My point was that the American way of preparing for HIC, focusing on individual and large unit training, individual manning, unwieldy unit structure and equipment, focusing on equipment over training, etc etc, are both poor for HIC and IW and that many of these "reforms" are recognized as important for IW, but that they also help our HIC abilities. I.E. Better trained infantry with a better doctrine will provide a greater improvement in HIC warfighting ability then any new FCS system. I'll try to put togethor a coherant argument after I get some much needed sleepOriginally Posted by slapout9
Can you expand on that? You are about to convince me. Does anybody care if California revolts...I thought they already had
Reed
Added: another key mistake is individual training over small unit training. Training as a fire team, squad and platoon is more important then air assault or Ranger school and that "special skills" need to be unit not individual based. Yes, this means I would have to give up my shiny parachutist badge, but I can live with that.
Last edited by reed11b; 06-01-2009 at 06:10 AM.
I have to say that this is what I take from the paper, I have now read. It is a pure Gray classic.
In Israel there simply is no "Airpower debate". Freedom to employ the air environment is just accepted as something you have to have or have to get, or have to deny the enemy. That is not say there are not very active debates as to the best way to achieve certain things, but the need for airpower is just accepted by everyone that I talk to.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hi, my name is Bob, and I am a strategist.
At least I try to be, guilty as charged. But with that said, I do not buy into the conventional wisdom on what strategy is or is not; or who does it or who does not.
It's just not that simple. When I showed up at the Army War College they said essentially: "Congratulations with 20 years under your belt we will now teach you to be strategic." This mindset reinforces the idea that strategy is something associated with a particular rank, or level of command, and certainly looked at in a purely procedural perspective that is true.
I look at it differently (ok, no big surprise there, I get it...). But to me strategy is not a level of command perspective, a vague statement so generic as to be virtually worthless that Colonels write, Generals approve, and virtually no one reads. To me that is nearly as mindless as it is worthless.
For me strategy is a level of understanding. Once that strategic level of understanding is achieved it is then something of value to everyone in the chain of command, from the Chairman down to the Squad Leader that helps them put their actions into perspective and execute them in a way so as to achieve the best possible effect. Have I achieved the strategic solution to populace-based conflict? No, but it is my quest. I am confident that I am heading in the right direction, and I believe that I am very close, but it is a continuous process with daily refinements as new or old information tests and either validates or invalidates the strategic concepts.
Is this somehow the sacred territory of just elected officials? God help us if it is. No, everyone involved in this from top to bottom as a duty to think, to ponder, to question, to seek understanding. Certainly also to do our mission as assigned.
I picture that cliché' scene in every movie on organized crime were the big boss smacks some underling while declaring "I don't pay you to think!" Many Regular officers may very well feel those same intellectual shackles as well. That's sad where true. Because we do get paid to think, and you don't have to wait until you get to the War College to get started.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Hi Bob! My name is Wilf and I'm not a strategist, and even if I was I could give up anytime. I just choose not to...
Strategy to me is the practical conduct/expression of your foreign policy. The military makes a contribution to it, but it is essentially political, and also the product of political belief. The specifics of your strategy created from your personal political and moral beliefs. It's not a rational business.....helps them put their actions into perspective and execute them in a way so as to achieve the best possible effect. Have I achieved the strategic solution to populace-based conflict? No, but it is my quest. I am confident that I am heading in the right direction, and I believe that I am very close, but it is a continuous process with daily refinements as new or old information tests and either validates or invalidates the strategic concepts.
Is this somehow the sacred territory of just elected officials?
- so telling Soldiers to "think strategically" is essentially flawed. Teaching them how military power can be applied to achieve any given strategy does make sense
Thus Military thought and science generally limits itself to the how military force serves policy, not makes it.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Yes but I think you two are inadvertently talking past each other.
I agree that Bob's World continually sallies into the political realm (the SO community does that quite often, I think it's it's probably genetic -- and one reason I left that commune...) and that you're correct on the division of effort. Strategy is a politically determined course; the Soldats can but propose and the Pols will dispose.
A 'strategy' is, as you say, merely a potential route -- not the goal -- to achieve a policy.
However, one of the assumed or presumed roles of the SO community is the influencing of 'earts and moinds so my sensing is that he knows you're correct but cannot cease proselyting to get the silly-villyun politicians to adhere to sensible 'strategies.' An idea with which I truly can wish him success.
My disagreement, if it is such, with Bob is that I'm convinced he's wasting his time because their concern (the majority at any rate) is now and forever will be reelection, not strategerizing...
I'm incredibly lazy; I hate to see good effort by smart people go for naught.
How about this....Strategy is how you make the enemies power irrelevant to you accomplishing your objective.
...er....from a struggling woodentop...
Isn't 'strategy' to do with the context[B[/B] of the issue, rather than its relative merits?
Therefore, a Platoon Commander thinking hard about how to destroy a Dushka firing from a compound is dealing with a fundamentally tactical problem. If he calls in a 2000lb-er on it, and the compound is full of civilians, there will be strategic implications, because Karzai will complain, and ISAF will cede more support/tolerance from the population. But the problem itself is a tactical one.
Whereas if we're trying to secure energy supplies for the next 20 years, this is a strategic issue. The choice between building a nuclear power station, or drilling for more North Sea Oil is perhaps a tactical one - but again both have 'strategic' implications in terms on industrial bases, environmental impact etc.
Therefore the strategic issue of dealing with a global islamist insurgency is clearly a strategic one, especially when mapped onto the risk of WMD proliferation and the increased porousness and vulnerability of an interconnected world.
Somewhere, leaders need to provide the intellectual clarity to lay down clearly how and where we will fight, for what ends, and in so doing identify which issues are reconcilable (ie - we accept scope for dialogue because an insurgent has some legitmate grievance)...and where we say, 'f*** you' - its not happening - the committed irreconcilable - whether thats a nuclear Iran (clock ticking), a nuclear NK (too late!) or AQ.
General Rupert Smith observed at a v good lecture at Kings College London that the UK had not had anythintg that remotely resembled a coherent national strategy, in terms of a vision for the role of the country, international objectives, and a foreign policy to achieve them and nest military efforts. Hard to diagree.
Coldstreamer me old mate,
From ADP LAND OPERATIONS Page 4-5
THIS IS UK DOCTRINE!“… to determine the aim, which is or should be inherently political; to derive from that aim a series of military objectives to be achieved: to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to measure available and potential resources against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.”
So, a goofed tactical action - bombing a UN kindergarten - is only a goof if it creates lasting and decisive political effects.
So you can't have a "Strategic Corporal" because Corporals cannot achieve lasting decisive political effects.
So not resourcing the formation is A'Stan is actually de-facto strategic failure.
Help any?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Means to an end...
Quoth Slap:Practically and semantically, I agree and think most would do so. In the politico-military context though, the issue become who decides the "how." Many moons ago, Lincoln gave Grant the authority to make those decisions; from then forward, however, that has not been the case. In the last 100 plus years in ALL western democracies, the politicians have been very firm in retaining control over the "how" decisions. I doubt that will change and as Coldstreamer says:"...Strategy is how you make the enemies power irrelevant to you accomplishing your objective."I agree but history and indications lead me to believe that the Politicians don't know enough, generally do not want to listen to the advice of non-politicians and are prone to make decisions based on domestic political concerns rather than the true geo-political or strategic issues at hand. So I think that's unlikely to change."Somewhere, leaders need to provide the intellectual clarity to lay down clearly how and where we will fight, for what ends...Rupert's a smart guy, fair book. He's too nice -- I'd say the European hearth nations as a whole have that problem. Penalty of a democratic approach to government. Generally, for most of us, the merits outweigh the obvious disadvantages. Democracies don't do strategy very well; they can do policies though -- but they tend to change after elections. Sigh.General Rupert Smith observed at a v good lecture at Kings College London that the UK had not had anythintg that remotely resembled a coherent national strategy, in terms of a vision for the role of the country, international objectives, and a foreign policy to achieve them and nest military efforts. Hard to diagree.
Wilf may be right about Strategic Corporals -- but I was once a Sensuous Sergeant. It's all about the means to the end desired..
Wilf may be right about Strategic Corporals -- but I was once a Sensuous Sergeant. It's all about the means to the end desired..
Too much information! But at least you knew what you were trying to do, and the means to go about it! I suspect todays political class would struggle equally in that field, were it not for interns, special advisers and secretaries on tap!
Brother,
As most of the time, violently agreeing. I was taking issue more with some of the other comments. My bad for being less than clear.
However, with the compressed 24/7 news cycle, the interweb and all the other issues we see, could we not say Lyndie England (poor sap/poorly led) was a strategic PFC? Lasting political damage? Worldwide perception impact? Big hit to moral high ground?
You can't go on being a Guards officer if you start making incisive and intelligent observations like that! Rupert and Tarquin will get very miffed!
....but yes, this is the nature of the debate. My points are:
a.) Lyndie England cannot loose the war for you.
b.) What she did will still have the same effect, with or without the internet or 24 hour news - Remember this?
or
Neither picture or the stories surrounding them had strategic effect. The only thing that generally creates strategic effect is the reporting of something strategically significant - The Sinking of the Lusitania, being a good example, and 911 being another. Both were deemed indicative of a collective intent, with political aims. Lyndie England type issues are very different.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Now now...when Rupert and Tarquin are sober they're actually quite bright! More importantly, they have decent estates for their fat old company commander to shoot upon - so cease your Light Division wibbling! (Not so different from a number of Riflemen I know, come to think...)You can't go on being a Guards officer if you start making incisive and intelligent observations like that! Rupert and Tarquin will get very miffed!
....but yes, this is the nature of the debate. My points are:
a.) Lyndie England cannot loose the war for you.
b.) What she did will still have the same effect, with or without the internet or 24 hour news - Remember this?
or
Neither picture or the stories surrounding them had strategic effect. The only thing that generally creates strategic effect is the reporting of something strategically significant - The Sinking of the Lusitania, being a good example, and 911 being another. Both were deemed indicative of a collective intent, with political aims. Lyndie England type issues are very different.
And I disagree! I think all your examples are have strategic effect - its a question of degree. The Vietnam pics most definately had a negative impact on the perception of the war, the opinion (right or otherwise) of the legitimacy of the US. And in all these things, Legitimacy, and the perception of it - is the most important strategic factor of all. US (IMHO) came unstuck in Vietnam because they were backing a loser - Govt of SVN couldn't/wouldn't provide for its people in an equitable way - VC notwithstanding (query Karzai and Kabul...oi vay...)
Collective intents? Political aims? Again all relative. What about that nutter who plugged Archduke Ferdinand and lit the fuse for WW1. Was he part of an organised collective that wanted World conflict? Or an aggreived Balkan who just wanted to lash out at the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
I think enough Lindie Englands probably can lose the war for you. The local national populace get incensed and support the insurgent more. The home base loses faith and want out. The Allies have even more of an excuse to break out their inhalers and run for their immodium tablets. And the poor bloody infantry groan, wait for the incoming, and count down the days until the RIP, and subsequent PTSD.
I thinks are more complex (and yet more simple) than the old state on state 'big event' paradigm.
If that were true 9/10ths of Africa would have had an effective insurgency by now. There is a long history of goverments that have existed only to better themselves at the expense of people, and this has a long history of mostly acceptance by the population. This good goverment as a form of COIN is a very new concept and has hardly been proved. I tend to question it's effectivness myself
Reed
Quoth Slap:Practically and semantically, I agree and think most would do so. In the politico-military context though, the issue become who decides the "how." Many moons ago, Lincoln gave Grant the authority to make those decisions; from then forward, however, that has not been the case. In the last 100 plus years in ALL western democracies, the politicians have been very firm in retaining control over the "how" decisions. I doubt that will change and as Coldstreamer says:I agree but history and indications lead me to believe that the Politicians don't know enough, generally do not want to listen to the advice of non-politicians and are prone to make decisions based on domestic political concerns rather than the true geo-political or strategic issues at hand. So I think that's unlikely to change.
I was thinking more at the level of Grand Strategy(national Policy) it should be how we harness our national resources to avoid having to go to war in the first place, If our National Policy fails, somebody tries to stop us from achieving our goals peacfully..... then do as Coldstreamer says draw a line and say this is enough and if need be we will light the big candle. However as you point out practically one should not hold your your breath that this will happen. And yes I was a wild ass Buck Sergeant
When the Cold War was raging, much of Africa was indeed riven by insurgency. And many of those insurgencies were fuelled by bad governance- expertly stoked by communist agent provocateurs and advisors.
Africa is difficult - most African 'countries' barely warrant the name, God help them - arbitrary colonial lines across the continent, with no development from ethnic, geographical or political lines. And most are indeed riven with internal conflict and insecurity - largely based on the reasons stated.
Bang on. Today's problem is a pretty average collection of decisionmakers in the political class of the West. Particularly unfortunate at this juncture of history...Remember the roll call at 9/11...Blair...Bush...Schroeder...Chirac....I was thinking more at the level of Grand Strategy(national Policy) it should be how we harness our national resources to avoid having to go to war in the first place, If our National Policy fails, somebody tries to stop us from achieving our goals peacfully..... then do as Coldstreamer says draw a line and say this is enough and if need be we will light the big candle. However as you point out practically one should not hold your your breath that this will happen. And yes I was a wild ass Buck Sergeant
Oh God...
Coldstreamer, I am reminded by a remark John Maynard Keynes made when he was trying to help us out with a little economic problem we were having, sometimes called The Great Depression.
"America Is To Stupid To Be The World Leader" by JMK
I prefer the phrase 'last best hope'...!
If we were to banter, I'd recall Churchill's famous words
"America can always be trusted to do the right thing...after it has exhausted all alternatives"
..but I prefer the soldiers' maxim - 'lead, follow or get out of the way!'
and I don't see anyone else in the free world picking up the baton.
Yes, where is General Eisenhower?
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks