SFA as part of a campaign design: supporting operational requirements (part 1)

[Bob's World]

Well sh..t,where do I start. Bob's World, What causes the cause? A person, and a person always has a motive. Until you understand that you can not prepare a Strategy to succeed. Not only that but you must have a good counter-motive to gain support for your side of things. So your objective should be to de-motivate the insurgency population(focus on their leadership). From there you can look for opportunities and select your methods. And Security Force Operations would have to play a big part in that in order to allow some type of civilized transition.

Ok, what do I mean by that? I think one good example lies within the American Revolution. Arguably one could state that "The Cause" was independence from England.

But what caused this diverse collection of colonies to unite to this common and dangerous end? Certainly there were motivating factors, such as the works of Thomas Paine, or the events in the Massachusetts Colony. But before that, what factors of causation were at work that allowed such words and actions to move a collection of individual people, and individual colonies to move as a body to throw off British rule?

I believe there are many sources of causation. One major one in this case was the simple fact that British citizens who lived in England looked down upon British citizens who lived in the colonies as somehow inferior. From what I have read this was taken as (if anyone would have even thought to ask) "of course they are inferior!" in England. But in the colonies, be it a man of means, education, and accomplishment like George Washington, denied admission to the British Regular Army due to his "status"; or a simple farmer, owning and working a plot of land that may well have qualified him for some minor title back in England; saw this as an outrage. And upon such festering sores of causation fell the cold slaps of motivation. And an insurgency is born. First of words, and then of works.

England did not need to send the most powerful Navy and Army in the world to solve this problem. A simple letter of apology and recognition of full righths of citizenship from the King would have nipped it in the bud.

But then, Kings don't do that, do they. Wouldn't be proper.

[slapout9]

Cable outage but am back now. BW this may be a chicken or the egg question. I am sure you think you proved your point.....but I think you proved mine and hear is why. If you trace it back to the beginning, as you did, you get a person with a motive. The King and his desire for power. The reason I push this is I think this fits in with your Population Centric Based Solution.

Example a bad or unjust law caused the rebellion....who created the law!!! You have to deal with that or as you point out the revolution will just smolder and eventually resurface when another cause (triggering method)appears because the motivated person is still there and may want revenge. Where their is a will there is a way. So the objective has to be to somehow de-motivate the person(s) hopefully through nonviolent methods but might not turn out that way.

Again I think this is critacal because as you pointed out( maybe on this or another thread) is why insurgencies take to long and costs to much......which is one of my pet rocks,

[Rob Thornton]

I'd made mention of these earlier. Here is the link to the UNCLASS functional design guide that came out of our support to OSD PA&E. Keep in mind this was done outside the context of the larger campaign design in the interests of illustrating a methodology for functional design. Ideally, the design would be informed by the assessment methodology (organizational/Operational Environment/Institutional) which would tell you what the required capabilities were in light of the conditions and objectives.

Note- the terms BSC (Build Security Capacity) was one used by PA&E. It is not a doctrinal term - but was useful in terms of its function.

Anyway after sending them to Marc and Slap, I thought it worthwhile to bring them up. The first few slides get after identifying the correct problem, and in establishing a design framework to postulate a theory.

Best, Rob

[marct]

Hi Folks,

Sorry for the delay in responding, but the past couple od days have been nuts!

Rob, I think you're right that the Hessians where not SFA per se, although if I remember correctly (the book I got this from years ago isn't available), they were involved in some training or, at least, cadre activities for Loyalist militia units.

Bob's World made an interesting point:

England did not need to send the most powerful Navy and Army in the world to solve this problem. A simple letter of apology and recognition of full righths of citizenship from the King would have nipped it in the bud.

Just as a matter of historical fact, the King couldn't do this.... at least in practice; this was a matter for Parliament. On the issue of 2nd (or 3rd!) class citizens, you are pretty much correct, but I'm not sure how important that actually was. A ket emotional motivator, surely, but a primary cause? Hmmm, I don't think so. BTW, the reason why I say that is that there is the rather complex example of Quebec not revolting during that time.

Where I think there are immediate lessons we can pick up is in the structures of governance; they also become crucial when we look at Upper and Lower Canada in the 19th century and, also, latter on in the other colonies that become Dominions. The evolution of socio-political thinking around governance in the 19th century, at least in Britain and the Empire, is truly fascinating - a model that really fits the currently trendy phrase of "Think Globally, Act Locally".

Part of the reason why I like to go back to the American Revolution / War of Independance is that it is one of the earliest and, in some ways, a prototype for, later revolutionary movements. We can see, at least in seed form, many of the later developments that, strangely enough, we are still struggling with: mass produced, local media (aka cheap printing presses), guerilla warfare, terrorist tactics (on all sides), and perhaps most importantly, the key to winning the conflict - it's centre of gravity - lying outside the theatre of operations (London and, to a lesser extent, Paris - shades of the Cold War!).

So, let me toss out a question.... In terms of SFA/FID operations, how would people classify (or conceive of) the French activities in that war?

[Bob's World]

Hi Folks,

Sorry for the delay in responding, but the past couple od days have been nuts!

Rob, I think you're right that the Hessians where not SFA per se, although if I remember correctly (the book I got this from years ago isn't available), they were involved in some training or, at least, cadre activities for Loyalist militia units.

Bob's World made an interesting point:


Just as a matter of historical fact, the King couldn't do this.... at least in practice; this was a matter for Parliament. On the issue of 2nd (or 3rd!) class citizens, you are pretty much correct, but I'm not sure how important that actually was. A ket emotional motivator, surely, but a primary cause? Hmmm, I don't think so. BTW, the reason why I say that is that there is the rather complex example of Quebec not revolting during that time.

Where I think there are immediate lessons we can pick up is in the structures of governance; they also become crucial when we look at Upper and Lower Canada in the 19th century and, also, latter on in the other colonies that become Dominions. The evolution of socio-political thinking around governance in the 19th century, at least in Britain and the Empire, is truly fascinating - a model that really fits the currently trendy phrase of "Think Globally, Act Locally".

Part of the reason why I like to go back to the American Revolution / War of Independance is that it is one of the earliest and, in some ways, a prototype for, later revolutionary movements. We can see, at least in seed form, many of the later developments that, strangely enough, we are still struggling with: mass produced, local media (aka cheap printing presses), guerilla warfare, terrorist tactics (on all sides), and perhaps most importantly, the key to winning the conflict - it's centre of gravity - lying outside the theatre of operations (London and, to a lesser extent, Paris - shades of the Cold War!).

So, let me toss out a question.... In terms of SFA/FID operations, how would people classify (or conceive of) the French activities in that war?

Marc we have a similar understanding, but coming from different perspectives draw different conclusions.

As to the French and British, clearly the American Revolution was a side show, an opportunity for the French to seek an advantage in their long competition with England. If London or Paris were a COG, it would only have been so for France or England, certainly not for the Colonists. Important in that, as I say, soldiers do not start or end wars, merely fight them. Is the peace process then a COG? No, not a source of all strength and power. More a critical requirement. You need that treaty to "end" the conflict, but not a COG.

As to the French role. Neither FID nor SFA. If anything it was UW. The American populace broke into two camps: Loyalists and Rebels. He who is the current legitimate government and works with the loyalist populace is conducting FID/SFA. He who is the outsider seeking to influence the revolution to support his own selfish ends is conducting UW. France conducted UW. England conducted FID/SFA.

[Ken White]

As to the French role. Neither FID nor SFA.

Agree...

...If anything it was UW.

Hmm. This doesn't look like any UW force I've encountered, (LINK).

Nor do these guys look like Go-rillas...

[Bob's World]

Well, like I said, "if anything, it was UW" Actually a mix of UW and plain old surrogate warfare, as is often the case.

Did you take that photo yourself?? :-)

[Ken White]

Did you take that photo yourself?? :-)

will get you for that...

[jmm99]

have a Bud Light (I'll join you virtually with a Bud high-test) - and reconsider the following statement in terms of the legal relationships (yup, I'm asking you to put on your lawyer's coif and put the green one in an honored position next to the Bud Light):

from BW
As to the French role. Neither FID nor SFA. If anything it was UW. The American populace broke into two camps: Loyalists and Rebels. He who is the current legitimate government and works with the loyalist populace is conducting FID/SFA. He who is the outsider seeking to influence the revolution to support his own selfish ends is conducting UW. France conducted UW. England conducted FID/SFA.

Consider:

1. Legal relationship between the British Crown and the Loyalist Colonists (whose pre-rev governments still existed, albeit with some in exile) - as viewed by the British Crown and the Loyalist Colonists.

2. Legal relationship between the French Crown and the Continental Congress (starting with our beloved Declaration of Independence - although you and I have different takes on its present uses; but more importantly, the relationship after the Battle of Saratoga) - as viewed by the French Crown and the Continental Congress.

After some consideration of the above, you should conclude that Ken is closer to the mark than you are. In short, you can have two conflicting, but valid, legal (and political) views driving an armed conflict.

I am in the process of reading (half-way through; and subject to many side-tracks) George O. Trevelyan, The American Revolution (1899; yes, the last year of the 1800s), which presents the Brit legal and political views of that conflict (biased toward the Whigs, e.g., Burke & Fox); as well as the Loyalist and Rebel views. Great insight (IMO).

The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict.

A full-spectrum planner would, in an ideal world, say: OK, here is our plan (version 1) based on our legal and political constructs and taking into account our operational capabilities. But, here is their likely plan based on their legal and political constructs and taking into account their operational capabilities. So, to meet their challenge, we have to adapt our plan (version 2; etc., what will they then do ?). Final question (version Nx) - Can we do that and still achieve our legal and political end goals ?

So far (still only half there), Trevelyan suggests that George III and his ministers never got beyond version 1.

BTW: interesting trivia from Trevelyan - did you all know that many of the Brit generals in the Revolutionary War were also MPs ?

[Old Eagle]

BW, the quintessential SF dude is correct about French conducting UW. However, the current defn of SFA as outlined in Army FM 3-07 allows for SFA (organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising) to support both FID and UW operations, as well as a host of others. In the US Army context, UW is most likely conducted by SF, while FID and other missions involving SFA components can be conducted by either SF or GPF, or both.

[Bob's World]

"quintessential" I like that.

still chuckling over Ken taking that picture though...

Actually, to expand, the Brits were also conducting COIN against the rebels and (yes, this is not new) "hybrid and Irregular warfare" as they executed capture/kill operations in the Carolinas against the militia; regular conventional ops against the Continental Army; and a little UW themselves west of the mountains as they leveraged the natives to make life tough on guys like George Rogers Clark and D. Boone.

It gets confusing. It gets real confusing if everyone is working off of 5 different definitions for the same named operation. But, at the heart of it, remains two very simple concepts:

1. Good/poor governance: A perception on behalf of a significant segment of the populace that the government is both failed, AND that they have no legitimate means of recourse.

2. Legitmacy: The government that exists must be percieved as legitimate by the governed, and they must recognize the source of legitimacy. If at some point they no longer recognize the source of legimacy, they will attack that source as part of their insurgency.

And lastly, ALL populaces and ALL governances are engaged in this little dance every day everywhere. There is no end, and there is no beginning. Usually it is peaceful, sometimes it gets violent. Its just basic human dynamics once you bundle us up into groups. Don't get so wrapped up in the facts or pursuit of "knowledge" that you never get past the facts down to the heart of the matter at "understanding." "Effectiveness" of governance is for bureaucrats and ametuers; don't get distracted by it.

Intel guys and Generals like Knowledge. I prefere understanding.

[Ken White]

or we'll get nothing done...

Not buying UW by the French in the American Revolution; There was nothing remotely unconventional about their entry, motives or operations. All boringly conventional. Surrogate warfare I'll accept -- though one could even quibble about that on the basis of who cajoled who to do what...

More importantly, as JMM noted:

"The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict."

Certainly applied to the Revolution but it has also applied to most of our wars. Most of which we got right.

Until the Department of Defense was created...

[Tom Odom]

Well, like I said, "if anything, it was UW" Actually a mix of UW and plain old surrogate warfare, as is often the case.

Did you take that photo yourself?? :-)

No, he painted pictures on a cave wall...

[Bob's World]

or we'll get nothing done...

Not buying UW by the French in the American Revolution; There was nothing remotely unconventional about their entry, motives or operations. All boringly conventional. Surrogate warfare I'll accept -- though one could even quibble about that on the basis of who cajoled who to do what...

More importantly, as JMM noted:Certainly applied to the Revolution but it has also applied to most of our wars. Most of which we got right.

Until the Department of Defense was created...

"unconventional warfare" does not mean you dress like rambo and conduct raids from some camp deep in the swamp or jungle. It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."

In other words, the organization conducting UW (the French in the American Revolution with the Rebels, or the British in the American Revolution with the Indians, or the Americans in GWOT with the Northern Alliance, etc) may act VERY conventionally themselves, as may the force they are manipulating to serve their mutual objectives.

The "unconventional" part is getting the other guy to do your dirty work for you. When we say that SF conducts UW, it means that we are the middlemen between that guy in the suit and that foreign populace facilitating the transaction.

[marct]

Hi JMM,

The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict.

A full-spectrum planner would, in an ideal world, say: OK, here is our plan (version 1) based on our legal and political constructs and taking into account our operational capabilities. But, here is their likely plan based on their legal and political constructs and taking into account their operational capabilities. So, to meet their challenge, we have to adapt our plan (version 2; etc., what will they then do ?). Final question (version Nx) - Can we do that and still achieve our legal and political end goals ?

I knew I could count on you for this ! Let me also note that there is one other legal fly in the ointment - the Iroquois Confederacy - which had been recognized as a sovereign state by the British via the Covenant Chain series of treaties (Hey, as a descendant of William Johnson, what else would you expect me to add ).

In all seriousness, however, there are two crucial points here. First, the one made by JMM that one can have equally valid and conflicting legal constructs (with operational implications) in a conflict. Second, and this wasn't mentioned per se, that the terms being used - FID, SFA, UW, etc. - actually rely on those legal constructs.

[jmm99]

"5.1 France and Great Britain on the Eve of American Independence" - at the end, but it did start that way with Beaumarchais and the trading company of Roderigue Hortalez & Co (the $2000 suit folks).

But then came Saratoga and French recognition of the new nation-state and its government:

The Continental Army put Beaumarchais' supplies to good use. The defeat of General Johnny Burgoyne and his army on October 17, 1777, to Horatio Gates at Saratoga, was a major turning point in the American Revolutionary War. It was won by American soldiers, even if 90% of the gunpowder used had been supplied by and paid for by France, and was used in French M 1763-66 pattern (Charleville) muskets, which by then had become standard in the Continental Army. The victory at Saratoga proved to the French that the American rebellion could be sustained with a possibility of success.

News of Burgoyne's capitulation reached Paris in the evening of December 4, 1777; on the 17th Vergennes promised to recognize the independence of the Thirteen Colonies, with or without Spanish support. On January 30, the king authorized the Secrétaire du Conseil d'Etat Conrad Alexandre Gérard to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and a secret Treaty of Alliance on his behalf. On February 6, 1778,Gérard carried out the order and Deane, Franklin, and Lee signed for the United States.

By these treaties, France offered "to maintain … the liberty, sovereignty, and independence" of the United States in case of war between her and Great Britain. France promised to fight on until the independence of the United States was guaranteed in a peace treaty. All the United States had to do in exchange was not "conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained.

Not unlike Astan (USSR 1979- & US 2001-) in these respects: UW > new govt > CW. The last type of warfare turned out rather badly for the Sovs.

And looking back, by the time the French assistance, whether conventional or unconventional, had ended, France had spent livres 1,000,000,000; and was on its way to bankruptcy and the French Revolution (hmm ... similar to the USSR).

Are there some lessons for today ?

Final thought:

Since it is Memorial Day, we might want to remember the French sailors and soldiers, whether conventional or unconventional, who made the difference at Yorktown. All in the same boat together - colonialement.

(from above link)

From Yorktown's ruins, ranked and still,
Two lines stretch far o'er vale and hill:
Who curbs his steed at head of one?
Hark! The low murmur: WASHINGTON!

Who bends his keen approving glance
Where down the gorgeous line of France
Shine knightly star and plume of snow?
Thou too art victor, ROCHAMBEAU!

John Greenleaf Whittier

PS: Tyrrell, somewhere (in looking at my wife's genealogy), I have William Johnson as part of the Ulster Shane O'Neills (Shane = John). If you have anything on that, drop me a PM. And, BTW, my ancestor Nick (Aubry dit Francoeur) also squared off against Johnson's troops in 1755 - Baron Dieskau's Defeat at Lake George. You won that one; but we took the Windmill.

[slapout9]

It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."

That is SBW (Slapout Based Warfare)

[jmm99]

from Slap
That is SBW (Slapout Based Warfare)

in some cases (e.g., Guatamala 1954), civilian agency based warfare (if you want to call disinformation and destablization "warfare"). BTW: Beaumarchais and the trading company of Roderigue Hortalez & Co were civilian.

Slap, in hindsight, if you were Louis XVI, would you have made that phone call ?

Long-term negative blowback from short-term operational success.

[jmm99]

Here we have a listing (more focused on upstate NY, but including other NY units, with brief mention of units from other states) of: NY Frontier Loyalists; Downstate Loyalists; and Other Loyalists.

Note that, for the much greater part, these were authorized units (that is, regular units within the Laws of War of that time, and probably still today) - soldiers of the Crown serving their King as British citizens.

Certainly, the RW was more a civil war than anything else, as you can see by following the various links here (including Tyrrell's ancestor), and here.

PS: The source of much US Ranger (SOF) mythology is the unit known as Rogers' Rangers of the French & Indian War. What is not generally well known (see in link "Other Loyalists") is that the RW Queen's Rangers was a regiment originally raised on August 16, 1776 by the same Robert Rogers.

Command passed from Rogers to Lt. Col. Christopher French in 1777, followed by Major James Wemyss of the 40th Regiment of Foot, who was wounded at Germantown. The Queen's Rangers achieved its greatest fame (or notoriety, depending on your viewpoint) under the leadership of John Graves Simcoe, first Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada. Simcoe took command of the Rangers on October 15, 1777.
...
The unit was later placed on the Regular British rolls as part of the "American Establishment" in May 1779 and renumbered as the First American Regiment.

The Queen's Rangers were stationed in New York until sent to Charlestown in April 1780, returning to New York in June. The Rangers returned to south in December as part of Arnold's expedition to Virginia. After this they became part of Cornwallis' army, eventually surrendering at Yorktown.

and from Wiki:

At the outbreak of the American Revolution at Lexington and Concord, former Rangers were among the Minutemen firing at the British. After these events, Robert Rogers offered his help to the commander of the Colonial Army, George Washington. Washington refused, fearing that Rogers was a spy because Rogers had just returned from a long stay in England. Rogers was infuriated by this and did indeed join the British--forming the Queen's Rangers (1776) and later the King's Rangers.

So, should we look at Rogers via British law and politics (a patriot), or via American law and politics (a traitor) - or should we simply ignore law and politics, as some might suggest ?

[slapout9]

Slap, in hindsight, if you were Louis XVI, would you have made that phone call ?

jmm99,
No, because the situation was to unstable to take the risk. But that is based on hindsight. Plus everything is a system to me. I don't care if they have uniforms or don't. I look at the effect being achieved, if they perform the functions of a soldier that is all I need to know.

Wilf is right when he says we have to many words for what are essentially Infantry operations actually EBO (Effects Based Operations) to me. Just my opinion, which is why I push systems thinking, makes things a lot simpler and clearer.