ISAF Campaign Plan Summary

[jmm99]

This is not totally thought out, so excuse me for thinking out loud - with thoughts based on CvC Book 8 (see quotes at this post).

Let us posit a situation where the People are split 5% for the insurgents (Taliban if you like); 5% for the incumbant (Astan govt if you like); and the other 90% are elsewhere.

Would this not resemble the pre-French Revolution situation in Europe, where the objective set by Politik (damn Germans have the same word for politics and policy ) is necessarily limited and the plan of the war is also necessarily limited ?

If so, should we not see something that is quite different from CvC's "ideal war" (the theoretical construct where the passions of the People are indeed aroused, etc.) ?

And, one might ask, is not this more limited construct applicable to most armed conflicts that we call insurgencies ?

In short, are we in fact unlikely to see an "ideal war"; remembering that is not what CvC endorsed as the best way to wage war, but only as the theoretical construct which is approached when (from link to Book 8 above):

Thus, therefore, the element of war, freed from all conventional restrictions, broke loose, with all its natural force. The cause was the participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on the internal affairs of countries, partly from the threatening attitude of the French towards all nations.

As a matter of political theory, I suppose that involving the People as active participants (even if only moral supporters) in an insurgency would be a great plus for whichever side could capture their unqualified support. However, if that were the case (that the People would participate en masse), there probably would not be an insurgency in the first place - or, if started, would not last long.

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The objective set by Politik for Astan (based the 13 Jun Guidance) is:

Success will be defined by the Afghan people's freedom to choose their future--freedom from coercion, extremists, malign foreign influence, or abusive government actions.

These "Four Freedoms", leading to the ultimate freedom ("to choose their future"), certainly relate directly to the People and are certanly political enough (Rove and Carville would be at home in that environment).

However, looking to strategy as here defined:

Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war; it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategy forms the plan of the war, and to the said aim it links the series of acts which are to lead to the same, that is to say, it makes the plans for the separate campaigns, and regulates the combats to be fought in each.

I find it hard to visualize the "series of acts" (military) which would lead to the penultimate objects (the "Four Freedoms") and the ultimate objective - allowing the Astan People (if that posited entity exists as a real entity) the freedom to choose their future.

The Command Guidance does present what seems a localized plan:

The ongoing insurgency must be met with a counterinsurgency campaign adapted to the unique conditions in each area that:

- Protects the Afghan people--allowing them to choose a future they can be proud of

- Provides a secure environment allowing good government and economic development to undercut the causes and advocates of insurgency

but, if (repeat "if") it works "in each area", how will it then proceed from what local Afghans want to the much higher level of what the "Afghan People" want ?

In short, can the "Afghan People" be treated as a monolith; or, in fact, is there such a thing as the "Afghan People" in reality, as opposed to an international legalism ?