"...because the militant/insurgent/terrorist is, in essence, a political-soldier (whereas in contrast the American soldier is just that, a soldier)."
I agree with his entire comment but that senetence is key. It's true and we should never, ever forget that -- as we sometimes try to do...

It is also unlikely to change. His comments concerning conventional versus COIN thinking are correct with respect to most but not all US Forces and I suspect that will always be true; we are probably not as a collective psychologically willing to adapt to the political and public face / relations efforts needed for us to essentially fight the Insurgent on his own terms.

I believe that efforts to attempt such adaptation for most of the force will actually be very counterproductive. One should also remember that not all fights against non-state actors or seeming insurgents are actually counterinsurgencies...

The Slide itself illustrates a conundrum that is not at likely to be addressed in the near term. I do not say rectified because I do not think that the dichotomy is really a problem or that we need to adapt our action to mirror the Insurgent model. We absolutely need to be aware of the difference and to develop counters for it but aside from Special Forces (not SOF in their entirety) no significant 'adaptation' is required of most units. What's required is simply acknowledgment of the difference and the development of strategic and operational flexibility to counter that. What we lack at this time is that flexibility and that is difficult to develop in a large bureaucracy. Difficult is not impossible.

Best way to fight a fire is with a suppressive agent, a different compound or process that deprives the fire of the oxygen it requires. Another fire, a backfire will sometimes allow a temporary gain but it will rarely extinguish the original fire.

Of course, good firebreaks and fire prevention are vastly superior to and easier than fire fighting.