Here are a few things I thought about after wasting some of my lunch hour reading that article.

Whos Command, Who's Strategy?
Throughout the article the author incorrectly holds General Patreaus responsible for percieved failures in Afghanistan as CENTCOM Comander. The chief problem with many of these accusations is that General Patreaus did not assume command of CENTCOM until 31 October 2009. The policy of using UAVs for kinetic strikes in Pakistan has been a matter of policy since 2004. How can a commander be held responsible for the actions of a higher headquarters strategy, let alone a higher headquartes he was not in command of?

Another thing we should ask ourselves here. Is it truly the strategy of General Patraeus? No, it is simply the continuation of a strategy that existed prior to his command of CENTCOM that has been in place since 2004, and approved by both President Bush, and President Obama. General Patraeus chose to continue the policy, but the approval for the policy came with the stamp of approval from the current, and former POTUS as well as the DCI and JCS.

The Swat Valley
The push into Pakistan's core by the Taliban is in part the result of religious and tribal friction coupled with a weak Pakistani central government. A corrupt intelligence agency that has strong ties to the Taliban and other Islamist entities does not help matters.

The quotes from the Times, regurgitated by Fred Bramfren, suggests kinetic strikes by UAVs as the primary cause of the Taliban's movement into the Swat Valley. The article fails to mention any other reasons why the Taliban may have wished to move into the Swat Valley. For example, the fact that the Swat Valley is home to some of the most lucrative emerald mines in the world. Mines the Taliban started exploiting as soon as they got a foothold in the valley.

Another good reason for the Taliban to move into the Swat Valley is the key stratigic location. The valley would provide an excellent base of operations site for any future attacks on Islamabad. It could also be used as a logistics hub for operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In fact, the Taliban invaded neighboring provinces in violation of the ceasefire a short time afer it was signed.

The Taliban were already strong in Pakistan, propped up by the ISI and other officials in nearly every sector of the Pakistani government who could not protect their own people. And that is the best case scenerio. The worst case scenerio is that the Tlaiban has the tacit support of the people.

A Look at the Warizistan UAV Strikes.
Let us take a more in depth look at just one of these UAV strikes, which occurred on April 19 2009 and was reported by the BBC on 20 April 2009. The strike was targeted against a top Taliban commander's compound in Warizistan. Warizistan has long ties to the Taliban and other groups belligerent to the US.

It may not be comfortable, or populer, but given the ambiguous nature of what is and is not a combatant that the entire Warizistan district could reasonably be considered a belligerent party engaged in war against the United States, and it's interests in the Af/Pak area of operations.
Through experience and observation I have come to the conclusion that relatives and neighbors of the various terrorist entities as their version Combat Support and Service and Support elements of the vast majority Mujahideen groups. This would make them legitimate military targets would it not?

Another possibility here is that the residents of Warizistan are being held hostage in their own lands by the Taliban, and other groups hostile to the US. Some 200 makiks have appearently been killed after makign attemppts to oust the Mujahideen from their lands. If this is the case the Pakistani government should make attempts to free them from the Taliban. Either way Pakistan is sailing away on the failboat when it comes to dealing with their own internal problems.