I thought I would respond at length to this thoughtful post. You see, I was an 25th Infantry (Hawaii's own) platoon sergeant during the 1968 Tet Offense that came in the middle of the first 'long war'. Later I went to college and went back to Asia with USAID and the UN. I have lived in Asia (and some in Africa) ever since I left the East West Center in Honolulu in 1981. I just finished 3 years with the UN in Afghanistan and am now in Pakistan. I guess Petreaus is right, trauma early in life stays with you. ;-)

Institutions are not libraries, but are understood formally as complex configurations of formal and informal rules, beliefs and attitudes that evolve over time to influence human behavior. A review of the literature of New Institutional Economics (Douglass North is the godfather of the doctrine) and complexity science (see Mitchell Waldrop's early (1992) history of this scientific discipline) are both fundamental to understanding the distinction between institutions as the rules of the game and organizations (like the Senate, Army, and libraries) as the players. However, institutions (as social incentive structures) are conservative forces that support the status quo and change slowly (see North's work for about 8,000 years of evidence). Understanding institutions as socio-cognitive incentive structures is critical to understanding how societies, organizations and individuals learn.

The Army is an organization with an internal set of incentives, deeply embedded in the larger American institutional context, that have a tremendous influence on soldiers. No one wants to die or to be labeled a loser for not following a winning approach. Before Vietnam, America had NEVER lost so the lessons learned were easy to track and deemed to be universally applicable. Today's Army has a modern knowledge management system that effectively translates lessons learned into doctrine. The lesson in the failure of Gen McKiernan to adapt to the new COIN doctrine in Afghanistan is less a failing of an old soldier who couldn't learn than a recognition of the time it takes for social incentive structures to change in any organization so that doctrine can be consistently translated into strategy and tactics (human behavior).

On a higher level, contrasting the impact of Vietnam and 9/11 on American institutions provides an interesting case. Not all trauma are alike, certainly not in their long-term effects. Vietnam dominated life in America for 10 years, but its lasting impact has been far different from that of 9/11 (but somewhat similar to that of Iraq). The Vietnam experience undermined long-standing institutions and led to the decine in public confidence in the government and the Army. Vietnam pitted Americans against Americans more intensely than anytime since the Civil War. In contrast, 9/11 was a cathartic experience, more akin to Pearl Harbor, that actually served, for a time, to bring most Americans together, but it also galvanized a form of neocon patriotism that strengthened government control over the lives of citizens.

Now, if you have read this far, please tell me how I can get a copy of Petreaus's dissertation.

Aloha,

Paul