Plan,Organize and Train for SFA

[reed11b]

Rob mate,


I understand the need to be sensitive to cultural impedimenta, but the British Empire went around the world training and raising some pretty good armies all based on how the British Army, was trained, equipped and organised. To my mind, the British saw little or no difference between training and raising local forces and their own. The Romans took a similar view.

Wilf,
Did the Brits or Romans raise forces to act independently or to supplement there own forces in a particular role? The weakness I see in US SFA is that we create "teeth" units that rely on American logistical, communication and fire support. We need to be able to create teams that can train to use indiginous resources or be prepared to shell out a lot more $$ in defense aid. I would opt for option one myself.
Reed11b

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Mike - please feel free to pass along anything useful, I hope we'll have something a little better by about the end of June in one complete thought.

Its interesting you bring up rapport and relationships, one thing we are trying to get across to unit commanders is that their advisors are are a primary means of influence and rapport building. I think trust comes from matching actions to narrative (doing what you say and being there when you are needed), and being able empathize or at least share and understand a perspective. It does not necessarily mean you have identical objectives, but that everyone should know where you basically stand and what your reactions will be.

On the issue of my take on the differences between FID and SFA - I'll give you my take on SFA in that it is the capability to conduct the fundamental development tasks of OTERA (Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild, Advise) for the purpose of building sustainable capability and capacity in FSF. The conditions and objectives may characterize it as FID or to some other policy end - as conditions and objectives change, then the characterization may change.

Its worth considering that once a capability and capacity is built we may have little influence over how it is employed, so its a good idea to consider the developmental objectives in a broader sense then just a bilateral one.

SFA ends when that desired capability or capacity is achieved, but if new capabilities or capacities are desired or required then the tasks of OTERA are undertaken again. I don't see them as competing or contradictory, but as complimentary. It simply provides us a framework to group these FSF development activities to achieve a policy end.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

One thing worth including in the document may be that of relative combat power, but with a twist on development. In one of the case study interviews the BSB SPO had referred to the transition teams as IBUs i.e. "Itty Bitty Units". At the time I had only thought of it in the context of his logistical problem and a concept of support for the outlying small units he had to sustain.

Recently though it popped up in a different context, a CDR saw the advisor teams he inherited as a supply burden and did not see them as a tool of influence or as a means to support the development of the FSF. Basically what he saw was 11 guys who he had to be responsible for and who he did not fully understand how to employ.

This got me thinking about how might a unit CDR "sees" his advisor teams. We have concepts for who "fights" what and for what is battle tracked - they are built around echelons. BDEs fight/employ & track companies, BNs fight/employ & track platoons and companies fight/employ & track squads and sections and while I know digital tracking allows a different perspective, in terms of admin such as senior rating, readiness, QTBs, etc. we are still conditioned to think along the two levels down model.

While in terms of "combat power" or the ability to accomplish a tactical task like seize, clear, defend, an advisor team is something akin to a section or a squad, in terms of the adviosr team's potential to influence and develop a FSF it may be the most important unit in the BDE CDR's organization, and as such the selection criteria for his advisor teams based on individual capabilities may be the most important organizational decision the CDR makes. This requires the CDR have an understanding of the fundamentals of SFA, and at least wrt to the LOE that includes developing sustainable capability and capacity in the FSF, that mission success equates to that partner's ability to generate, employ and sustain.

I think that until CDRs understand that, the advisor teams will often still be seen and resourced as something they "have to support" vs. "the organization that can best facillitate mission accomplishment" wrt to supporting the development of the FSF. This is true regardless I think no matter if a BDE falls in on advisor teams, or if it is organic to the BN. This is not a question of who owns what, but of relative value based on understanding the requirements of the mission. Providing guidance and action that clearly elevates the importance of the advisor team when conducting this mission to at least the level of the rifle/tank company/troop will probably help the CDR get the most out of his advisor elements. I know that in some cases CDRs have come to this conclusion in mid tour, but understanding it during planning, training and organization could put the unit on a better operational footing from day 1 in country.

Best, Rob

[John T. Fishel]

in such a way that it becomes clear why John Nagl came up with his notion of and advisor corps. That, IMO, is a bridge too far. So, the practical question is how we get the BDE commander to SEE his advisor teams as his primary maneuver force. My answer would be selection of the BDE commander.

A commander of a BDE that will be employeing advisor teams should be selected individually from among the eleigibles by an interview with the senior operational commander. In Iraq, the interviews would have been conducted under my concept by Petraeus and Odierno with, my preference, Crocker participating. Send home the guys who don't pass and give them their brigades in some other environment - with a letter in their 201 file explaining that they showed no aptitude for the SFA mission.

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

Send home the guys who don't pass and give them their brigades in some other environment - with a letter in their 201 file explaining that they showed no aptitude for the SFA mission.

You know, John, that sounds suspiciously close to a "selection by merit" argument - totally antithetical to the HR policies that bring stability to any Big Organization (i.e. Time Served). I mean, seriously, someone might think that One Size doesn't Fit All if this radical idea of yours caught on !

Cheers,

Marc

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Boot,

I do know that a team of Marines has recently returned from SOUTHCOM AOR in which they were carrying out a true FID mission and weren't MARSOC. SF doesn't have a patent on this.

Boot, I don't think there are too many "experienced" SF guys who claims that SF has a patent on FID. Our unique capability is unconventional warfare, and that is why we're task organized the way we are. Of course every organization strives to stay relevant, so during the counterinsurgency era of the 60's SF also (along with the Marines, Big Army and the other services) focused heavily on FID. SF was unique in that its personnel knew how to fight as insurgents. SF generally had a better understanding of the counterinsurgent fight and what the centers of gravity were. They did not have a unique capability for training host nation forces, although I would argue their interpersonal and intercultural skills and maturity did make them a force of choice in many cases. I think you would agree there is a difference dynamic taking place when the host nation forces are interfacing with a mature Soldier who has been vetted for this type of work (and likes it), than when they're training up with a pick up team of young soldiers/marines who may not really care. I have seen this too many times, and like most failures in the military these were examples of leadership failures.

Getting back to reality, anyone with some training can train host nation forces. It obviously makes more sense to train an experienced and technical expert on how to be a trainer, than sending a SF guy to armor or artillery school for example. However, all the training in the world can't make the trainer care about the host nation personnel. In my opinion, that is one of the biggest differences I see between SF and conventional forces. SF guys generaly care about their counterparts and that shows in so many ways, and that respect is returned in kind. Also, SF did produce the most relevant FID/COIN doctrine based on years of lessons learned while the services tended to ignore FID in the 80s and beyond, so there is a little rub when conventional folks "invented" something new without consulting those who already had a great depth of knowledge. Once again the arrogance of the big Army stroke again.

[John T. Fishel]

Yeah, Marc, it is selection by merit (as BTW) is selection for command. But this command is a peculiar kind of job and any old COL who has been command selected may or may not have the aptitude to really work in SFA. As you well know, the BCT commander must interact with his HN counterpart. So, he's not just working with US forces but also with HN forces and his SFA teams are really the pointy end of his spear.

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

Hi John,

Yeah, Marc, it is selection by merit (as BTW) is selection for command. But this command is a peculiar kind of job and any old COL who has been command selected may or may not have the aptitude to really work in SFA. As you well know, the BCT commander must interact with his HN counterpart. So, he's not just working with US forces but also with HN forces and his SFA teams are really the pointy end of his spear.

Sarcasm just doesn't come across well in online venues . Honestly, I think the process you outlined would work very nicely - I'm just not that sanguine about it ever getting past the bureaucratic mindset unless there was some way to institutionally "regularize" it (aka stick it in a box... maybe as an MOS or some such, but that gets us into other discussions...).

I think Bill hit the nail on the head when he talked about SF guys "caring" about the people they work with. Obviously "empathy" and the ability to listen become crucial skills for any BCT/BDE commander in an SFA setting, but there is also another, probably more important, skill which might be called "cutting through the cultural c$@p" on both sides and getting to the lived reality core of the problem.

Let me go back to something you said in the same post

So, the practical question is how we get the BDE commander to SEE his advisor teams as his primary maneuver force. My answer would be selection of the BDE commander.

It strikes me, possibly 'cause I'm working on that Shrivenham paper now, that there are two answers to this. One, which you suggest, which is careful selection of the commander. The other lies in reworking the rhetorical placement of advisor teams (BTW, Kilcullen does a good job of this in Accidental Guerillas (p 270-271) using a rhetoric of ROI). I'll admit, there are some serious dangers with that one as well .

Okay, back to work...

Cheers,

Marc

[Ken White]

I think you would agree there is a difference dynamic taking place when the host nation forces are interfacing with a mature Soldier who has been vetted for this type of work (and likes it),

I wholeheartedly agree with that. I've also noticed a number of times that one can occasionally end up with someone who isn't all that mature and / or who doesn't like that kind of interface that much...

...However, all the training in the world can't make the trainer care about the host nation personnel. In my opinion, that is one of the biggest differences I see between SF and conventional forces. SF guys generaly care about their counterparts and that shows in so many ways, and that respect is returned in kind.

I also agree with that -- generally. I'll also note that I've seen a number of 'conventional' guys who cared every bit as much and some SF guys who couldn't stand their counterparts...

... Also, SF did produce the most relevant FID/COIN doctrine based on years of lessons learned while the services tended to ignore FID in the 80s and beyond, so there is a little rub when conventional folks "invented" something new without consulting those who already had a great depth of knowledge. Once again the arrogance of the big Army stroke again.

Agree; agree; disagree, disagree.

The Army mostly screwed up big time on COIN and FID from '75 to '01, no question and they did so in spite of a number of of folks on SBH and throughout the Army who told them doing so was dumb. However, while SF did keep a light in the window -- they also got fragmented into non SF pursuits as well, all in quest of flags and spaces...

IOW, what you said is correct but that's only part of the story.

Who is it that you think is claiming they have "invented" something new without consulting those who had a great deal of knowledge?

If you mean the 'arrogance' of ignoring UW / FID by the big Army folks; was it arrogance or a dumb attempt to influence national policy (to wit: to avoid the messy dirty, politically disadvantageous stuff that is COIN and FID. Those disadvantages apply regardless of who is the pratctitioner) that was bound to fail? If something else, what arrogance?

[Old Eagle]

Most of us on this site won’t argue the point that SF, because they are trained to do FID and because they used to be able to practice during JCETs, have a corner on the advisory skill set. Got it. BUT their functional expertise (capability) and the size of the SF force (capacity) make it mandatory that big Army get involved in the game. So however much better the special guys are than the rest of us, is moot. The rest of us have to chip in and perform the SFA mission. Similarly, other expert capabilities – FAO, CA, etc – are excellent, but simply don’t have the capacity.

Yeah, big Army shied away from FID after Vietnam, but little flames were still nurtured. John T and I took a trip down memory lane off line, recalling other notable efforts during the 80s and 90s.

Now we all need to get serious about SFA and cooperate to succeed. Part of the reason we got to where we are in the movie is that we allowed walls to be built around little rice bowls, and now we’re paying the price. SF stepped up to the plate and took responsibility for FID and made it “special”. Big Army, for its part was pleased as punch to let that happen, so we could go off to the NTC and 2-up and 1-back ourselves to death. Similarly, security assistance and security cooperation were walled off, surrounded by a Byzantine bureaucracy and procedures that were aimed more at propagating more bureaucracy than accomplishing the mission on the ground.

In Iraq and Afghanistan we were suddenly, but not surprisingly, confronted with SFA requirements that outstripped SF and SA cylinders of excellence. We simply need to do this better. Sooner rather than later. Hard to believe we’ve wasted this much time already.

@ Bob – Yep need legal and programmatic changes to make longer term planning possible. Critical.

@ Rob – I think that SFA will be politically sustainable if ‘splained correctly. The U.S. does not have a force large enough to protect ourselves unilaterally. By working by, with and through our partners, we can do a lot more with restricted resources. First, we have to help develop those partners. That was also kinda the tone of Nixon’s Guam Doctrine.