I'm sure it's still considered a multi roll and will serve all those porposes. This is more likely a diplomatic thing calling it an attack aircraft. Sounds better come time to get funding. And making it seem like a modernized version of the p-38(which it is) sounds somewhat comemorative and patriotic and that is always a good selling point to congress.
Last edited by luckyroll; 06-05-2009 at 07:39 PM.
The decision will likely be made this week.
Big pow-wow of AF generals this week (Corona).
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/20...rfare_053109w/
They'll likely make a decision on the irregular warfare wing. This won't necessarily mean the aircraft they will buy will be set, but they will at least lay out the requirements. Should be interesting to see the results.
V/R,
Cliff
And...Originally Posted by Cliff
errr.... A-10 anyone? It can do the job now, and needs a couple of modification to be just about perfect. Some aircraft converted into the two-seat A-10B can do all the weapons, sensors and FAC roles far better than any prop-driven bug-basher.Making up the wing would be 20 “light strike” attack planes; four C-130 Hercules to ferry troops, small transports and helicopters;
Last time I checked the C-130, AC-130, and A-10 were all operational in the inventory.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I'm guessing you like the Thunderbolt 2. The problem with the T-bolt 2 is that it has no turning radius= very poor manuverability compared to prop craft and can only hold a slow pattern for a few seconds before you have to dip back into the engines and give the stick a little tug. Atleast this is what my sisters boyfriend tells me. He flies Hornets in the Corps, but was a Hog (t-bolt 2) pilot before that.
He also said that at those low speeds it was insanely rough and that hard jolting would sometimes cause the 30mm to jam. He said the feel is similar to flying a commercial jet at very low speeds and altitudes. But, he said it almost impossible to tear it apart with heavy fire, or, anything else for that matter( thanks to carbon fibre covered ceramic spawl plates). He said he's seen many of them get hit with SAM's in the stubs and still land. He said he has even belly landed one and it was back up and flying a few days later... didn't hurt it at all. That says ALOT for any jet powered craft. In that aspect that plane lives up to it's namesake.
I like'em alot! Probably my favorite jet pack, but the not turning thing would make me sick. But, it is a flying tank and is designed to do exactly what it does, included in that is the fact that it has little manuverability. That is so you don't overshoot or, have to dip to keep your point of aim on a target when your coming in on top of it. This is what I'm told about that aircraft and it seems to make sense. He even said that turboprop "bug bashers" are better for serving alot of the roles that the A-10 serves and more. I called and asked him just to see what he said, but, this is only one opinion of one pilot. But, aside from the fact that you can't hardly take an A-10 down, I think a turboprop is just as good in it's own right.
But the idea of recip engine "horse fly" planes was a little silly now that I think about it in terms of the US armed forces. Where in the hell would they get AvGas and why would they want to deal with that?! Although to me it still makes sense for the private sec.
Last edited by luckyroll; 06-06-2009 at 01:38 PM.
The A-10 can fly slow enough to employ weapons effectively, which is all that matters. The days of slowly loitering low over the battlefield employing the Mk 1 eyeball as the primary sensor are pretty much gone. Sensor pods provide much better SA, work at night, can defeat some types of CCD, provide much better targeting info (if needed) and can be transmitted in real-time to whoever is on the ground, etc.. In that case there's no need to fly very low most of the time (in fact, the view from medium altitudes is often better), nor is there a need to turn tighter than the A-10 can currently turn.
I really like the idea of bringing back the 2-seat A-10. It allows a pilot to concentrate on not getting shot down or flying into terrain (which is very challenging in Afghanistan, for example), while the back-seater can concentrate on the sensors, coordination with the ground element, comms, etc. I would consider adding some conformal fuel tanks for more loiter time as well.
The A-10 has a lot of other advantages too. It can self-deploy, it's faster, it can operate in higher-threat environments, can carry more ordnance and more precise weapons, etc. Oh, and it also has a big gunI can't think of any reason to downgrade to what's been suggested in this thread so far, except possibly for operating cost, which isn't really compelling considering the trade offs.
Joining this forum, fun.... Talking of aircraft, great... My two cents......... Worthless. I swear someday they will find a cure for my diarhea of the mouth and brain.
I still think that the new Bronco/lightning set-up will be something to behold( if it ever hits the tarmac).
I'm just wondering if I'm going to have to spend the rest of my days buzzing in circles, listening to Marshall Tucker, wasting fuel. Maybe I should join CAP... LOL!!!!
I don't know what to do with myself....
Last edited by luckyroll; 06-06-2009 at 04:53 PM.
Nobody calls the A-10 the T-bolt 2...
except maybe Republic (well, now Boeing owns the contracts).
It's the Warthog, or just Hog.
The A-10 has a better turn radius than the Hornet.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...craft/a-10.htm
Turn radius is a function of speed vs. G. The Hog can pull 7.33 gs max. It's turn radius down low ranges from just over 1000' with flaps to 2000' without. A turboprop could turn tighter, but only by flying slower... which doesn't do you too much good. A-10s fly at 200-300 knots, which isn't too much faster than most turboprops.
Any aircraft at low altitude is going to have a bumpier ride. The lower the wing loading, the harder the ride. The A-10 doesn't have a ridiculously low wing loading. An F-15C at low altitude is much worse.
The Hog is one of the most survivable aircraft ever. It also has a lot of foam inside it to reduce spalling from hits.
I respectfully have to disagree. The A-10 was designed to destroy Soviet armor in the face of intense AAA, MANPADs, and SAMs. It does that exceptionally well. As for CAS for COIN efforts, the A-10C with targeting pods and GPS weapons is excellent for CAS.
The reason why the USAF is looking at AT-6s or Tucanos for the COIN mission is because it is not only cheap, uses a little less gas, but also because you could easily train indigenous forces on the AT-6 and then sell them their own aircraft.
The irregular warfare wing would not just support our own forces (the A-10 is probably a better platform for that as several folks have pointed out) but also work the training and by/through/with portion of the COIN fight. After all, the ultimate goal in COIN is for the indigenous forces to be able to stand on their own as part of a legitimate government.
V/R,
Cliff
As usual...
I agree with Entropy. For just CAS, the A-10 is perfect, for all the reasons listed... if you're going to buy a decent CAS platform, the speed to cover a wide area is good - otherwise you need to buy more assets to cover the same area.
Good words my friend!
Luckroll, where/what are you flying? I can't seem to find an intro from you...Joining this forum, fun.... Talking of aircraft, great... My two cents......... Worthless. I swear someday they will find a cure for my diarhea of the mouth and brain. I still think that the new Bronco/lightning set-up will be something to behold( if it ever hits the tarmac). I'm just wondering if I'm going to have to spend the rest of my days buzzing in circles, listening to Marshall Tucker, wasting fuel. Maybe I should join CAP... LOL!!!!I don't know what to do with myself....
You can introduce yourself here.
V/R,
Cliff
Ok, introduced myself for what little it's worth... Ahh, I feel so exposedSorry for that Cliff.
Most of what I am saying is just poking at you gentlemen to get responses from one opinion to the other. I'm trying to stay dynamic, as I usually do, in the what and why. So far, I think I'm loaded on info, atleast for now.
Last edited by luckyroll; 06-07-2009 at 01:58 PM.
COIN aircraft at Paris
Looks like the competition for COIN turboprops is heating up:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124508942994615891.html
Air Tractors are tough planes, but it seems like they would be pretty vulnerable due to being so slow.
Very manouverable though... anyone that's seen one working a field understands why.
I am curious to see how far the re-alignment in defense aerospace swings toward the small wars...
V/R,
Cliff
So am I, because the lack of insight so far is quite worrying. Things that fly are utterly irrelevant except for the sensors and the weapons. A Hellfire type weapon does not care if it comes off an MQ-9, C-130, or an A-10.
With over 100 A-10s in service If the US goes out and buys cheap "COIN aircraft" it will be because it wants to, not because it needs to.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
COIN: Is Air Control The Answer?
Counterinsurgency
Is “Air Control” the Answer?
by Major Angelina M. Maguinness, Small Wars Journal
Counterinsurgency: Is “Air Control” the Answer? (Full PDF Article)
Within the last few years, many airpower theorists advocated for the creation of a more air-centric approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. They point to modern airpower successes as the central component in military strategies, such as the successes in Bosnia in 1995, in Kosovo in 1998, and in the air policing operations conducted over Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Other airpower proponents decry the lack of “air-mindedness” and the short attention given to airpower in the 2007 United States (US) Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency. They call for a truly joint COIN doctrine that recognizes and leverages airpower’s combat capabilities instead of relegating its use solely to support for ground forces.
Many of these arguments are reminiscent of the early airpower zealots who believed airpower’s emerging technical capabilities promised less costs in money, lives, and resources with equal or better results than the use of large armies. Airpower, however, is not a cure-all in COIN, as demonstrated by Britain’s foray into colonial policing from 1919 to 1939. These lessons are applicable today, as military leaders continue to explore alternatives and supplements to existing American COIN strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. While there is no doubt airpower plays a prominent role within COIN strategy, airpower’s most prudent use should not be as a primarily offensive weapon but as a component within a restrained combined arms approach.
A far better report with a lot of detailed research is linked below. Including actual messages sent to the population as part of the information campaign. Use of 5 pound bombs to limit damage and Bombing to interrupt as opposed to bombing to damage. Written by a real Air Force Officer not an Intelligence Officer.
http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/saas_T...a/longoria.pdf
As opposed to a Real JAG Officer?
I actually found Maj Maguinness's article interesting, especially when paired with our own LawVol's offering from a few months back. Perfect? No, but it's refreshing to see someone looking at things other than "bombs on target" and "airpower will win the war." She did a good job of touching on things that do get a longer look in the paper you linked (which is possible when you're working with 72 or so pages as opposed to 10 or so).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I plan on reading this tonight but in the meantime could you please explain what a "real" Air Force officer is?
I wondered about that, too. I'm guessing it's a pilot or similar aviator-type.
Not baggin' on ya, slap...just seemed an odd word choice.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
That's probably a good question, back in
my day, the CCT Squirrels were accused of being far and away too Army - oriented by the rest of the AF ...
While Longoria is quite correct that legitimate authority is a required precursor to any action, air policing or otherwise, he misses the point of law enforcement. He seeks to use the coerciveness of airpower to effectuate change. This isn't law enforcement. Sure cops bust down doors and get the bad guys, but surely there is much more to it than that (Slap, you're the expert here). Community policing principles teach that interaction of the cop on the beat with the locals creates a bond of trust that helps control crime. This dovetails nicely into traditional COIN principles.Air policing is a form of law enforcement and it naturally requires some kind of legal authority. Additionally, law enforcement and air policing must proceed on the basis of some form of civil order and on some degree of environmental order. If the policeman is to police there must be an adequate degree of calm in his operational medium. Airpower differentiated itself from ground power because it literally rose above immediate threats on the ground. This allowed it to be used in its most effective manner.
I fail to see how coercive airpower can accomplish this. The author discusses that there are 3 possible coercive mechanisms that airpower can provide: damage, morale and interference. The goal being to disrupt daily life. However, with the inevitable mixture of combatants and civilians, can you really limit the coercion solely to the combatants? In other words, are you cutting off your nose to spite your face? If one believes that COIN means winning over the populace, this isn't the way. As you would expect, I think a softer form of airpower is the answer.
I would also point out that the use of air policing in this fashion would encounter problems from an international law perspective. Obviously, there are situations when steel on target is necessary regardless of the fallout. But as Maguinness indicates, coercive airpower isn't always the answer.
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
naturally Ken got it
He was a CCT officer,Master Parachutist,with a combat jump
Hi John, he also talks about the 3 situations
1-no law and order(small War)
2- some law and order
3- support to existing civil authority
That shaped how Air "Force" would be used. He also points out that there was a political Officer representing the official Government that was in constant contact with the tribal chiefs explaining the benefits and punishments of not following lawful commands.
But the most important part of the paper I thought was the Strategic Catechism at the end. The questions you should ask to determine IF Air Policing is even feasible! The answer is....all depends on the situation. My Opinion... in Iraq no, In Afghanistan it may be a viable option. But we need some better Intelligence to determine the answer.
I think that obtaining accurate intel to adequately
use air power for 'policing' is unlikely. The Afghans are pretty wily and more than willing to shop each other.
Add to that the lack of infrastructure to target, the dispersion factor (by five categories -- individual, family, clan, tribe, race -- and geographically, that's a big country, about 1.5 times the size of Iraq), the essential rural nature and location of most of the populace and the terrain and I'm doubtful it could be made to work.
Why do you think it might?
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