Quote Originally Posted by AlexTX ret View Post
One thing that I will say is that the Small Round Tactics are not an Urban Myth because I first heard of these ideas in Officer Training (early Vietnam war). However, the first person of any importance to put them forth as new policy was Air Force General Curtiss Lemay. There has been a push to discredited this by many sources because he was actually looking for a SCHV weapon to replace the M1/M2 carbines of his security troops.
So let me get this right. Curt LeMay set down on paper that the US Army light weapons doctrine was to produce weapons that "Wounded and did not KILL" and/or "wounded in preference to killing."

a.) If such a document exists, it would support my thesis that light weapons applications is severely mis-understood.

b.) It would also indicate Le May was an idiot, because once you overrun he enemy position, (central tenet of infantry and land warfare doctrine) the enemy wounded become your responsibility - and if you don't care and are going to kill them anyway - a war crime - then why not do it sensibly in the first place?

The object behind "SCHV" was to create low recoil, low dispersion automatic fire to increase the likelihood of hits, and also multiple hits. Now translating that into an operational reality may be suspect, but I see nothing to refute the logic and thus validity of that thinking.

One aspect of SCHV actually overlooked at the time was the intended or accidental fragmenting of the round, causing multiple would channels. This why UK light weapons doctrine focusses on the 400+ Joules on striking, to enable the high % fragmentation of the L1A1 service round.