The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Rifleman]

.....suppressive fire will not deter competent troops to any great extent.

Or troops with a sense of purpose and calling, I guess. Sgt. York is the example that comes to mind. A man with a five shot bolt action rifle and a M1911 against several machine gun crews was not deterred.

.....weapons and cartridge supplied to the Viet Namese and initially tested by the 82d Abn Div were not the identical to the weapon the Army later fielded as the M-16.

Was the weapon and cartridge first used by SF in the early days of Vietnam different from those fielded by the Army in 1965? I've read accounts saying that SF really liked the AR-15 when it first came out in the early '60s (War Story by Jim Morris and The New Legions by Donald Duncan).

[Ken White]

Was the weapon and cartridge first used by SF in the early days of Vietnam different from those fielded by the Army in 1965?

were Stoner and Sullvan's original rifles and the cartridges were the original Remington designed and manufactured 5.56 -- you're asking a lot from an old guy with a flaky memory...

The original had no bolt closure device (dumb item to add, but the Ord Corps insisted for some unknown reason...) and the gas tube was larger in diameter. There were other minor differences, one being the method of attaching the bolt carrier key and another had something to do with the gas seal rings on the bolt. They also changed the rifling twist from 1:14 to 1:12 to achieve better stability for the traveling bullet -- a factor that lessened the yawing and therefor wounding capability (and then later we went to 1:7 for the SS109 / M855 which made it reach out further but with less energy and upset potential...).

They changed the cartridge from a DuPont extruded powder to Olin ball; slower burning, to lower the chamber pressure, they then had to lighten the original bullet (whose weight I can't recall, 58 gr, I think...) down to 55 grains to meet the MV specs so they shortened it making it less stable -- not realizing or, more likely, not caring, they had decreased the energy at all ranges and increased the propensity to be deflected on contact with a brisk wind in so doing. With that MV, you had a light Gopher hunting pill that traveled too fast to upset on a hit except at the end of its range envelope; in close range shooting it passed right through bods and did little damage. Overpenetration, they said...

So given a weapon that the Troop Test had clearly shown was deficient in lethality, they bought it anyway, made it less lethal and issued it to people in combat.

Politically purchased weapon. Fault of the Pols. Politically modified to satisfy whims. Fault of the Army.

[RJ]

AlexTex posted - "The combinations of both effective range and knockdown power determine what ranges you will fight at and its effect on the enemy combatant at those ranges. The Russian Guards Unit was an awesome (frightening to most German units) fighting machine but in the face of units with strong morale and Esprit de Corps, these Russian juggernaughts could be picked apart at range. So you have two different units here whos tactics and TO&E weree determined by the weapon type and how each side determined the war should be fought.

The deciding factor here was training which would help the arguments you put forward. The Russians had little more than peasants of little understanding of war was about. So training was limited and its linch pin was aggression. The German's were the exact opposite. More and detailed training showed greater results."

You are exactly right. I made friends with an old Panzer Grenadier who made if back from the Eastern Front to Germany for wounds received. He was in the fight against the US in the Hedgerows of Normandy in 1944.

Gunther Storrjohann has pass on, but over several decent dinners in Wilmington DE, where he worked for VW and my company hauled his vehicles he spoke of actions on the steppes that had reduced German infantry companies dug in that defeated Russian Regiments.

German Artillery would engage the assualt columns out to a mile or more, and pound them almost to 200 yards of the dug in infantry. The Infantry MG's would begin hitting the mob of Russian Infantry at about 1200 yards and the riflemen would chime in at 400 yards.

He said you could see them coming by the dust they stirred up. There was no place to hide and the Russians would push their troops at the dug in Germans. It was a slaughter.

In one fight he said his officer ordered the company to fix bayonets and charge to remmnants of a regiment at about 100 feet. He said the Russians broke when the Germans came at them.

Diciplined troops who are good shots can do enormous damage on poorly trained troops who have to be herded and goaded into assualting them.

Gunther said there was no fire and maneuver, just a herd of men being driven to attack them. He also admitted that if the Russians didn't break they would have overwhelmed his company.

He retired to a beach community in NC and pass on about ten years ago.

[AlexTX ret]

So I'm sort of having people time with my family so this will be short.

I've not forgotten you, Wilf. You raised some interesting and factual points. However, since you made your comments, I have realized that I need to research my statements and come up with more compelling facts. I don't mind. It is what I do a lot of. Nevertheless, bringing up "Salvo" without mentioning all the research that was going on before, concurrently, and later, will not help our discussion make any sense. It certainly won't help our discussion, if we focus only one aspect.

One thing that I will say is that the Small Round Tactics are not an Urban Myth because I first heard of these ideas in Officer Training (early Vietnam war). However, the first person of any importance to put them forth as new policy was Air Force General Curtiss Lemay. There has been a push to discredited this by many sources because he was actually looking for a SCHV weapon to replace the M1/M2 carbines of his security troops.

RJ, Your description fits everything I've heard from the German side except that it was a perfect killing ground for the Germans. However, too many times, the Germans found themselves attacked from much closer ranges or were not so couragous. Then it was the Germans that were slaughtered.

For a while I had direct contact with either the actual members of thse Guards Units or there sons and daughters. The Russians saw this as a great honor and were for the most part the cores of rifle units that had shown courage and tenacity in the face of the enemy. However, no matter how patriotic the men felt, there was always a line of political officers and dedicated troops, (usually not the racial mackup of the men that made up the frontlines) that pushed the men forward. They also shot any soldiers that either fell back or tried to flee.

I bring this up in that most of the conflicts we've fought since Mogadishu, have had strong tribal ties and have the same callous disreguard toward deserters or even actual fighting men as the Russian politcal officers had for the fighting man. However, there is something to be said for blind aggression
and not questioning orders. The poor Soviet soldiers that fought in Afganistan or Russian Soldiers in Chetznia showed the same reliance on these tactics and in both cases it was the SOG troops that did all the fighting. I understand that in Chetznia, they used a lot of Airborne but to the Russian forces, Airborne is mostly made up of VDV troops and they would be concidered SOG troops.

[William F. Owen]

One thing that I will say is that the Small Round Tactics are not an Urban Myth because I first heard of these ideas in Officer Training (early Vietnam war). However, the first person of any importance to put them forth as new policy was Air Force General Curtiss Lemay. There has been a push to discredited this by many sources because he was actually looking for a SCHV weapon to replace the M1/M2 carbines of his security troops.

So let me get this right. Curt LeMay set down on paper that the US Army light weapons doctrine was to produce weapons that "Wounded and did not KILL" and/or "wounded in preference to killing."

a.) If such a document exists, it would support my thesis that light weapons applications is severely mis-understood.

b.) It would also indicate Le May was an idiot, because once you overrun he enemy position, (central tenet of infantry and land warfare doctrine) the enemy wounded become your responsibility - and if you don't care and are going to kill them anyway - a war crime - then why not do it sensibly in the first place?

The object behind "SCHV" was to create low recoil, low dispersion automatic fire to increase the likelihood of hits, and also multiple hits. Now translating that into an operational reality may be suspect, but I see nothing to refute the logic and thus validity of that thinking.

One aspect of SCHV actually overlooked at the time was the intended or accidental fragmenting of the round, causing multiple would channels. This why UK light weapons doctrine focusses on the 400+ Joules on striking, to enable the high % fragmentation of the L1A1 service round.

[William F. Owen]

Nevertheless, bringing up "Salvo" without mentioning all the research that was going on before, concurrently, and later, will not help our discussion make any sense. It certainly won't help our discussion, if we focus only one aspect.

Well I only reference those papers because they are the only published ones I know of that directly informed the design of the AR-15. I know of no others, bar Marshall's "Weapons Usage in Korea," which I think garbage.

If you have access to US light weapons testing data pre-1945, then I would be extremely grateful to see it.

As concerns that done since, I think you can take you pick of that you wish to prove. CRISAT data springs to mind as something that may be of dubious relevance, and whose beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

[AlexTX ret]

So let me get this right. Curt LeMay set down on paper that the US Army light weapons doctrine was to produce weapons that "Wounded and did not KILL" and/or "wounded in preference to killing."

I don't know if he set it down on paper directly but he used several studies done that promoted a biased view of the SCHV (Small Caliber High Velocity) rifle. You can't use todays experiences to evaluate these studies because they were in entirely uncharted territory. Like the 6mm M1 rifle, they were fighting a bias of the majority of the military towards anything that wasn't a full sized round or at least at the upper limit of the FACR weapons.

Everything that I have on file (I'm reaserchng on the Net now for other information) shows that politics was becoming the great battleground and it was sort of becoming a battle of "theologies" sort of like the 9mm vs the 45 cal. It is a battle that has never been won and there is still fanatics that are fighting the good fight today.

a.) If such a document exists, it would support my thesis that light weapons applications is severely mis-understood.

I have no disagreement that SCHV rifles are misunderstood. However, I have a problem in that discussions have turned 180 degress. People/countires have too much invested in the SS109/M855 round and the various systems that use it that they are willing to sacrifice tactical sense to maintain the status quo. IMHO, there needs to be a new discussion about tactics and weapons that fit those tactics. Primarily, is the present bias against infantry rifles because the powers at be still think that MGs and Artillery are the real killers of the enemy. This is done from studies done in WW1, WW2, Korea and actually some done in Vietnam which I would of thought impossible because of our objectives and the reliance on the rifleman to hold ground.

I'm realize you are making sense in touting the the SCHV rifle advantages. However is the 5.56 round the best for our present day tactics or is it the most expediant? Could greater tactics be created if the small units had a cartridge that was effective farther out and hit harder with out sacrifising the ability to engage the enemy with automatic rifle fire?

There is a round that does that in spades, the 6.5 MPC. It will fit in existing magazines with out modification. The same can be said for the upper reciever. The only part that must be changed is the barrel. It even plays nice with shorter barrels (M4) and the problems with the impinged gas sytem of the M16 family. It is a better round for IARs, Saws and SDMs. Without a dangerous increase in chamber pressure, it is longer ranged and has a greater penetration at these ranges. The only problem with that it requires a change in tactics and politics of the military. There are various studies that are positive about the 6.5 MPC. The problem is that can the cartridge over come the prejudice of the procurement system of the military.

The other problem that I have seen about the SCHV/Salvo is that as far back as 1957, there were set parameters that were to determine the capabilities of the M1/M2 carbine replacement. The parameters were 500yds range and penetrate a steel helmet at that range. There were others requirements but these were the big two. However, the 22 cal bullet was the darling of the SCHV crowd and had been so since the 1890s, So the 222 Remington/224E1 was the preordained caliber with a wieght of the bullet dropped from 68 grains to 55 grains. There was a few tests done in various artificial mediums but no tests done on live animals at this time. There was a test on Army mules at one time but none done with modern (1950s) test criteria. Later on the 224E2 round becames the 5.56 as to not confuse the testers and observers when the early 224 LWMR was being tested.

Gen. LeMay was at first looking to replace the M1/M2 carbines used in the Air Force by security forces. He found that the 224 LWMR, as it was first known, with the 5.56 cartridge was more effective than the carbines. However, he also found that he couldn't get the funding for a simple repacements for the under powered M1/M2 carbines. So he sold the powers to be that this was a better weapon than the problem riddled M14 rifle. (That's another story)

So with the support of LeMay and various small orders by various countries looking for a replacement for AK47 that could be supported by the Free World, the 224 LWMR became the defacto replacement of the M14. However, this took several years and much modification to the original 224 LWMR rille, in physical changes and the basic concept behind it.

a.)b.) It would also indicate Le May was an idiot, because once you overrun he enemy position, (central tenet of infantry and land warfare doctrine) the enemy wounded become your responsibility - and if you don't care and are going to kill them anyway - a war crime - then why not do it sensibly in the first place?

LeMay wasn't an idiot, he was head of the Air Force with a political agenda. The Air Force claimed to be top dog because it controlled the Nukes. And for the most part, Gen LeMay made sure that stayed the way it was. He wasn't an infantryman, he just brow beat the Army and Marines into accepting that they were lower on the feeding chain and would have to accept what the Air Force wanted.

All my studies show LeMay had no knowledge of the infantry of any kind. All he had was a set of data points and it showed him that he wanted the AR15/M16. The Army is not blameless here. When the M16 was problematic when the main supplier of the rounds being use changed the powder that was specified to save money, they said it was the soldiers fault and he needed to keep up the maintance on his rifle. It took too long for this problem to rectify itself.

The object behind "SCHV" was to create low recoil, low dispersion automatic fire to increase the likelihood of hits, and also multiple hits. Now translating that into an operational reality may be suspect, but I see nothing to refute the logic and thus validity of that thinking.

I will agree with you in principle. The problem is that there were so many different theories that tried to show how that would be done. From flagettes to multiple barreled weapons, the situation was confused from the beginning. The only group with any coherency was the 22 cal group. There were other rounds that showed more promising numbers but the .22 crowd kept to their agenda and won in the end.

Could we of done better with more and clearer discussion? Also rounds as potent as the 7x43 mm were shown to be effective automatic fire weapons. All the power of a 7.62 NATO out to 800yds with all the advantage of a SCHV rifle. What kind of tactics could we have created then Especially with all of our overlapping calibers reduce to a single cartridge size.

One aspect of SCHV actually overlooked at the time was the intended or accidental fragmenting of the round, causing multiple would channels. This why UK light weapons doctrine focusses on the 400+ Joules on striking, to enable the high % fragmentation of the L1A1 service round.

As for the fragmentation of the 5.56 round, it lost most of this when the SS109/M855 round was standardised. I have checked my notes and this shows up as a problem by studies done by many countries. At present, there is a move by many to go back to the old M193 cartridge because it does fragment.

[Ken White]

... politics was becoming the great battleground and it was sort of becoming a battle of "theologies" sort of like the 9mm vs the 45 cal. It is a battle that has never been won and there is still fanatics that are fighting the good fight today.

That's sure the truth. Plenty of logic and studies to back up any position and most will work to at least some degree; it boils down to politics and preferences.

...the present bias against infantry rifles because the powers at be still think that MGs and Artillery are the real killers of the enemy. This is done from studies done in WW1, WW2, Korea and actually some done in Vietnam which I would of thought impossible because of our objectives and the reliance on the rifleman to hold ground.

Function of the type of warfare. In medium to high intensity combat, Artillery may again be the big killer. What is problematic in my view is that a well armed and trained infantryman has not been available to the US in large numbers really since the end of WW II -- and those infantrymen mostly came out of Italy and the Pacific, the northwest European battles were, after July 44, not Infantry battles but combined arms in the greatest sense; infantry skills were of marginal value except for the period in the Ardennes -- and we payed heavily for not having them. In any event, the senior leadership of the Army will invest heavily in the Infantry but the priorities get skewed and tend to emphasize technology as a substitute for training.

We'd be far better off without laser pointers and with a better cartridge. Not weapon, it's adequate -- the cartridge isn't. However, that would require better marksmanship training...

The only problem with that it requires a change in tactics and politics of the military. There are various studies that are positive about the 6.5 MPC. The problem is that can the cartridge over come the prejudice of the procurement system of the military.

Agree on politics but I believe the tactical changes would be quite minor.

LeMay wasn't an idiot, he was head of the Air Force with a political agenda. ... he just brow beat the Army and Marines into accepting that they were lower on the feeding chain and would have to accept what the Air Force wanted... All he had was a set of data points and it showed him that he wanted the AR15/M16.

LeMay was not the big Kahuna; he was a peripheral player but was an asset to McNamara in the decision. The determinant factor well known at the time, though it obviously didn't make the mainstream press.

The M-14 contacts had gone from Springfield Armory (the government original and the developer of the tooling who also manufactured some 50K or so for issue) to Harrington & Richardson with a contract for 150K (IIRC) ~$145.00 each; Winchester got the contract for the second batch of the same size at about $109. each. Having completed proofing test production runs, DA was going to let a contract for 1M. TRW had never made a weapon before but wanted in the defense business and they had some good Engineers; they said we won't bid on 1M but if you'll give us a contract for 2M, we'll make them for $90.00 each (and that was four dollars cheaper than the M1 at the time...). So they got the contract and were in mid stream when McNamara decided to kill the contract (paying a cancellation penalty) and buy the M-16 for about $210.00 apiece.

The decision was based as much or more on the fact that TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign and were big time Republican supporters while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's campaign. Bobby Kennedy was a vindictive little guy.

It is also noteworthy that McNamara repaid the Army's insistence on not going to a varmint cartridge by insuring Sprigfield Armory was closed in 1968.

...The Army is not blameless here. When the M16 was problematic when the main supplier of the rounds being use changed the powder that was specified to save money, they said it was the soldiers fault and he needed to keep up the maintance on his rifle. It took too long for this problem to rectify itself.

Not exactly. Olin didn't do that on their own, the Army dictated the powder change to get a lower chamber pressure. That also resulted in lower energy and more powder fouling. Regrettably, the first year of service in Viet Nam did see a lot of failure due to not keeping weapons clean.

The M16 and M4 are adequate combat weapons; they aren't great but they're okay. They DO require, IMO an excessive amount of maintenance.

[Kiwigrunt]

There is a round that does that in spades, the 6.5 MPC. It will fit in existing magazines with out modification. The same can be said for the upper reciever. The only part that must be changed is the barrel. It even plays nice with shorter barrels (M4) and the problems with the impinged gas sytem of the M16 family. It is a better round for IARs, Saws and SDMs. Without a dangerous increase in chamber pressure, it is longer ranged and has a greater penetration at these ranges. The only problem with that it requires a change in tactics and politics of the military. There are various studies that are positive about the 6.5 MPC. The problem is that can the cartridge over come the prejudice of the procurement system of the military.

6.5 MPC is still only a compromise, designed to fit within the 5.56 envelope. It may have some nice advantages but little that would strike me as breathtaking (also not sure how well it defeats body armour). 6.5 Grendel would be a little more breath taking but even that is a compromise for the same reason (length-wise anyway). These are all rounds that are designed to suit, to some extent anyway, existing platforms. Going for a marginal compromise would probably not end the conversation.

I think the US have missed (another) beautiful opportunity in the late seventies/early eighties with the 6 mm SAW, which was said to have been dropped for fear of adding a third calibre. That could have been a good round to replace both other calibres. The M16A1 was in need of replacement anyway, so the A2 might as well have been a totally different weapon, me thinks. Back then most NATO members had not yet committed to 5.56 either….....hindsight.

It appears to me that the 5.56 is indeed marginal, but ‘kind-a’ does the job it was meant to do. The round sort of sits on the fence. Whether or not it is okay seems to depend more on which side of the fence the observer is on, agenda’s and all.

All that said, I would agree with Ken, and probably Alex, that a ‘true’ general purpose round makes sense. And the 6.5 Grendel does seem to be close to it. (I know Wilf…..weight….)

....At present, there is a move by many to go back to the old M193 cartridge because it does fragment.

Really? With 1 in 7 barrels? That would make for a short-range weapon.

[William F. Owen]

I think we can all agree that 5.56mm SS109 may not be perfect, but what is?

Carried weight, human performance, doctrine (tactics?) and training are all more critical issues - or more important than calibre. Put another way, I can't see a need to alter training, (apart from the handling) doctrine and tactics, if I change my main infantry weapon from M4/5.56mm, to an M4/6.5mm, or even an AK/7.62. Actually an optic sight might have more overall impact.

In 1987 I went from using a 7.62mm SLR and GPMG to an all 5.56mm platoon, and tactical doctrine did not miss a beat, except for some very minor issues, caused by now having everyone with a fully automatic weapon. Even today the minor tactics of 1919 remain relevant, regardless of calibre.

IMO, Fragmentation is the best primary wounding mechanism, for a small calibre round, but it is not useful to suggest that the primary purpose of an infantry round is to break up inside the human body. Perforating cover is just as important - thus the CRISAT criteria. After that, multiple hits would seem to be a very strong determinant in providing the relative state of incapacity required - or much more likely to kill.

All that said, as a point of tactical doctrine, I assert that infantry minor tactics should emphasise the use of projected HE, as the primary means of breaking enemy will. I fully recognise that this has some problematic issues associated with it, but it is a viable solution.

FRAGMENTATION
The data I have on this is that the M855 cartridge (62-grain, gilded metal-jacketed, lead alloy core bullet with a steel penetrator) will at high velocities, (900m/s) fragment up to 50% after travelling 5-8cm into a 10% gelatine medium. M855 remains intact at velocities below 763m/s, so from an M4 barrel, M855 will not fragment on impact. In fact it will only achieve viable fragmentation (30-20%) out to 100-125m.

However, I think it is fair to say that the actual requirement for immediate incapacitation is a close range issue, bearing in mind that even with multiple fatal wounds into the heart and lungs some men may continue to function, to the degree he can walk and return fire for up to 15-20 seconds.

According to ARDEC, this would account for why some soldiers assume that their fire has not been effective.

As a correction to an earlier post the UK round is actually L2A2, not L1A1.

[Jones_RE]

Why not issue both a full power rifle and an assault rifle? Everyone seems to be in absolute agreement that you have to select one single caliber to issue to the entire squad.

WWII infantry used a combination of automatic rifles/machine guns, full power rifles and submachine guns. This provided a combination of accurate long range fire, full automatic suppressing fire, and close quarters automatic fire.

These weapons used at least two different types of ammunition and somehow the supply system held up. Why not consider it again?

The full power rifle has to be as powerful as possible without being overly heavy. The assault rifle has to be controllable when fired fully automatic. It's impossible to do both.

To me the answer to this dilemma is just to use two weapons. For example you could issue full power rifles to most of the squad and reserve fully automatic assault rifles for the squad and team leaders. The weaker round of the assault rifle requires better marksmanship and the fully automatic feature requires more discipline - qualities you expect in your more experienced soldiers. The squad loses three full power rifles, but it gains a significant advantage if the enemy gets close.

You could also issue a full power rifle to your squad's designated marksman. That gives a measure of range and power but doesn't come with quite the same cost in weight. It also overcomes failures in marksmanship (whatever the cause) by hand selecting the squad's best shot.

Having the two weapons already in inventory also simplifies the transition if the environment contraindicates one or the other. E.g. in the desert you would just withdraw the short range assault rifles while in a jungle or urban area you'd likely move away from bulky battle rifles.

I know that the logistical and training issues are supposed to be too complicated. However, all the major combatants in the second world war overcame these obstacles! They covered many different training regiments, philosophies and every type of environment you can imagine. Why is it that we have an absolute commitment to the one proposition that supplies such a ready counterexample?

[William F. Owen]

Why not issue both a full power rifle and an assault rifle? Everyone seems to be in absolute agreement that you have to select one single caliber to issue to the entire squad.

It's not an impossible idea, but the descision would have to be based on some pretty rigourous testing because right now the case is not proven to my mind.
In the British Army between 1963 and 85 it was common to issue 1-2 AR-15/M-16 to SLR equipped sections in Northern Ireland, Belize, or Brunei, to provide close range full automatic fire. - so a variation of what you suggest was commonly done by the UK.

WWII infantry used a combination of automatic rifles/machine guns, full power rifles and submachine guns. This provided a combination of accurate long range fire, full automatic suppressing fire, and close quarters automatic fire.

These weapons used at least two different types of ammunition and somehow the supply system held up. Why not consider it again?

The current UK platoon issues 3-4 different SAA natures. The US also. The problem is not the supply system. The problem is the sub-unit and platoon management and scales. If the Platoon just has 5.56mm Ball as it's SAA nature, it's vastly easier to manage, carry and scale than having

1. 5.56mm ball
2. 5.56mm link
3. 7.62mm link
4. 7.62mm ball - Marksman.

Plus there is all the other ammunition nature you need, like 40mm, (3 types), grenades (2 types) LAWs, etc etc.
IMO, if you focus just on small arms ammunition, you are not solving the problem.

[SethB]

Ken, I would be interested to know what you mean by maintenance intensive.

You can be specific, I've had a dozen AR15s over the last decade.

[Ken White]

daily -- or, in an adverse environment, two or more times a day. If you clean the M-16 - M4 in combat that often they're fairly reliable. That has generally been acceptable in Afghanistan and Iraq as it has been in all our wars since the weapon was adopted.

Problem is in heavier combat, you cannot always do that. It's reall bad with the M-16series since you have to clean out the residue from the gas tube excess in the receiver and that's not done effectively without breaking the weapon open and rendering it temporarily inoperable, something you cannot always do. The bolt closure device is a dumb idea -- but it is there for a reason...

Ideally, a weapon that can go three to five days (or three to five basic loads +, which ever comes first) with no attention other than reasonable care in handling and be 100% reliable should be the goal.

If parts are fragile or sensitive enough that replacements should be carried or readily available, that's inadequate reliability IMO.

I think the M1, BAR and M14 were less maintenance intensive and were more reliable (though they had other problems...); as I said somewhere above, all weapons are compromises. The M16 series are IMO decent weapons but they require excessive cleaning (they also get it and that creates other problems).

[AlexTX ret]

This is somethng from Rec Guns that I think is a good start at trying to unravel this mess. I don't agree with many of its findings for I have different sources. Also, I feel that there is a certain bias but where would I find a place that wouldn't be. Gun Theology being what it is, everybody (including me) thinks they have a clue.

http://www.thegunzone.com/556dw.html

I hope this gives Wilf a sense of how long this SCHV rifle disscussion has been going on. I have a few of the reports mentioned in the timeline so they're not pulling all of this stuff out of their *sses. But I can't vouch for the report's voracity. It's free, you get what you pay for.

[AlexTX ret]

I have a question for everybody...

You all say to one extent or another that the effectve range and hitting power of the Infantryman doesn't effect tactics. But even here, I 've heard people say that we need a better cartridge than the SS109/M855 round. On the oppsosite tack, there are those who say that the cartridge doen't mean that much, it's all about tactics. My Officers training and the War College said similiar things to the effect that obediance to well conceived operational plan will over come minor weaknesses in the soldier's equipment.

However, in the 45+ years that I have been playing soldier, (somehow I still remember running around the neighborhood with plastic guns) I've been in some very non-standard spaces and fought in some unusual places. In these environments, the soldier's effectiveness was closely tied to the weapon he carried. There weren't a lot of LMGS and heavy support weapons. Supply was also important. The fewer different rounds involved the more the ammo loadout could be achieved.

So today the average soldier has an effective range of 200m and a bullet that overpenetrates, possibly making a lot of small caliber holes in the enemy's body for little imediate effect. If you created a round that increased the range of engagement and increased the chances of creating immediate shock in the target so that he can't fire back, wouldn't that change tactics at least on the small unit level.

Wilf. the effect of "Knock down power" (as it is misnamed) is well known to Law Enforcements Agents. The 357 Mag as it was originaly loaded had tremendous power but ineffective bullets that didn't open or mushroom most of the time. Simply blowing a small caliber hole through the body with little effect on the perpetrator. This was the one of the major findings of the FBI Miami incident. I digress.

However, the opposite is true in that a weapon with too heavy a recoil in either semi or full auto mode is going to cause problems for the soldier. I know this to be a fact. I'm not a proponent to go back to the 7.62 Nato round to be used in all weapons. However, wouldn't it be for the best to create a weapon that maximizes the abilities of the soldier to fight and is a sufficently effective cartridge that it can be be used in all a squad/platoon rifles, LMGs and SDMs. Wouldn't that give the Individual trooper more trust in the abilities of his weapon. And since it would increase the effective ranges of engagement and be better suited to the ranges of his support weapons, such as the Milkor M40 GL, wouldn't make the small unit more effective across the board?

[SethB]

It's reall bad with the M-16series since you have to clean out the residue from the gas tube excess in the receiver and that's not done effectively without breaking the weapon open and rendering it temporarily inoperable, something you cannot always do. The bolt closure device is a dumb idea -- but it is there for a reason...

I've fired 3500 rounds over three months through a gun with no malfunctions. I added lubricant by squirting oil through the gas vents on the side of the carrier. On the 3501st round the cases stuck (a hot day and a hot gun with 800 rounds of dirty Remington ammunition fired in several hours) and revealed the biggest problem that I have with the rifle. The case has a thin rim and a stuck cases often loses a rim. You need a rod to clear that.

I would have thought that grit from a desert or sand from a beach would be worse.

If parts are fragile or sensitive enough that replacements should be carried or readily available, that's inadequate reliability IMO.

Most parts on an AR15 derivative can be replaced easily. A spare bolt and carrier weigh twelve ounces and drop in in less than fifteen seconds. The trigger is a different issue and I have had several trigger groups fail.

I think the M1, BAR and M14 were less maintenance intensive and were more reliable (though they had other problems...); as I said somewhere above, all weapons are compromises. The M16 series are IMO decent weapons but they require excessive cleaning (they also get it and that creates other problems).

John Garand was interviewed about the M16s teething issues. He said that his rifle went through the same issues in 1942. As for reliability, a Marine friend told me that the M16 was too small and the M14 had too many reliability issues. He favored the AKM. I didn't argue.

[AlexTX ret]

What is problematic in my view is that a well armed and trained infantryman has not been available to the US in large numbers really since the end of WW II -- and those infantrymen mostly came out of Italy and the Pacific, the northwest European battles were, after July 44, not Infantry battles but combined arms in the greatest sense; infantry skills were of marginal value except for the period in the Ardennes

The whole concept of Blitzkreig took the emphasis of the infantryman away from the effectiveness of mobile warfare. Even today, I hear stories of infantry sections being couped up in their IFVs for up to 11-12 hours. The only effective use of infantry was to keep Hunter-Killer groups away from their tanks and to hold ground from counter attacks by the enemy. It's a bit different situation in urban areas bu there the military tries to marginalize that as muchas possible. One factor I think is that the Civilian Govenment is afraid of casualties on civilian moral.

In any event, the senior leadership of the Army will invest heavily in the Infantry but the priorities get skewed and tend to emphasize technology as a substitute for training.

I feel that Airmobile tactics in Vietnam sort of blew a hole in the concepts of the higher ups and they have never caught up since then. The helicopter was as hightech as it came in the beginning and the tactics of the 7th air mobile division were astonishing. I didn't get in on the ground floor but even by the time I became involved, most higher commanders didn't know how to handle the troops.

Since then till the COIN activites today, IMHO, the upper levels of the military's bureaucracy have been left behind and unfortunately what they don't understand, they won't allow lower level commanders to effectively attempt.

The M-14 contacts had gone from Springfield Armory (the government original and the developer of the tooling who also manufactured some 50K or so for issue) to Harrington & Richardson with a contract for 150K (IIRC) ~$145.00 each; Winchester got the contract for the second batch of the same size at about $109. each. Having completed proofing test production runs, DA was going to let a contract for 1M. TRW had never made a weapon before but wanted in the defense business and they had some good Engineers; they said we won't bid on 1M but if you'll give us a contract for 2M, we'll make them for $90.00 each (and that was four dollars cheaper than the M1 at the time...). So they got the contract and were in mid stream when McNamara decided to kill the contract (paying a cancellation penalty) and buy the M-16 for about $210.00 apiece.

The decision was based as much or more on the fact that TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign and were big time Republican supporters while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's campaign. Bobby Kennedy was a vindictive little guy.

All true by my memories and papers that I read of the times.

Olin didn't do that on their own, the Army dictated the powder change to get a lower chamber pressure. That also resulted in lower energy and more powder fouling. Regrettably, the first year of service in Viet Nam did see a lot of failure due to not keeping weapons clean.

The papers that I have read that Olin went to Army first saying they could save the Army money. Also that by not using the spec powder, which was turning out to be harder to get, they could keep to their contract of so many rounds in a certain time.

The M16 and M4 are adequate combat weapons; they aren't great but they're okay. They DO require, IMO an excessive amount of maintenance.

Yes, the are "okay" and because of finacial restraints, maybe what we can afford for a while. I just wish the Army would admit to it rather then blaming the poor private that he isn't doing his part.

[AlexTX ret]

6.5 MPC is still only a compromise, designed to fit within the 5.56 envelope. It may have some nice advantages but little that would strike me as breathtaking (also not sure how well it defeats body armour). 6.5 Grendel would be a little more breath taking but even that is a compromise for the same reason (length-wise anyway). These are all rounds that are designed to suit, to some extent anyway, existing platforms. Going for a marginal compromise would probably not end the conversation.

The group of us who say the 6.5 MPC would be a better round say so because only a barrel change would be needed. We're still paying for the banks you know.

I think the 6.5 Grendal would be a better round but would reguire a upper reciever change plus the barrel replacement. If you're going to do that, maybe you should go for a whole weapon change. The HK416 in 7x43 would be advantagess. The 7x43 is the best cartridge that I have found that balances all the factors of the modern day tactics. However, beside the cost of the weapon you would have to increase training cost for each individual trooper.

I think the US have missed (another) beautiful opportunity in the late seventies/early eighties with the 6 mm SAW, which was said to have been dropped for fear of adding a third calibre. That could have been a good round to replace both other calibres. The M16A1 was in need of replacement anyway, so the A2 might as well have been a totally different weapon, me thinks. Back then most NATO members had not yet committed to 5.56 either….....hindsight.

Yep! That is why I wonder if our leaders understand what the job of a rifleman is all about.

Really? With 1 in 7 barrels? That would make for a short-range weapon.

No, they actually want to change the barrels to optimize the M193 round. They're talking about going back to the 1:12 to 1:14 barrels. Who would of thunk.

[Rifleman]

I feel that Airmobile tactics in Vietnam sort of blew a hole in the concepts of the higher ups and they have never caught up since then. The helicopter was as hightech as it came in the beginning and the tactics of the 7th air mobile division were astonishing. I didn't get in on the ground floor but even by the time I became involved, most higher commanders didn't know how to handle the troops.

11th Air Assault Division?