There seems to be some movement on this on the ground in Iraq. As I mentioned previously - shaykhs want to form a house of lords-like counterpart to parliament. I like the idea of molding the government closer to Iraqi cultural realities. As for actually incorporating tribal law, that gets into two questions.

The first question that our academic friends like to ask is 'what is and was the effect of Islam on the tribes?' And from there we can extrapolate that there was an effect, and that it influenced tribal law in some way. This extrapolation might be correct in some cases, and in others it might not.

The next question, which is taboo in most circles and quite un-PC is "What effect did tribalism have on Islam?" The answers to this question require a translation of tribal laws - which vary by tribe and even sub-tribe. It's a vast subject area, and I'm not sure how to approach that one. It's too big of a job for me - I've got my hands full with other things. And, the inference, which I think rings true, is that tribal law is represented to some extent and perhaps standardized in the shari'a. Now, that is conjecture on my part, but there's a lot of laws in the shari'a that sound rather tribal to me. Eye for an eye, God permits the marriage of cousins, and others.

However, a house-of-lords for the shaykhs might allow a process of further tribal law standardization to occur within the context of contributing to or modifiying legislation. This might ensure that tribesmen, who vote in accordance with the way their shaykhs tell them to, have some representation that is meaningful to them. That being said, I suspect such a house would collapse at times, and perhaps often into squabblings that are the result of both old and new grudges, so that might be a down side.

A house of lords also might also produce a situation that moves shaykhs away from implementing tribal law, and referring much of their reconciliations, disputes, and criminal issues to the federal government. They themselves may come to the realization that it is time for them to move away from the laws that aren't solving their problems, while keeping those that do. That's a long shot that will require a great deal of time, but is nevertheless a possibility that might make the investment in a parliamentary branch for landed shaykhs a worthwhile endeavor. However, these are decisions that lay in the hands of Iraqis, and most notably the Iraqi intelligentsia that is in charge right now. I believe that they have a disdain for tribalism overall, as many are educated abroad and have seen how their own tribal societies are limited.

But I think think the question remains as to how to "move" Iraqis from tribalism. And the answer to that is to create a situation where it can work itself out, shed the negative, and keep the positive contributions. Allowing a society to evolve on its own, I think, is best.

However, Iraq doesn't exist in a vacuum, we are there, and so are many other competing interests. The tribal system has adapted to many very difficult things in the past, including some aspects of what we consider to be modern life. Our presence, as well as others, are influencing that system by simply being present.

The answer might lie in government - and with that I hope that the government will get and remain quite close to its tribal leaders, incorporating their voices in the legislative and judical processes on a permanent basis. This is being done to some extent with the Tribal Support Councils, and such, but I think there are other ways in which the goverment can adapt itself to the tribal system, and thus encourage the tribal system to evolve.

Here's to good intentions.

As for the noble tribes being a silver bullet - that they are not. However, they are an indicator towards the fact that there is more than one war going on in Iraq, which everybody knows, but the question is what that war is really about, and why should we care?

That war is indeed about the Caliphate, which is certainly interrupted. However, the fight for such isn't over by a long shot. Those with the biggest interest in establishing a Caliphate are the noble tribes - which are a minority and by definition impeded from taking power due to the fact that the "democratic" system currently in place empowers large tribes, which in essence might be able to vote themselves or a coalition in which they participate into power on a recurring basis. Iraqis are keenly aware of this reality, and the big losers in this are inded the noble tribes.

According to my research, noble tribes at most consist of about 8.4% of the total population. There are around 40 or so different noble tribes, some larger, and some smaller. These noble tribes are divided by sect - no crossovers that I know of like the "non-nobles" such as the ((Al-Shimmari)) confederation, or the ((Al-Dulaym)) which have shi'ite and sunni sub tribes. Social marxists should ping on the noble tribes as being a potentially oppressed minority. Cultural experts should ping on that number as the noble tribes are a very, very important part of Islam. The noble tribes are the descendants of Muhammad the prophet - and many of them seek power and believe they are justified to wield it due to their lineage. The thing that we label "sectarian violence" has a lot to do with these noble tribes struggling against each other while using their followers, from many other tribes noble or otherwise, as proxies.

Further, after having counted all the sub tribes of every known tribe shown in Iraqi tribal research sources that I translated, the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) comprise about 5.1% of the tribal system in its entirety - and that number will be subject to revision as my research progresses, and once a decent and tribally oriented census gets done.

According to 'Abbas Al-'Azzawi's research, the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) consisted of almost 18% of the total tribal system in 1956, when he published that research. I think that is the result of the fact that he might not have had as much visibility as those who followed in his path of research in the 1970's and the 1980's.

According to data in Al-Rudhan - if we compare 'Azzawi with Rudhan and assume (bad idea) that both are entirely 100% accurate and not warped politically, it seems to me that between 1956 and the 1980's, the tribal system tripled in size (which sort of coincides with population estimates of those time periods in comparison).

Further, it seems to show that Al-Anbar and the north grew faster than the south, or that Saddam's death squads were particularly active in the south, allowing for more of a balance, and reducing the size of the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) in comparison with the rest of the tribal system.

Nevertheless, if we'd really considered the data in this light before, I think we might have identified who the real major tribal entities are in Iraq long before now. In 2003, I heard many, many senior officers repeating the mantra that the ((Al-Dulaym)) were the largest tribe in Iraq, or that the ((Al-Shimmar)), or the ((Al-Jubur)).

We had a tendency at the time to believe our trusted Iraqi friend who seemed to know all, not realizing that every tribe is the biggest tribe in Iraq if they are talking to us at the time.

If 'Azzawi's work is correct, then the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) can definitely maintain their tribal hegemony in the south as long as other tribal coalitions (masked by politcal parties) are divided hopelessly. If Al-Rudhan is right, then the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) have to create a broad coalition in the south, as they are widespread and dominant in many provinces, but they only constitute at best a plurality. Nevertheless, as long as Nuri doesn't completely dork things up, and can cut across and build consensus with the main tribal entities of other provinces, he has a good shot at staying in power.

Everybody is right that the tribes are not the only issue in Iraq. I wish it were that easy. I also wish that getting real answers by analyzing the tribal system was easy. It's not - and using western sources doesn't really lay these things out in a way that is understandable and incorporated intimately with the many other important factors.

Anyway, those are some of the things I am seeing right now. Both 'Azzawi and Al-Rudhan's work seem to reflect some very important aspects that British and other Iraqi Tribal research doesn't really show or make clear. It's all fine and good to have the tribal data - but without understanding and classifying the tribes by sect, nobility, location, etc, then we are prevented from really understanding those other important factors cohesively and as a whole. There is no separation between the tribes and politics, tribes and the insurgency, etc.

It's not that the tribes are MY world view, either. It's just a prism that seems to filter out a lot of chaff if used properly.

V/r,

Tribeguy