Hi Folks,
First off, a great discussion even if it's not exactly what Rob was hoping for.
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Slap, I would certainly agree that that should certainly have a place in it.
I do, however, think that it is crucial, at least for me since I have a tendency to go from A to T without bothering with intermediate steps, to lay out exactly how I view these things. First, I view Grand Strategy as operating in a global environment. Ideally, it should also have some decent, long term (50-100 year) goals that can best be described as Philosophical - "Principles" as it were which are (hopefully) shared by both the military and the political spheres and, ideally, with the majority of the population.
Second, threat categorization, at the Grand Strategic level, needs to distinguish between competitors and opponents. Competitors agree to play by (very) roughly the same rules, while opponents reject those rules. NB: I am talking about rules of competition, not Grand Strategic goals.
Third, and again on the threat categorization level (i.e. "perception"), since no one will agree to play be exactly the same rules (otherwise we could just resolve conflicts via poker games), we all have to be aware that most of the players involved in the Great Game are not nation states: some are supra-national NGOs (e.g. the Red Cross / Red Crescent, various religious organizations, trans-national corporations, etc.), some are regional or local [sub-national] NGOs, while some are communities of interest / practice. What this means is that the de facto reality of NGOs (in the broad sense) as players must be recognized and they have to be held to account to play by the rules. So, if we adopt Slaps suggested Motive Means and Opportunity model, it needs to be applied here.
Fourth, Bob's World is exactly correct that changes in primarily communications technology, coupled with rapid changes in production technology (the economic and perceptual core of Globalization) are generating most of the perceptual difficulties at the Grand Strategic level and the lived reality difficulties on the ground. Central to this problem are two bits of culture lag: unequal changes in distribution technologies and cultural perceptions of scarcity.
Let me touch on the first one of these. Distribution technologies have not kept pace with communications technologies. In effect, anyone can "see" or "experience" (vicariously I admit) a lifestyle that most cannot access physically. This ability of individuals to perceive will, in many cases, also lead to a comparison of that perception with a perception of their daily lives. This comparison, in turn, leads to several things.
- First, a perception that the State (i.,e. their government) has "failed" them because a) they don't have it and b) they are constantly being bombarded with messages that say it is the State's responsibility to provide them.
- Second, the possibility of a perception that the State cannot provide these resources because it is being "opposed" / "oppressed" by some other State or interest group.
- Third, the possibility of generating focused anger and hatred of another State based on jealousy.
These potential reactions leave a populace open to manipulation by politicians (loosely speaking to include religious "leaders" as well).
Let me touch on the "scarcity" issue, now, since it is actually much more dangerous. Let me start by saying that even since, roughly, 200 years after we, as a species, developed horticulture, we have been perceiving resources as scarce. If critical resources are "scarce", then it stands to reason that each social and cultural group has to figure out how best to allocate them - this led to the development of social stratification and "command" economies (i.e. the Temple States in Sumeria, Mohenjo-Daro, Knososs, etc.). One of the crucial things that happened during this period was that the concept of access to resources was conflated with social status (which ties in to all sorts of other things...).
Today, "scarcity" of resources is still assumed to be tied in with social status and "power" (loosley construed in the Galbraith sense of the term). However, many of the resources themselves are not scarce - the supply is artificially manipulated to induce scarcity (various agricultural Planning Boards in Canada are a good example of this, as is the production of oil). This artificial scarcity is used to maintain and enhance the social status and access to resources of various sub-state small groups as well as States themselves (OPEC anyone?). The maintenance of artificial scarcity also extends into R&D efforts (e.g. delays in the production of hydrogen fuel cell technology [from the 1970's], delays in the use of mag-lev technology [late 1970's], etc.), and also into the production and support of social movements that help to increase resource scarcity (e.g. the anti-nuclear technology groups).
This brings me to my final point about Grand Strategic perceptions, and that has to do with how the rhetoric and principles of a Grand Strategy are played out in everyday life. Let me give a really simple example from the advertising world: Nabob coffee. Nabob has declared as one of their Grand Strategic principles that "fair exchange" is one of their principles. Recently, at least in Canada, they have begun advertising their strategic alliance with the Rainforest Alliance (Coalition? Sorry, seniors moment...). They are selling a product that many Canadians buy, coffee, and showing how buying their version of it leads to improving the lived reality of the workers who produce that coffee, both as individuals and as communities. While they are also making a nice profit on the deal, that particular "message" has a value add for the Canadian consumer since most of us happen to think helping other people out, especially if it doesn't cost us much extra, is a pretty good thing to do.
Shall we compare this with the US political rhetoric in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially in light of other locations such as Darfur, Rwanda, the Congo, Nigeria and Kenya (okay, most civilians have little idea what's going on there, but they will shortly)? The near instantaneous communications technologies which enabled, and were required by, globalization mean that actions in the world are pretty darn hard to hide while, at the same time, guarenteeing that statements made "on principle" will be compared with actions in perceived "reality".
What this rather rambling post is really aimed at is that at the Grand Strategic level, the "talk" and the "walk" have to be in line with each other. Furthermore, and this has more applicability at the Strategic and Operational levels, the communications-distribution-production realities have to be kept in mind of the global population. This doesn't mean you can't shoot the "Bad Guys", it just means that you can't claim to be the "Good Guys" while simulataneously doing "Bad Things". (Gods, I hate that type of simplistic rhetoric!).
Let me draw out one, specific, SFA example, by way of bringing the talk back to Rob's original post. In FM 3-07-1, there is a really brilliant observation that says:
What, and this is not a rhetorical question, is going to be done if the FSF is perceived by the local populace as illegitimate or as a "necessary evil"? This is why I have been harping on the Grand Strategic level stuff, since how those principles are constructed will impact on how an SFA mission deals with problems of FSF legitimacy.2-1. ....Soldiers conducting SFA must also understand that legitimacy is vital. The relevant population must perceive FSF as legitimate for long-term success.
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