There are always many sides, and many perspectives.
My greatest (not sole, but greatest) frustration with OEF-P is that if the MILF of Mindanao and the MNLF of the Sulu Archepeligo wanted the ASG and JI (our two targets of OEF-P, and the reason for US engagement) out of the Philippines, those guys would be gone within a week. So long as they provide sanctuary instead, the security forces of the Philippines will never be able to drive them out. So the clear main effort is to get the Government of the Philippines to work out a compromise with these two main groups that contains that removal of those other two groups as a contingency, while granting the first two full legitimacy in the government.
We should offer the Philippines aid and support contingent on them working seriously to do this (carrots); and tell them quite seriously that if they won't help the populace of the south, then we will, and that while a separate Moro state is not our ideal situation, if that is how government wants to play it, then that is their choice (sticks).
Second order effect would likely be a push by the communist insurgency in the north and a toppling of the ever-fragile national government by either them or by the military. Regardless, we would be able to work with whichever group took power and continue to work toward accomplishment of all of our national objectives in the region if this did occur. The Fils know this; and I am sure they often wonder why don't do the obvious.
Bookmarks