Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[reed11b]

In all seriousness, if we do a regime overthrow (Japan, Germany, Iraq, and Afghanistan) then we're in facto the government, even if we quickly prop up another government and pretend they're in charge. Until their bureaucratic systems mature, and that can take awhile if we're putting in an entirely new form of government, then we're doing COIN. To pretend otherwise is to get on the road to failure. We want to transition to the point where we're doing FID as fast as possible, but fast as possible isn't a few days after their election. Maybe we would have more successful in Iraq and Afghanistan if we slowed the train down and focused on the COIN fight while simultaneously putting considerable effort into building their government and security forces, instead of rushing through the process?

Good Point, well taken. My argument would be that we need to know how to "win the peace" and that this is more important then being proficient in COIN. In another thread I outlined a long list of original mistakes we made in Iraq that made an insurgency inevitable, and strongly contend that the scope of the insurgency in Iraq was completely avoidable. Are saying that these steps to provide increased security and structure fall under COIN? I have always felt that successfully ending a conflict w/o it turning into a COIN fight was a separate skill base. What are the councils thoughts on this?
Reed