It's the Tribes

[Hacksaw]

I'm with Slapout.... where is the teaser beyond - I know something you don't?

I'm intrigued... I'd say the approaches that tribeguy describes have been the focal point of the Seminar that the USA/USMC COIN Center has pitched for the past 3.5 years (problem is that as cursory as that treatment is... 7 days) but that approach is not universally adopted across training/education entities...

So.... Tribeguy, help us help you, if what you have to sell is unique and helpful... loosen the copywrite strings a little and let us read and think about your approach beyond a few leading questions...

I love the smell of sunflowers in the morning... it smells like... summer

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by Steve Blair

Interesting, but any close reading of the Army's operations on our own frontier would have pointed out the importance of understanding tribal organization and interior politics. Sad how we always have to reinvent the understanding wheel every few years....

Absolutely, on another thread we were talking about the Revolutionary War and Indians. George Washington was a land surveyor by trade and he had numerous contacts and knowledge of the Indian tribes that certainly were of benefit during our own Insurgency. But we seem to have forgotten that as Steve points out.

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by Hacksaw

I'm with Slapout.... where is the teaser beyond - I know something you don't?

I'm intrigued... I'd say the approaches that tribeguy describes have been the focal point of the Seminar that the USA/USMC COIN Center has pitched for the past 3.5 years (problem is that as cursory as that treatment is... 7 days) but that approach is not universally adopted across training/education entities...

So.... Tribeguy, help us help you, if what you have to sell is unique and helpful... loosen the copywrite strings a little and let us read and think about your approach beyond a few leading questions...

I love the smell of sunflowers in the morning... it smells like... summer

Yea, there is another best seller out called Tribes by marketing expert Seth Godin and your sales tactics seem to mimic this book

[tribeguy]

Alcon:

I appreciate your concerns, but a chapter or two out of my book isn't going to get you where we all need to be.

I do post things on my blog at www.theiraqiarabtribalsystem.com, but I am not sure that anybody (anthropologist or not) is really going to understand the fullness of it without some basics that come from actual Iraqi Arabic Tribal scholarship. That's why I wrote the book. We, on the whole, have a partial understanding of the importance of tribes and their relationship to all things relevant in Iraq. This concerns me a great deal.

And I'm not saying that I understand the fullness of it - after having briefed the commander of MND South, as well as a variety of other senior level officers, however, the universal response has been "I wish we would have known about this five years ago." So, while I think most are pursuing a greater understanding of the tribal system, I believe that we are limited by the way that we approach the subject - through our western prism.

For example, Tom posted the idea that he studies the tribes as it is necessary. Well, what Tom believes is necessary might differ substantially from what is actually required. Also, what I think is necessary might be overstated, and it might also fall short. I think that we all need to remain very curious about this subject. Tribalism is one of the most powerful currents in Iraqi history, not just post-Saddam. There are reasons for this that need to be understood before we start trying to put tribalism in some kind of conceptual box. Tom has stated in other posts that tribalism and sectarianism are both important, and I agree with that. There are many scholars that believe that sect and tribe are separate issues - and they are not. The question then becomes, where does tribalism and sectarianism intersect.

That's why I ask the question: what are the noble tribes in Iraq, and what is their role in.....well, everything. It's a subject of study - and it is not something that I can answer even in the most longwinded post here.

Some of the topics that are most germane in the book are: 1) the Arabic Naming Convention and its Application to Tactical Tribal Analysis, 2) the sub tribal naming convention and its application to tactical and strategic tribal analysis, and 3) the identification and management of Iraqi tribal hegemonies at the national, regional, provincial, Qadha, and Nahiya Levels and 4) The relationship between the democratic model of government and the tribal system and who this empowers, and also who it automatically disenfranchises.

Having been involved in operations at the ground level for four years, I am confident that our collective understanding of this (including anthropologists) is insufficient and thus doesn't bring us the really important data that we need to incorporate into our strategies from the corps level to the company level.

That being said, I pose the questions to Tom, as he works for MND-C: What is the relevance of Sunni noble tribes to events on the ground in Baghdad province, from the the FOR to the present? What is the connection between Sunni noble tribes and the insurgency (based on open source stuff only).

I presented some of the answers to this to the class that I gave yesterday. I am so grateful to them for bearing with me through this.

The book is very inexpensive in comparison to the thousands of dollars that I have spent amassing Iraqi and other arabic tribal research. My heart tells me to give the book away, but my wife disagrees. So, I made the book inexpensive, and I trust that everybody else who has written a book that they believe is important would and has done exactly the same thing. Further, writing the book has cost me a substantial amount of money. The copies that I have were the ones that I had to purchase. I'm not in this for self promotion, nor am I in this for the money. I am also not in this to go further into debt. I am sure that anybody can understand this.

Besides, the issue at stake here is the tribes and our efforts in Iraq. I have something to contribute beyond my book, and so does everybody else. Buy it, or don't. But let's talk about the tribes, eh?

What I will do for free is post my provincial analysis of tribal balances of power in Iraq, the data from which was translated directly from 'Abd 'Aun Al-Rudhan's "Encyclopedia of Iraqi Tribes," Dar Al-Ahaliya L-Al-Nashar Wa Al-Tawzi'a, 2007. I am in the process of completing this analysis, and hope to have the intial results by this Friday.

The database that I put together on this allows for me to drill down to Qadha and Nahiya levels as well. My intentions are to build a model of Iraqi society, including the government with the tribal system as its base. Now, this is a top down approach that I hope will assist those who operate in theater in understanding the connections between events on the ground and the broader strategic picture in terms of tribalism and politics.

It's going to take some time, and since this is all going to be open source without the nuisance of copyright issues, I'll be pleased to share it with those who care to actually use it.

That being said, the tribal picture isn't comprehensible without a disciplined approach to the sub tribes vis a vis the sub tribal naming convention- which is the Arab convention, and not our western model. I have found that the Arab method is much more easy to understand, and allows us westerners to distinguish between the thousands of sub tribes that have exactly the same first names.

As for giving what I know without asking the leading questions, I disagree. The questions are the most important thing. Once those questions are understood, I think that everybody is going to own this subject. And that is my goal - that we all own it. The leading questions aren't for me to answer. They are for everybody to answer. I don't have all the answers. I do have some questions that have led to fruitful answers, but those answers aren't permanent, as the tribal system and politics are dynamic. So, the questions are key, and have to be asked and studied on an ongoing basis.


Hacksaw - I am in Leavenworth. Contact me at sam.stolzoff@gmail.com, and I'll send you my contact data. I'd be pleased to help you, now that you mention that you are at the COIN Center. That goes for others who are in Leavenworth. I have a lot of presentations put together that cover topics that are germance to your efforts, may add some nuance to what you already have, and some methods and applications that you all might not.


Thanks for all of your input.

Tribe on!

V/r,

tribeguy

[tribeguy]

True - the Brits had some true genius - Sandeman is amazing. Those who were in charge of Transjordan were also very skilled and shrewd at tribal administration.

Alas, many of those lessons are indeed long forgotten.

We Americans truly want to do the right thing, but we often listen to the wrong people when it comes to getting counsel on tribes.

There are many in academic circles who are discourged from studing tribalism - it's not PC. It's seen as culturally judgemental. So, for the last 50 years, glorious academia has fallen short in tribal studies. Yes, there are some fine works out there, but their scope is generally quite small.

Worse yet, our soft science student corps generally doesn't speak foreign languages, and especially middle eastern ones. So, the chinese wall between academia and middle eastern studies is built with the brick and mortar of our making.

Now, I am not a fan of all things British, but hats off to your brave forefathers (and to you too for raising the point!).

I agree, also, with Tom about HTS. But, good things are happening there - and they are getting much, much better. More on that to follow - the system is starting to emerge on the Iraq side of the house. I am very hopeful in that regard. I'm not too sure about the Afghan side of the house quite yet. The Afghan side works very hard, but the data sets available for them prevent predictive analysis at this point. Predictive capability (or at least educated guestimation) is being developed on the Iraq side of the house, of that I am quite confident.


V/r,

tribeguy

[Steve the Planner]

I suppose its a little of each.

Like Tom said, we know a lot. All the older tribal references have been pretty exhaustively mapped if you know where to ask. Seen 'em and spent much time debating them with the folks who put 'em together. If you really wanted to track names, its easier to cross-reference the Land Records with the property maps (both are digital), and track the name influences and transfers.

Problem with all these sources is that with some 15-25% of the population in rapid transit pulses since the 1970's (not just our displacements), older printed references (like the old tribal maps) do not reflect the facts on the ground in many of the critical areas (especially the disputed areas). Somebody on the ground better make sure who is where NOW before any serious actions are backed by outdated data.

In September 2008, I assembled all the census data for Central and Northern Iraq going back to the 1930's---Iraqis themselves tracked ethnic and religious info via census, not tribal, until 1980's. The tribal maps were elsewhere but I have digital copies of most. I had to create a complete set of census places/pol/admin maps to connect the data to places and politics, but, once done, it showed very enlightening patterns (up to a point).

Once you followed through on the ground, it often seemed that the parties who knew what they were doing were focused not on tribal issues but on shifting political demographics to beyond a tipping point on a nahia-by-nahia basis. It sometimes seemed random to us, but the real players new how the underlying geo-political/ethnic/religious game is played (Iraqis don't need to be taught gerrymandering---they are hard-wired for it). So, do you follow old, partially relevant data, or the big drivers.

Sam's point about tribes having less influence in cities sort of mirrors the Talabani/Barhzani split in the Kurdish world. Talabani represented the urban (and often educated and technocratic) Kurds, and Barhzani the old land holder class (like the Bhuttos in Pakistan). One is not very tribally oriented, and the other is. The combination of different cultural, social, educational, business and other outlooks between the two (technocrats vs. old land owners), begs the question of how much the tribal (vs. other socio-economic, ethnic) factors are a major driver.

Nonetheless, Iraq is primarily an urbanized population, following similar rapid urbanization (or ruralization of cities) in many areas. This urbanization pattern, and it's inherent result of breaking down tribal links, often goes hand in hand with those things needed to become successful in an urban environment. As an urbanist (an urban planner and economic geographer by training), I am intrigued by the cross-cultural commonalities of the pressures that arise from urbanization (whether in New York in 1880 when immigrants came, or most northern US cities when everybody (and particularly southern blacks) moved to the cities in and after WWII, and the folks that have exploded the populations of cities in places like Iraq, Afpak,etc... How do you keep 'em down on the farm, and what do they need to go through once they arrive?

Yesterday, I attended a talk by Linda Robinson (Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq), and share her belief that: the tribal thing was overplayed. A knowledgeable Arab explained it to me like coming into New York after the technocrats drove off the Tammany Halls, and offering to boost up the old mafiosi to replace them (a less than desirable step backwards).

Alas, I agree with Sam that the level and quality of information in US hands is far from what it should be. As one who suspects the SOFA will not be supported by the Iraqi public (even with consequences of insecurity), and, therefore, our current time is short, I wish there was more focused and systematic attention to collecting up the information that would be useful later.

Steve

[jcustis]

I don't mean to be wry or flip when I ask this, but why should WE be worried about the tribe context?...so we can advise the Iraqis on the issues inherent with them, or just know what forces are at work?

This smells to me like you think we are still in the lead in Iraq, or should be. If I misread you, my apologies, but I just get this sense of gloom eminating over how little we know about the tribes. I have to ask the question of why (at this juncture) we should care?

Tribalism in general?...got it. Iraqi tribalism?...not so sure it is as relevant as argued here.

[Steve the Planner]

Yesterday, I had the pleasure of meeting the Honorable Iraqi Ambassador Sumaidaei (Hope I got that right). He is a man of great distinction, and very worldy and well-educated.

Put him together with the likes of Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh, and the current (Dr. Ali Baban) and former Ministers of Planning, and you have enough US and British diplomas to float a new think tank in DC.

So how do these distinguished and forward-looking Iraqis, who are all very much in important positions, fit into a view that tribes are anything more than relevant, but not central to Iraq's future?

Saddam was a nobody by birth, and leapfrogged to prominence by expanding the power of a lesser tribe into something powerful...using bloodlines for security first, and tribal factors as coincidental. No?

Sure he played up his link to Salah ad Din, but he was actually a Kurd from Erbil.

Steve

[tribeguy]

Jcustis - our ability to prosecute the GWOT in general will be enhanced manyfold by our knowledge of tribes. One of our errors as westerners is to assume that there is such a thing as a tribe that is confined within national borders.

We are all concerned with the war against terror here, and our enemy as substantial mastery of the tribal system, does use this material. Have a look at Al-Sahab.com, and you will find that members of the salafist community that sympathize (work with) AQ and other affilliated organizations trade this data, and I must assume that this is because the tribal networks are their logistical and recruitment networks. (Actually, that's not an assumption.)

So, why should we care? Because detailed knowledge of the tribal networks are vital to our lines of effort in Iraq and the GWOT.

Willful ignorance of this will teach us very painful lessons that result ultimately in the deaths of our soldiers. Sythesis of tribal network analysis has and will continue to play a very important role in our lines of effort. Not continuing to develop our capabilities in that is like saying we don't need a rifle that is better than the M16, or that we don't need to develop new weapons systems, or that we should ignore Iran. It's a bad mistake, considering that we'll likely be involved in the Middle East for the forseeable future, and that the small wars that we prosecute in other places throughout the world largely take place in tribal socities. If we develop solid and precise methodologies in Iraq, they will come in handy in the Horn of Africa, the Phillipines....

In other words, tribal analysis has been a huge force multiplier or us in certain circles. Yes I am an advocate of expanding this capability so that we can have it at the ready for future conflicts. Precision in this area gives us great insight into the "why" of the intelligence process in terms of prosecuting a COIN. As others have noted in other forums, we have some serious S2 shortcoming in terms of syntesizing cultural data into the intelligence process. The rewards for successfully doing so are readily apparent as per the capture of Khalid ((Al-Mashhadani)) on 4Jul07 - a noble tribesman that Nibras Al-Kazimi identified as being Abu 'Umar Al-Baghdadi in his blog www.talismangate.blogspot.com. Khalid was a noble tribesman! Sheikh Hamid ((Al-Zawi)), the new Abu 'Umar Al-Baghdadi is, too! What does this tell you about AQ's tribal engagement strategy?

Not care about the tribes? The enemy does. The Awakening is completely tribal. The tribal system can be our friend, or an enemy to be feared. Just ask the Brits who were massacred in the Middle Euphrates in 1920.

I think it would be wise to analyze all phenomena that occur in Iraq in from a tribal perspective, in addition to others. My experience from doing so is that it is often more reliable than other, western oriented means of analysis. More importantly, history teaches us that ignoring the tribes leads to failure when it comes to the Middle East! We are prosecuting a COIN. Ignoring the organic political structures of the green population is unsound from a conceptual point of view, in my opinion. However, my views are the product of my experiences, education, and those who have had great influence on me throughout my life. The truth is bigger than that, of course.

All of your comments are great - I'm interested in this ((Al-Samida'a)) character that one of our members had the pleasure of working with. It might please you to know that he is a noble tribesmen - and while some might wish to downplay this - the subject of noble tribes seems to keep rearing its head in terms of the insurgency on both the Shi'ite and Sunni sides of the fence. I find the fact that Mr. ((Al-Samida'a)) uses his tribal name to be very interesting, particularly if he downplays the importance of tribalism in Iraq to you. In fact, the concept of noble tribes is culturally central in terms of tribalism and Islam despite the fact that the noble tribes are small. Why is this?

The Iraqi intelligentsia wants to move us away from analyzing their society in terms of tribes, and to the degree that such a thing would be insulting I can understand that position. Keeping in mind such sensitivities is important, this doesn't discourage me from diving into the issue. There is certainly a time and place for discussing tribalism- and talking tribalism in a meeting with a major representative of the Iraqi government might not be the most polite thing to do until you have an established and trusted relationship with that individual that has lasted for more than a few hours, and when the conversation is private.

As the sheikh of the ((Al-'Akra'a)) ((Al-Shimmari)) tribe told me a couple of months ago "Yes, we have our doctors, our lawyers and our politicians, and they say that they aren't us (tribesmen). Actually, they always are, and always will be. We Iraqis are like schools of fish - we can only swim in certain waters. If we go to waters where there is the slightest change in salinity, it could kill us. We like to stay together."

Outstanding comments all - fascinating. Again, the noble tribes.....

V/r,

sam

[Steve the Planner]

Tribe guy:

You can ready His Excellency Ambassador Sumaida'ie's bio at www.iraqembassy.us/Ambassador.htm

He is also a subject written about in Linda Robinson's Petreaus book.

If you want to wrap him in your worldview of noble tribes, I can't change that, but I watched him sit across from Linda as she gave a speech in which she said the tribe thing was overplayed in Iraq, and he shook his head in agreement.

Maybe there are other dimensions???

Steve

[Surferbeetle]

From today's BBC Dramatic plane arrest of ex-Iraq minister

Iraq's former trade minister has been arrested at Baghdad airport on corruption charges as he was trying to leave the country.

Officials said Abdul Falah Sudani had been on a flight to the United Arab Emirates which was asked to turn back to Baghdad so he could be arrested.

Mr Sudani resigned as minister earlier this month amid claims officials in his department had embezzled large sums.

He denies wrongdoing. Investigators had already arrested one of his brothers.

Sabah Mohammed Sudani was held on suspicion of corruption at a checkpoint in the south of the country on 9 May.

[Jedburgh]

Originally Posted by tribeguy

....One of our errors as westerners is to assume that there is such a thing as a tribe that is confined within national borders.....

That is not just a general statement - with all the caveats going along with that - but stating that "westerners" assume such a thing is yet another assumption on your part. As someone who was not too long ago a young buck sergeant in uniform, you know exactly what assume means.

Awareness of cross-border (often not just two, but multiple borders) has long been critical in strategic intelligence analysis and especially for SOF. It was known and exploited in many ways by both sides during the good ol' Cold War days.

And tribal network analysis is simply another aspect of simple social network analysis. Hell, I've worked tribal influence linkages since the stubby pencil days of charting. Most other old HUMINT'ers with a focus in regions with substantial tribal populations could say the same thing in their unique context. As a relatively recent example, in the early '90s (during Provide Comfort) we did extensive tribal analysis integrating that with resettlement patterns and the influence of political parties among the Kurds. And during the period between Desert Storm and OIF, extensive study and research was done at the strategic level (and in academic circles) on how Saddam manipulated tribal relations to solidify his power base.

I could go on and on with historic examples - both of success and failure in where tribal knowledge (or the lack thereof) played a role. With regard to what most consider the roles of intelligence and policy in "modern" warfare, there are extensive lessons dating back to WWI. But you could all the way back to Caesar's Commentarii de Bello Gallico and see how he took tribal networks into consideration during the IPB process and how it ultimately affected operations. A lot of lessons have been forgotten, but new ones are being learned - and making general statements about how the importance of tribes is being ignored is simply insulting to all of those who effectively integrate such awareness into operations and policy.

The "willful ignorance" comment with regard to al-Qa'ida's exploitation of tribal networks for logistics and recruitment is a also a bit over the top. (Whether or not it is self-serving is another question) Those focused with real responsibility on the issue are have long been well aware of such exploitation, as well as how important tribal networks are for JI and other such organizations. But there is an entire spectrum of influence factors, and to focus too tightly on tribes - as to focus too narrowly on any aspect - is a recipe for failure.

Finally, as regards this continuing discussion, your arguments thus far tend to be devoid of substantial context, failing to flesh out your position clearly at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. You're crying out listen to me, I know the answers, yet your own assumptions and repeated generalizations in pushing your single-focus agenda do you little intellectual credit. I'll pass on the book.

[Tom Odom]

Originally Posted by Jedburgh

That is not just a general statement - with all the caveats going along with that - but stating that "westerners" assume such a thing is yet another assumption on your part. As someone who was not too long ago a young buck sergeant in uniform, you know exactly what assume means.

Awareness of cross-border (often not just two, but multiple borders) has long been critical in strategic intelligence analysis and especially for SOF. It was known and exploited in many ways by both sides during the good ol' Cold War days.

And tribal network analysis is simply another aspect of simple social network analysis. Hell, I've worked tribal influence linkages since the stubby pencil days of charting. Most other old HUMINT'ers with a focus in regions with substantial tribal populations could say the same thing in their unique context. As a relatively recent example, in the early '90s (during Provide Comfort) we did extensive tribal analysis integrating that with resettlement patterns and the influence of political parties among the Kurds. And during the period between Desert Storm and OIF, extensive study and research was done at the strategic level (and in academic circles) on how Saddam manipulated tribal relations to solidify his power base.

I could go on and on with historic examples - both of success and failure in where tribal knowledge (or the lack thereof) played a role. With regard to what most consider the roles of intelligence and policy in "modern" warfare, there are extensive lessons dating back to WWI. But you could all the way back to Caesar's Commentarii de Bello Gallico and see how he took tribal networks into consideration during the IPB process and how it ultimately affected operations. A lot of lessons have been forgotten, but new ones are being learned - and making general statements about how the importance of tribes is being ignored is simply insulting to all of those who effectively integrate such awareness into operations and policy.

The "willful ignorance" comment with regard to al-Qa'ida's exploitation of tribal networks for logistics and recruitment is a also a bit over the top. (Whether or not it is self-serving is another question) Those focused with real responsibility on the issue are have long been well aware of such exploitation, as well as how important tribal networks are for JI and other such organizations. But there is an entire spectrum of influence factors, and to focus too tightly on tribes - as to focus too narrowly on any aspect - is a recipe for failure.

Finally, as regards this continuing discussion, your arguments thus far tend to be devoid of substantial context, failing to flesh out your position clearly at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. You're crying out listen to me, I know the answers, yet your own assumptions and repeated generalizations in pushing your single-focus agenda do you little intellectual credit. I'll pass on the book.

Well said, Ted.

Best

Tom

[tribeguy]

Overplayed in some cases - yes. The Tribal Awakening is certainly overplayed at his point in time.

Overplayed in accordance with our understanding of tribes yes. But there is something about the tribal system that we don't get -that something is where tribe and sect meet.

The underlying story of the insurgency, and much of Iraqi history has to do with struggles of groups of people over who should rule the Caliphate. Tribe and sect meet at this juncture.

Which are the tribes from which the ruler of the Caliphate should come? This is a body of knowledge that you don't find in western books, and further puts UBL and middle eastern political Islam in a light that is much more understandable, and gives more predictive power than trying to interpret events on the ground in terms of who we westerners think about the tribes.

The Tribal Awakening, from a certain perspective, has been overplayed.

The analysis of tribes with respect to actually figuring out "why" the insurgency happened, and why those conditions still exist today speaks to the center of COIN.

The noble tribes are most certainly a part of this answer. I certainly don't mean to downplay the efforts of those with "real responsibility" in that area, however, I am also certain that nobody is talking about the noble tribes and their dispositions with respect to the current GOI. The divergence of interest between Sunni Noble tribes and their Shi'ite counterparts explains an awful lot about why the insurgency wasn't a united front against US forces, and why they were fighting each other.

True, I am withholding some information - but I am doing so so that you all can be the ones who discover this on your own. The subject falls squarely in the field of our anthropologist friends. They are the ones that should be able to answer the questions regarding the noble tribes with great specificity with respect to Iraq. Their theories and analytical models, if applied most directly to events on the ground in Iraq, will show what I am talking about with respect to the noble tribes.

Do a cursory review of all of the AUAB's except for the ((Al-Mujama'i)) that is in custody right now (he's an imposter - a tool in an information operation against AQ). Find out whether or not they are from noble tribes.

Then, do a cursory review of the tribal affiliations of Iraqi Shi'ite Imams (not ((Al-Sistani)), he's Irani).

So what? I think you will find that all of the AUAB's are from Sunni noble tribes, and the majority of the major Iraqi Shi'ite Imams are from noble tribes as well.

The previous speaker of the house was Mahmud ((Al-Mashhadani)), the future one will be a ((Al-Samara'i)). Both are Sunni noble tribes. Both speakers, in sucesssion. All the AUAB's - in succession, and most if not all of the Shi'ite Iraqi Imams, in succession are from noble tribes.

Both sides claim to be the direct descendants of Muhammad, the prophet. Both sides tacitly believe that they have a right to at least candidacy for Caliph.

The argument over the Caliphate is ongoing, even while the current Iraqi governmnet is in power. The noble tribes are at the center of that, and thus at the center of the insurgency (on both sides of the sectarian fence).

And yes, the noble tribes have been ignored. It's a sensitive subject for our Iraqi friends. However, 'Ali Al-Wardi discusses these issues with great frankness from a historical perspective in his book "Lamahat Ijtima'iya," which alas has not been translated into English. The names of the noble tribes have shown up over and over again throughout Iraqi history - but without knowing the context of why they are noble and why this has been and is still an important driver from a cultural perspective has and does inhibit us from understanding why certain phenomena such as insurgencies and sectarian violence occur. There is a depth to this that isn't applied by our huminters and our analysts across the board.

As Galula states in his books - it is best to listen to all members of your units, even measly former buck sergeants like me. I appreciate Jedburgh's rebuke - but just because I was a buck sergeant doesn't mean that I wasn't in a position of real responsibilty, and nor does it define anything about me except to those who can't think outside of the box.

-Tribeguy

[jcustis]

Originally Posted by tribeguy

Overplayed in some cases - yes. The Tribal Awakening is certainly overplayed at his point in time.

Overplayed in accordance with our understanding of tribes yes. But there is something about the tribal system that we don't get -that something is where tribe and sect meet.

The underlying story of the insurgency, and much of Iraqi history has to do with struggles of groups of people over who should rule the Caliphate. Tribe and sect meet at this juncture.

Which are the tribes from which the ruler of the Caliphate should come? This is a body of knowledge that you don't find in western books, and further puts UBL and middle eastern political Islam in a light that is much more understandable, and gives more predictive power than trying to interpret events on the ground in terms of who we westerners think about the tribes.

-Tribeguy

This sounds like the thesis to your book, which is what folks like me wanted to hear from your first post on the subject, rather than just the broad-brush claim that we don't pay enough attention to tribes. Now that wan't hard was it?

And please, please do not bristle at criticism. It doesn't get anybody anywhere around these parts. YOU brought up the topic of being a buck sergeant, as if Ted was attacking you over that fact. Maybe I am incorrect in this perception, but if you feel that passionately about what you have to say, you also need to remember that you will always have many detractors, both real and imagined.

Best of luck, but keep pushing the premise of your thesis to us. That will help me understand better why you think you have methodoligies that exceed the standard, or are going to allow us to understand aspects of tribes in ways that can benefit our warfighting efforts.

One particular question I have that I do not believe I asked well the first time is this: If we are attempting to end even our supporting role to the Iraqi govt and military, what does a deep understanding of the tribes gain us? As we apply fewer tactical and operational resources to the issues Iraq faces, and delve further in the political and strategic, aren't we talking more along the lines of diplomacy, and not lines of operation that a RCT or BCT commander would be concerned with (assuming the counterpart Iraqi Bde Cmdr even permits the US commander to send his troops off the FOB)?

In a post-SOFA Iraqi state, what does this tribal expertise gain us, when we are not in the lead over there?

How does this insight stack up against our commitment to the central government? I'm not certain I understand whether you are advocating a closer relationship with the noble tribes, or simply pointing out realities that you believe we do not see, to our peril when it comes to analysis of the situation with the tibes, who they might be supporting, who is getting courted by AQI/ISI, and who we need to interview/interrogate next.

[tribeguy]

Yeah - it was hard - my intention was to vet council members' tribal understanding - I believe I have done that, as I still haven't gotten the answer to the question: which are the noble tribes in Iraq?

I don't bristle at criticism. Note that I am not criticizing anybody except our collective selves - and I'm in that group. If that makes anybody bristle, well, that's the sound of a mind slamming shut. Hubris is a trap for everyone, from the lowly buck sergeant to the lofty general. I understand my cognitive limits. I wonder if the rest of us do?

Further, what we see as terrorism is a cultural manifestation that is deeply rooted in Middle Eastern society. It just happens to be a negative one, amongst many that are positive, I think. Identifying tribes that are sympathetic to the extremist version of the insurgency may well (actually does) point us in the direction sub tribes that are present throughout the rest of the middle east, and even Africa - many of which are logistical sources for ACF recruitment, lethal aid, yada yada. Many Iraqi tribes do indeed have a sub tribal presence in those other AOs, and vice versa.

Also - I was there when the tribes first approached us in 2004 - many saw where things were going, and wanted to provide security for themselves. If we knew so much about tribes then, as some of those who post here claim, then why didn't we help those tribe leaders that were, at that time, most clearly expressing that their true interests were in alignment with our own.

It's because we couldn't perceive what their interests were in the first place because we were clueless about the intertribal and intratribal alliances and disputes, and we had no idea what the concept of nobility is Islam, and apparently we still don't. The best answer I've gotten to the question of which noble tribes are in Iraq was from an anthropologist with a PhD, who could only provide a general definition of what a noble tribe is, and copped out with his statement that actually knowing ARE in Iraq is "granular knowledge." Oh, well, granular knowledge saves lives. Of course, I suppose I should sit back and just accept that - but if that is the best that anthropology can do for us in support of the GWOT, then I'm going to be looking elsewhere for answers. Middle Eastern scholarship is where it's at - with all of its warts, its still more reliable than somebody that worships at the altar of anthropological theories - or those that claim to be masters thereof but can't produce anything better than a cop-out answer. I've had the duty of applying what I learned on the job in Iraq.

I asked another social scientists "Which are the noble tribes in Ninewah province." I got a laughable answer - she said it was the Yazidis.

Our founding father, George Washington said "there should even be a place in our intelligence gathering for minutiae." Well, this is no small issue. It's the 800 lb gorilla sitting in the GWOT room.


So what? Get and stay curious, that's what. Noble tribes...

So, best we dive into this stuff while we are there, for the sake of the future GWOT. Might as well use our time wisely since we allegedly aren't in the lead, at least on the conventional side things. Iraqi tribes don't exist in a vacuum. Those stupid lines in the sand mean exactly @#$@ to a tribesmen with family members on both sides.

You said: One particular question I have that I do not believe I asked well the first time is this: If we are attempting to end even our supporting role to the Iraqi govt and military, what does a deep understanding of the tribes gain us? As we apply fewer tactical and operational resources to the issues Iraq faces, and delve further in the political and strategic, aren't we talking more along the lines of diplomacy, and not lines of operation that a RCT or BCT commander would be concerned with (assuming the counterpart Iraqi Bde Cmdr even permits the US commander to send his troops off the FOB)?

The answer to this question is easy if we stop looking at Iraq as a box, and start considering it as a vital organ in Middle Eastern Culture that is connected in a myriad of ways with all of its neighbors. What we learn there has a direct connection to how we work WITH tribal societies to fight extremists that hallucinate about the establishment of a caliphate and justify murder on that basis. An RCT or BCT commander has a very uenviable job of taking on the responsibilities of maintaining operations while deployed in Iraq, but has to be cognizant that this is just one phase of GWOT, and once we learn how to use the cultural tools that are at our disposal in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will have a much easier time getting ahead of the power curve in areas such as the FATA, HOA, et al. Hopefully, commanders with real experience in Iraq doing these things will find themselves in other areas, but this time thrice armed with a knowledge of the tribal system and the organic structures' importance in the fight against our enemy, and in the enemy's fight against us.

Yes, now we have an Iraqi government complete with diplomats so we can interface our governments in a way that seems best to us. As soon as all Iraqi insurgents quit, I suppose I'll stop studying the tribes and their connections to things that threaten to destabilize the state. I have at least 10 more years of this, as far as I can tell.

I don't bring any methodologies that are "mine" to the table. I do bring what other Iraqis call "their way of doing things" to your attention. It differs greatly from what we think we know - it's "their" methodologies, not mine. And yes, they are better than ours.

And, I'm NOT going to give away the answers to this and open myself up the "well, we already knew that" counter. If we all knew this, then I'd have my answer to which are the noble tribes in Iraq now, and happily move on to another area of study knowing that this field is in good hands. It's a good question. No good answers from the peanut gallery yet, though. Just personal attacks - but the issue remains, and I won't get distracted from driving the point home, unless of course somebody can make the point for me, which is preferable.

It's not that "I know something that you don't," its that they, the Iraqis know something that they aren't talking about, mainly because we have a tendency to ask the wrong questions about the tribes.

Case in point:

Is the tribal thing overplayed in Iraq? (obviously leading question to his excellency the noble tribesman).

Oh yes, Mrs. American writing a book about General Petraeus, the tribes are overplayed. Don't go in depth there! Nothing to see there!

I am sure that some are satisfied by such answers, especially those who were looking for that answer in the first place. As if our excellent Iraqi friend hadn't evaluated the question and decided to chose his words in such a manner that made you satisfied and served his interests in the first place. These people are far more sophisticated and savvy than you could ever imagine. Asking a question like the above is an invitation for him to warp his answer in such a way to make sure that you have no idea what is going on. Sound familiar? Well, it should! That's what Iraqis have been doing to us since 2003! What else would you expect.

Your example regarding Mr. ((Al-Samida'i)) is weak, proves nothing other than that the question was leading, and his agenda reflects that of the Da'awa party's own Nuri ((Al-Maliki)) who about 4 months ago told the American press that "the tribes are passe." The next week he was at a tribal council meeting, and shortly after that established the tribal support councils. Everything that you ever hear from any Iraqi politician is an information operation, particularly if people are taking notes.


-Tribeguy

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by tribeguy

Yeah - it was hard - my intention was to vet council members' tribal understanding - I believe I have done that, as I still haven't gotten the answer to the question: which are the noble tribes in Iraq?

Not because no one here knows, probability is that someone or several someones may but aren't inclined to play games. The obvious answer to that is that you aren't playing games. If so, then you may be making the ol' bad impression. Like this:

"...If that makes anybody bristle, well, that's the sound of a mind slamming shut. Hubris is a trap for everyone, from the lowly buck sergeant to the lofty general. I understand my cognitive limits. I wonder if the rest of us do?

We probably do understand ours and we collectively tend to avoid slamming minds shut and raise an eyebrow at anyone callow enough to suggest such things. To follow that with this:

... No good answers from the peanut gallery yet, though. Just personal attacks - but the issue remains, and I won't get distracted from driving the point home, unless of course somebody can make the point for me, which is preferable.

Seems sort of a pot-kettle thing and as though you're looking for rejection and think you've found it.

But I believe you've only found skepticism. Nobody on this board rejects Privates who post here -- or high school or college students. A Sergeant with four years down range has beaucoup cred unless he shreds it by trying to be too slick and tap dance on the head of a pin and impress the locals with his smarts and savoir faire. That approach will get you some sharply worded questions and if the answer is "I have the holy grail" the intensity of scrutiny will increase because most of us hard headed old b@$!^&ds have heard that before and found out there was no pot of gold there. All that was there was another hill to climb and no water or resupply...

Don't think anyone here disputes that the Tribes are important, that you may have some fresh insights or that those tribes will strongly influence events in Iraq and nearby nations. I think the issue may not be closed minds here but a misperception on your part -- and that got started when you barged in and flooded the zone with excessively glib sales pitches and teasers. Most here don't do or play the academic mind game thing. FWIW, challenges to this crowd will generally get a reaction and if one isn't careful, it may not be the reaction one wants. Seems to me you can either modify your approach or chalk this crowd off as whatever you wish to call them / us and save everyone some time and effort.

That said, I do strongly agree with you on this: "Everything that you ever hear from any Iraqi politician is an information operation, particularly if people are taking notes. I'll add that if you check the Arabic notes and the English notes, there'll be a difference -- and those remarks apply throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Nothing there is as it seems, it's the area of the old Persian Empires; those who taught the area most of what they know. I'll also add that you may want to look at the impact of the Parthian and Sassanid Empires on the tribes if you haven't already done so.

[Steve the Planner]

Ken's on the right track.

Last month I took a GIS analytical course with an ESRI master, and he pointed out that nobody knows everything about it. The software guys know what it could do, but the users know what it needs to do. But even there, the military GIS folks don't know a lot about the civilian/socio-economic/engineering side, anymore than vice versa.

The issues in Iraq have always been that way--- a multi-dimensional thing that sometimes looks very different depending on where you are playing it and when. Even if one of us thought we had the whole picture (including at the top), reality has proven a very tough task master.

Like with GIS, I know, perhaps five levels of a 25 level game, and have found, through this board, other folks who know a heck of a lot about their five levels. But nobody sees the whole picture, and we all still have to wait until the historians can gradually piece it all together (along with, as Tom Ricks reminds us, some of the big parts that haven't even happened yet) in 2029.

There are not a whole lot of people involved in matters in the Middle East that think there is a magic bullet, or that the pronouncements of a politician, even the Prime Minister, may be as quixotic as to be different for each audience he meets with in a given day. Nothing new in that...

But the Iraq puzzle is still in progress, and I doubt that the final answer lies in any of the one or two layers you have discussed than in the layers I know about. Comparing notes helps, but all of us are gifted with only partial knowledge.

Maybe the real answers to the next roll of the history dice are in events in Egypt, a whole new set of issues that will arise over the Kuwaiti positions in the UN negotiations over the sanctions extension, the upcoming Iraqi SOFA vote (the requirements for which came from Grand Ayatollah Sistani's sphere), or a domestic revolution against widespread corruption and governmental ineffectiveness. I won't hold my breathe for the noble tribes to re-establish the Caliphate any time soon.

Steve

[jmm99]

with its title "It's the Tribes, Stupid" (paraphrasing James Carville is not a good idea to create any sort of civilized discourse) - and hasn't improved since.

Too bad, because the subject matter area could be of interest to me. I.e., Iraqi national law was and is Euro-Code based with some modifications. The tribal setup might suggest a parallel system or sytems of tribal law of equal or greater importance.

[jcustis]

Also - I was there when the tribes first approached us in 2004 - many saw where things were going, and wanted to provide security for themselves. If we knew so much about tribes then, as some of those who post here claim, then why didn't we help those tribe leaders that were, at that time, most clearly expressing that their true interests were in alignment with our own.

It's because we couldn't perceive what their interests were in the first place because we were clueless about the intertribal and intratribal alliances and disputes, and we had no idea what the concept of nobility is Islam, and apparently we still don't.

I'm trying to understand this statement, as I was there in 2004 too, and probably reviewing intelligence developed through means you probably supported. Do you have any references that address this issue?

Who was approaching us, and what were there issues, concerns, or requests? What sort of branch did they extend?

There was a lot going on in 2004, predominantly a lot of heavy fighting that carried on into 2005, and since I was there too, I ask from an academic and historical perspective.