Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
Somewhat related point - I think the real crux of the issue regarding whether we need to "train Soldiers for COIN" and also "train Soldiers for high-intensity operations" rather than "training them to operate across the full spectrum" is a debate that completely misses the point. The real crux of the issue is not just one of whether you can pack in a certain amount of knowledge and skills into one brain. Rather, it is a question of whether you can expect the average 19-year-old Soldier to adjust his mental and emotional state on the fly to operate across the full spectrum of operations. The average 19-year-old rifleman is intelligent, resourceful, and creative. He can learn the skills and apply the knowledge. But 19-year-old riflemen are generally not emotionally mature. They have a difficult time transitioning from close-quarters combat, where the interaction is an exchange of deadly force, to face-to-face non-lethal engagements where the interaction is an exchange of information. The real question should be, can we expect most Soldiers to operate effectively in this environment? (I think the answer is yes, but....) If so, for how long? If deployments were 4 to 6 months in length and units maintained a habitual relationship with their AOR (meaning you deploy to location X, redeploy and maintain dialed in to what is occurring in location X, then deploy again to location X, and so on) and we kept Soldiers at their duty stations for 5 or 6 years, rather than 3, then we would see much better results and there would be no more wondering about the counterproductive distraction known as the Nagl-Gentile debate.
This is spot on. One solution I've kicked around would be to focus unit training on kinetic, force-on-force engagements--as we've always done. At the same time, create a 10-week, stateside, permanent, counterinsurgent course focused on basic language instruction, customs, regional negotiation tactics, etc.

You send all junior combat arms officers through the course after OBC and you send E-4s and above when you can get them there. One of the primary purposes of Ranger School is that you train these guys from across the Army, and then sprinkle them evenly throughout combat units, so that no infantry platoon is without at least one or two Ranger-qualified soldiers. These soldiers, then, are supposed to be the ones who pass on mental toughness, confidence, and expertise (the ability to march while sleeping, I guess?).

By setting up a course like this, you wouldn't have to spend time training every young soldier on the tenets of COIN while he's just trying to learn how to fight and how to use the 240 and the ANCD (if we still use those). Let the leaders in each platoon handle the counterinsurgency. (Because realistically, how often do 19-year-old riflemen need to interact and exchange information? That's a job for NCOs and officers and, fortunately, with the exception of maybe checkpoints, there's usually an E-5 or above present in most situations.) This way, COIN becomes ingrained in combat units, while they focus their unit training on shooting, moving, communicating, and fighting.

This would be expensive and excessively time-consuming, but when nature builds a better mousetrap, you have to become a better mouse. We have to be able to do both.