SFA capability is rooted in Individual Talent (part 1)

[Bob's World]

Sir,

Great post highlighting the challenges in training and mindset, and the failure of the AC/RC guys to build rapport and advise.

I think we are saying the same thing, except from my view the last few years, I have not seen SF actively seeking to shape the GPF advisory mission. We were forced to assign GPF soldiers as advisers in OIF and OEF because there aren't enough specifically trained and selected guys in your branch to do so.

So the Army's first attempt was "Well, let's deploy the USAR Training Divisions as advisers, since it's a training mission." That was a disaster, as these great individuals were prepared to run basic training for US kids, not mentor Iraqi battalions. Then we created Ft. Riley, taking an Armored BDE (!) to run advisory training. Where was SWC? Hell if I know. It would seem a no brainer that if SF couldn't fill the adviser demand, they should have at least run the training, since it's been the core competency of SF for the last three decades or so. But we didn't for whatever reasons. Same story for recent doctrine.

In the two years I have worked at CAC as the ops officer for COIN, I have seen little interest from the US Army SF community in GPF efforts to get better at this. I can count on one hand the number of times anyone working for USASOC (excepting COL Maxwell/USASOC G3) has contacted the COIN center here about anything we are doing. Sure they attend the occasional conference, but mostly I have received the impression that most in SF just wished we would go away, usually muttering comments about "amateurs". People are doing the best they can with imperfect resources and less background to make this work. As a very personal observation, SF seems to have schadenfreude over the whole GPF circus with building TT's. My perception is that they haven't been a big part of the solution.

SOCOM is a different story though, so is JSOU. They have been actively plugged into what has been developing. Just interesting to me.

There's a big study coming up about SOF/GPF integration. I hope it produces something.

So in a way, the SF have failed to advise/influence the GPF. Kind of reverse of what happened with your AC/RC experience.

You are spot-on that USSOCOM has not shaped the development of the conventional force as it has ventured into what has traditionally been SF territory. SOCOM is not the Executive Agent for COIN, as an example, and as a rather small HQ with a rather large mission, has been reasonably reluctant to take on full proponency for several DOD-wide programs with strong SOF roots. We should have taken on a tailored level of proponency, and shaped the portion of the doctrine that defined the context and spirit of these operations, allowing the conventional force to pick up from there.

Similarly, after being "burdened" with a couple of rotations of raising and training the Afghan National Army, SF escaped that mission and SOF forces in theater all headed out to focus on sexier roles. In retrospect, the mission essential tasks in Afghanistan were not on the border with Pakistan, they were in mentoring the development of the governance of the country. There should have been a more appropriate balancing between what was important, and what was sexy. No one wants to be back at a school house or Gov't office when his brothers are out running combat operations.

Point being, that SOCOM absolutely does not have a corner on "smart" and has made as many mistakes in approaching this conflict as any other HQ.


But we start this war from where we are right now. How we got here is interesting, but not worth agonizing over. We need to, in my opinion, have two main priorities in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

1. Enhance HN governance legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, and work equally hard to stop any activity or policy that tends to create a perception of US legitimacy over the same.

2. Focus on enabling "goodness" of governance over creating "effectiveness" of governance. (the first being rooted in the perception of the populace, the latter being something measured by us outsiders).

This new focus would drive a very different perspective for the employment of all elements of US power in both AORs. A return of true and full authority to the HN (I.e., We only do what they ask us to do or approve, all detainees are HN detainees, and if asked to leave we leave); no US unilateral operations; etc.

Bottom-line: In order to achieve true and positive change, we must first relinquish control. The problem is that Cold War strategy was rooted in controlling others, so it has become our paradigm. Time to move on.