Some Things Never Change

[Schmedlap]

And, Ken White led the charge in the first Neolithic battle even recorded in cave paint.

JMM - I would expect you to know the rest of the story. In one battle, Ken's adroit use of a club resulted in a caveman named Cirroc being bonked unconscious and his body was frozen in the ice. Scientists later thawed him and he became... Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer!

Seriously, though, the most valuable lessons that I think we can learn from the past are not how smart Generals employed their militaries on the battlefield, but in what preparations they made prior to arriving to the battlefield - particularly in the arena of forming alliances, generating public support, putting the adversary off guard, deceptions, et cetera. The General and statesman were not always two separate individuals. In many ways, the job of the General is easier because he can now focus on a narrower set of issues and leave the political bickering to the civilians. He is also in a better position to provide advice to those civilian masters because his nose isn't against the grindstone regarding political matters. He has the luxury of stepping back and looking at everything in perspective. That was my impression as an XO. While I trusted the judgment of my CO and found him highly capable, I also noticed on several occasions that by me not being knee deep in all of his command-related issues, I could more easily critique his decisions and step in every now and then to say, "woah, sir, wait a minute - what about this...?"

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Sun Tzu and Saint Carl...say it ain't so!

In light of this newly revealed paradigm should I trash my copies of Machiavelli, du Picq, Freddy The Great, Musashi, Herodotus, Maurice of Nassau, Tacticus, Vauban, Thucydides, Vegetius, Xenophon...

Seriously, by tossing out all those pre 20th Century dude's books I could free up two shelves in one of my bookcases.

I draw the line at getting rid of my 1st Edition copy of Chandler's The Campaigns of Napoleon. Toted that beast around too many places to part with it. Not gonna do it. Wouldn't be prudent.

[jmm99]

to dispel the inaccuracies - nay, perhaps even culumnies - recited of that noted serjeant atte arms Ken de Alba, which are circulating with reckless abandon within the hallowed halls of our Inns of the Court, particularly amongst the middle benches of the fledgling barristers. Indeed, the tale is an old one - are not all truths and falsehoods old ? - of de Alba's use of a club in battle to dispatch Cirroc (a fate, which if true, was far too good for that wretched creature, allowing him admittance to Valhalla).

Nay, as revealed by our oldest pipe rolls, the facts are quite different. For Cirroc, amongst his clan and others, plied the trade of a divorce lawyer. It was in the course of de Alba's little-known first divorce that, what could have been a mutual and acceptable settlement between the man and the woman (represented by Cirroc), became a shambles because of Cirroc's abusive verbal tactics in resolving the question of custody of the Family Club. Driven beyond all reason by that divorce lawyer's antics, de Alba did indeed smote Cirroc with that honorific club - a clear case of irresistible impulse.

So, while de Alba did smote Cirroc with the club, it was not an act of war, but one of excusible assault. Perhaps, it was that story that impelled some in literary circles to claim that de Alba, by then known as White, caused the Bard to write the famous phrase "kill all the lawyers". Again, we know that also is inaccurate because the military rolls are explicit that White was then advising Lord Essex in his campaign against the Irish insurgents.

Another inaccuracy concerning de Alba (perhaps an enlargement of the Family Club tale) is that he used a club in battle. We know in fact that de Alba kept abreast of advances in military technology and wisely selected those weapon systems and associated tactics that would yield him the best advantage. Why do we know this ? Not because of the vagaries of hearsay, but because of demontrative evidence - the graphic of the blood feud battle between de Alba's clan and Cirroc's clan.

We see that de Alba employed a wedge formation - he leading the wedge; and all combatants used bows and arrows. His sense of tactics led to his now famous doctrine: "One up, two back; effective suppressive and supporting aimed fires - and hit them in the flank."

Cirroc's clan was, of course, outnumbered in this contest; for it lacked Cirroc. Not that that wretched creature would have added much as a warrior; but it was truly said that he had the voice of 10 or even 100 men - the first PsyOps officer.

PS: Wilf, the attachment is especially for you.

[slapout9]

PS: Wilf, the attachment is especially for you.

That drawing was Ken's first Strategic plan

[Ken White]

You shouldn't try to tell that when you've been partying...

Clobbered Cirroc with Wife Nr 1; head harder than club.

Not advising Essex but the O'Neill -- only thing I told Essax was to stay away from Walsingham as he would lead to trouble...

Tell Slap that plan also worked and note, not five rings but three dangles, ala Maize...

[jmm99]

Gussy, my mom's leading figure in pre-20th century Finnish history - not because of his strategies, operations and tactics (of which, she knew naught); but because he recognized the importance of Finland.

As such, he promoted Finns[*] who did know those things military: Gustaf Horn (Realm Marshal; his farm name was Kankas); Ake Tott (Field Marshal); Torsten Stålhandske (General of Cavalry); and the little-known figure in the supply services, Erik Trana (Commissioner General of War). And, he introduced to continental Europe Stålhandske's Hakkapeliittat, whose concept of normalcy was that of "total war".

So, the prayer in RC German churches during the 30-Years' War:

"A horribile Haccapaelitorum agmine libera nos, Domine".
("O Lord, deliver us from the terrible army of the Haccapelites")

Study of these combined rulers-generals leads one to question of how useful even Gussy Dullfish was to his nation. Were the often transitory gains worth the long-term costs from lost opportunities?

In the case of Charles XII of Poltava, we know the answer to be negative.

Is a nation better to have a policy formed by such as their ancestor Gussy Vasoline, who was a very reluctant warrior - either because he was too cheap, because he was sick of the slaughters that placed him on the throne, or both ?

Schmedlap, thanks for the reminder of one important use of history.

--------------------
[*] The English Wiki articles call these generals "Swedish" - checking the birth places, where they lived and their genealogies prove they were Finns (e.g., Gustaf Kankas, aka Horn). They spoke Swedish (probably as well or better than Finnish), which was simply the norm for anyone connected with the Swedish Crown at that time.

[jmm99]

from Slap
That drawing was Ken's first Strategic plan

a plausible suggestion - or, his after action report. Much less likely (since I don't think Ken believes in magic in things military) is a graphic invocation of magic before the battle.

We will have to get the answer from the bunny's mouth.

[jmm99]

the true scoop - and proof that even the ancient pipe rolls were sometimes inaccurate. Essex's military rolls were known to be very inaccurate (serious fact, not funning).

And, Ken, I'm so happy that you were on the right side - thought mention of Essex would get your Ulster going.

[William F. Owen]

I trash my copies of Machiavelli, du Picq, Freddy The Great, Musashi, Herodotus, Maurice of Nassau, Tacticus, Vauban, Thucydides, Vegetius, Xenophon...

You read Vauban? I am seriously impressed. What works? I can't find any of his work in English or recently and affordably published. He's is the uber-dog of Military Thought codification - something I aspire to!

I would also add FOCH, - a brilliant a very misunderstood man.

[CR6]

I draw the line at getting rid of my 1st Edition copy of Chandler's The Campaigns of Napoleon. Toted that beast around too many places to part with it. Not gonna do it. Wouldn't be prudent.

The only thing that keeps this from being my favorite book ever is the fact that it's a two-man lift.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification which I picked up at a library book sale pretty cheap in Yuma, AZ. The Vauban Fortifications of France by Paddy Griffin, a recent addition to Osprey's Fortress series, is a pretty good adjunct to it.

Foch doesn't really fit into the Viscount de Turenne's admonition of our general's lacking an appreciation for the study of pre-twentieth century warfare.

I would like to get a hold of his work. It is tough to get English versions of French strategic thinkers of the early 20th Century and my abysmal French doesn't lend itself to serious reading in it. I recently finished Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914-18 by Clayton and Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War by Doughty.

@CR6: My copy has a special place in my heart since several pages (the chapter on Rivoli and the spine) still show the effects from having been read under a leaky poncho, in the rain, on a hillside near Yechon, then dropped when I slipped on the way back to my hooch.

[William F. Owen]

A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification which I picked up at a library book sale pretty cheap in Yuma, AZ. The Vauban Fortifications of France by Paddy Griffin, a recent addition to Osprey's Fortress series, is a pretty good adjunct to it.

I owe you a Schwarma and a beer, if you get your ass the Tel Aviv!
I know Paddy. Didn't know he'd written about Vauban.

Foch doesn't really fit into the Viscount de Turenne's admonition of our general's lacking an appreciation for the study of pre-twentieth century warfare.

I would like to get a hold of his work. It is tough to get English versions of French strategic thinkers of the early 20th Century and my abysmal French doesn't lend itself to serious reading in it. I recently finished Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914-18 by Clayton and Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War by Doughty.

Foch is very poorly understood in my opinion, thanks to some very sloppy military history. I have the 1918 edition of "Principles," in English.

A lot of the statements are of dubious merit, but within that, he is talking about a lot of stuff that we assume the Manoeuvre Warfare lobby invented. If you believe in something called Manoeuvre Warfare, then Foch was a believer and advocated as early as 1903. Moreover he clearly understands how armies work, in a way not clearly or usefully written about today.

[jmm99]

are available at Google Books: Foch search; and Vauban search.

Just downloaded OK Foch's Principles, his Precepts and Judgments (both in Eng) and the 1906 Principles in French.

The Vauban books are all in French - sorry, Wilf.

[Surferbeetle]

I have no financial interests in, and am not associated in any way with this website, but I have received excellent customer service from them and note that they carry many neat books to include St. Carl in German for Wilf, Vauban for Umar Al-Mokhtār, and...

Biblio.com

[Schmedlap]

Speaking of technology and it's impact on war. I'm looking at my bookshelf and one of the books is "The Utility of Force" by GEN Rupert Smith. He points out that the two weapons that kill more people than any other, in spite of our technological and social progress, are the AK and the machete. I would add that another common strategy or tactic - depending on how you classify it - is rape. And forced conscription is still common, including children (so I guess our personnel system could actually be worse ).

The only thing that keeps this from being my favorite book ever is the fact that it's a two-man lift.

That quote just brought back a bad memory. When I was an XO, I was the survey officer for a report of survey that was so large, so outrageous, had so many exhibits, and so much other related paperwork, that took so long to process, that we did not even call it by its document number. It was known throughout the battalion S-4 shop as the "two-man lift Report of Survey." Many trees gave their lives to finalize that nutroll. I actually dedicated one USB stick solely to that headache. And when the ordeal ended, I was only able to get one month's pay from the clown responsible for it all.

[William F. Owen]

Speaking of technology and it's impact on war. I'm looking at my bookshelf and one of the books is "The Utility of Force" by GEN Rupert Smith. He points out that the two weapons that kill more people than any other, in spite of our technological and social progress, are the AK and the machete. I would add that another common strategy or tactic - depending on how you classify it - is rape. And forced conscription is still common, including children (so I guess our personnel system could actually be worse ).

The General is right about the Machete and the AK, but a great deal of that book fails the "So what" test. Once you boil it all down, you are not left with much, and almost everything he says was said by other authors in last 25 years.
Now, he is a very good General, jolly nice chap, and friend of several friends of mine, but had the book not been written by him, it is very doubtful we would be discussing it.
I am not quite sure how rape has a political or military dimension. What's the premise of it being a strategy?

[davidbfpo]

(From a non-SWJ friend)The only books in English I have are all on fortifications and sieges – Abel Swall’s 1702 translation, Rothrock’s Manual of A Siegecraft and Fortification and Blomfield’s biography.

Rothrock’s translation is the nearest I have which has some of Vauban’s military philosophy and codification in it; I found it second hand on the internet at $65, 2 years ago. There are tonight two copies on Abebooks at $60 and $78.

There are numerous books on fortification, in English, that include Vauban and of course there is a Vauban society, in France. Perhaps some of our French members can help too.

Hope this helps.

davidbfpo

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

is very, very, very tempting.

My short visit to Haifa over a quarter of a century now past was delightful.

Now if I only had the money and the time...

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

I am not quite sure how rape has a political or military dimension. What's the premise of it being a strategy?

Really, it's more of a tactic that has strategic implications (like terrorism ). In many cultures, "rape" is considered to be the woman's fault, and serves to a) cut her off from her support network while, at the same time, b) shaming / dishonouring her male relatives ("'real' men can protect their women!"). As such, it doubly weakens a targeted population.

In other societies, it has been used as part of an ideological program of "forced eugenics". While it has similar effects, it also totally disturbs the cultural birth-spacing and drains resources while, at the same time, ensuring a "future generation" that will be at odds with the parental generation; a social destabilizing influence.

[Schmedlap]

Wilf / Marc,

Marc's response is basically what I had in mind. As for why this is "strategic," I was thinking that this generally occurs in countries that don't have a planned parenthood on every corner. If the rape victims are impregnated, then they are probably going to carry the child to term. Pregnant women require more food and medical care, have the risk of complications or death, have less energy, et cetera. It is a drain on resources, in instills terror and emotional distress that could be debilitating to a society for long after it occurs, or instills terror far greater than simply the fear of attack, and it has the "eugenics" effect that Marc mentioned. (Kind of like in Braveheart: "The problem with Scotland is that it is full of Scots").

I'm not a strategist. Do those qualify as strategic considerations?