SF officers and NCOs - and you are right, in essence there is nothing new here - perhaps just some new applications by some folks that have not had to think of it as something they need to know. As a side note, war is ultimately about dealing with people (just a question of how you are dealing with them -coerce, compel, kill, aid, etc.), so the skills developed in SFA are I think fungible across warfare.
We have one SF SNCO at JCISFA, and one SF 06 who did allot of his time doing FID. What I did try and do with this document is make it user friendly to the processes that are already in use by GPF. This is also why we chose the tools for assessment methodology (see the fundamentals of SFA doc) that uses things like the war fighting functions, METT-TC, PMESII and DOTMLPF to do the assessment, it may not be a perfect fit, but it at least provides a familiar framework for seeing ourselves that we can use to help us see the FSF, and ultimately help the FSF see themselves - e.g. it facilitates dialogue.
On several of the other points, I think you are spot on, SFA needs to be seen in the context of policy OBJs - both those which are current, and those which may result from changes in conditions.
I heard that a fairly senior OSD official recently made a remark that got everyone's attention in the room, it was to the effect of a review of the alignment of policies, programs, resources to achieve objectives - while that may sound like common sense, it was received as I understand it as a WARNO. After those things have been aligned, perhaps the rational to address the authorities piece can be put into context, until then it will be ad-hoc, subject to annual review (paragraph exceptions to statute), etc. I'd mention that there are good reasons why those authorities may exist as they are, and I'm not totally comfortable with accepting the consequences of a permanent realignment of those authorities. However, the objectives may call for a more flexible exception, or in fact may need to be fundamentally changed. I'm not confident that any other agency will have the wherewithal to take on these missions, neither in the near term, or in the long run. They may be able to contract them out, but we've seen there are down sides to that as well. Ultimately, I think our pocket book is going to get allot smaller, and additional force structure in the USG to do this may be wishful thinking. This said, DOD may be the only agency capable and with the capacity to do so on any sizable scale - but we better make darn sure that the objective is worth the effort, because developmental activities are generally long term affairs.
As a side, I had the chance to listen to a former member of the HASC who asked the question of how we'll articulate how this matters to Congressional leaders who must in tun explain it their own political constituents, e.g. how does it get them re-elected? I think its an argument similar to that you made in that given the conditions we can use SFA to help partners (provided they are willing partners - which is a critical assumption) build security capacity such that they can extend security across their responsibilities, and possibly participate in solving regional issues as opposed to us having to intervene with U.S. forces to protect or advance U.S. interests. This should be a supporting part of a broader and more comprehensive effort by the USG and preferably with other partners, and it should support well articulated policy objectives both in a bilateral and regional sense or increased capabilities and capacities could have a destabilizing effect. I also mentioned that following a contingency, the risk of leaving a security vacuum exists, and building the security capacity of a legitimate authority helps secure the end game of the objective. There is also the issue of strengthening a given partner to offset a regional power which opposes U.S. interests. Ultimately the more effective we are in achieving our policy objectives, the more efficient we will be and the sooner the politicians can get back to focusing on the domestic issues which get them re-elected.
All of these things require a fairly pragmatic point of view, which is sometimes at odds with the desired efficiencies of the moment (as opposed to creating effective solutions) which characterize our political system (where you sit is where you stand -and our 2/4/8 year cycles). In sum I think we are going to have to work hard to convince (some of) our elected leaders that this is a useful capability to fund - it comes back to helping them understand how this keeps them elected (that is not bad, it just means they are doing the job they were elected to do). As I said earlier, I believe its enhancing to our other skills, as war is waged by people - which should make it easier to convince ourselves that these individual skills are worth while to cultivate.
I think you make some good points about the capabilities in SF and the broader force, but I think there is room to grow on both sides. Many of these functional requirements are resident in one and not the other, and neither may not have sufficient capabilities and capacities in and of themselves. As such, the conditions and objectives should drive the requirements, and the capabilities should be tailored as such. This requires a degree of flexibility that may require us to leave our comfort zone, and recognize that although the organizations may feel ad-hoc (meaning they may not be standing organizations), they can be built around familiar designs, and based on DOTMLPF processes which produce the individual skills required to do this right. While some may argue that we are getting along fine in addressing this, I'd ask how do we know, and what are we basing our level of required effectiveness? How much of our perceived success is by virtue of mass and other conditions, and how much of it due to our effectiveness?
I raised the issue on the thread about McChrystal being put in charge of Afghanistan if we are going to be able to provide him with the right capabilities in the right amounts to support his preferred operational approach, if not he may have to succeed in spite of our (big USG) support rather then being able to benefit from it. I'm just not sure we (big USG we) are willing to generate the right capabilities in sufficient capacities to do what may be required - I'm not sure we have even really decided how much the objective there is worth to us, or that we have the right objective in mind.
Well I've departed a bit from the original thrust of the discussion and perhaps the issue is can we (and should we) generate the capabilities (this includes programs, policies and authorities as well as resources) needed by operational requirements to meet their requirements?
Best Regards, Rob
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