Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?
Excellent question -- and I submit they'll try and thereby dissuade us from action on occasion. However, as Old Eagle pointed out and I said earlier:"Could be conjecture; could be a ploy, could be a misstatement of intent (accidental or deliberate). We'll have to wait and see..."

Tom:
Ken, I will disagree with you on this one.
We can disagree, that's okay -- but just as a point of interest, here are the two points I made:

"...Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels... "

"...I suspect the civilians who are nominally innocent will get more visitation by various bad guys and said civilians will not really appreciate the extra attention (nor will they be happy that a small source of income, claiming non-existent casualties, has been removed)."

Note I said not smart on several levels -- not that it was wrong -- and the only level I spelled out was the second quoted paragraph above. Do you disagree with that? What are your other disagreements? (my other concerns are below)

You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.

Wilf said:
"No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see."
To my mind that's the gist of this; the thread has been mutated into a COIN best practice tutorial and I don't think anyone is questioning what best practice is -- and killing ANY excess civilians -- even 1, une, ee, fagat yek, hannah, ichi, mot, ein, uno solamente -- is to be avoided. Tactical efforts to preclude harm to civilians should be constant, no question. I see no one above disputing that.

That's not the issue -- the issue is the possible guidance which none of us has apparently seen and its potential effect on the effort of units in Afghanistan. I specifically raised the issue of second order effects and unintended consequences. I have seen such orders before and have seen them fail and be allowed to die, unenforced. The problem: As Cav Guy said, the US Army habitually significantly overreacts to every order...

The Afghan attitude toward fighting differs from the Arab attitude. What effect will the order have on the population it is designed to aid?

I go back to Wilf's comment: ""...rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.""

We need to see the order but when we do whatever we say will have little to no effect -- however, the issue to me is the tone of the order and potential adverse effects; the positive effects and the possible need go without saying. With a kid likely to be there again soon, I got one a them there vested int'rests...

Oh and Tom, on this
This has been overdue and we have been dancing with the effects for several years now.
I have to ask WHY have we been dancing with a problem like that -- and it is one -- for several years; why has it not been fixed before this?

I know the answer and it's not pretty and that really needs to be fixed. I doubt this order will fix it, it is attacking the symptom...

That said, I understand that need, really do -- but rather than "this," I would have greatly preferred better training. That would have, should have, meant no need for "this."