Afghanistan ROE Change

[slapout9]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

[Blackjack]

Cavguy, I think we share the same ideas on the use of airpower, or more appropriatly not using it. I recall sitting in Corsica and hearing abut the PPCLI getting lit up by two F-16s while on a training range and it made my stomach turn. The same can be said for everytime I hear the words 'airstrike' 'Afghanistan' and 'civilian casualties'. The use of airpower as it has been used in Afghanistan should come to a swift end. Air power should be treated like the W-88 warhead of COIN. Use only as an absolute last resort because the fallout is usually never worth the effects on target.

[Old Eagle]

I'd like to see exactly what the forthcoming guidance says in detail. Anyone who knows SAM might have a difficult time imagining him issuing a "runaway! runaway!" order.
To a certain extent, we're all commenting on something that hasn't been finalized.

@jw -- based on anecdotal evidence from the Sons of Iraq, Swat Valley, etc., it appears that when the bad guys get abusive, there is pushback from the local population. IMHO, if the balance of violence tips significantly against the Taliban, we will have an opportunity to exploit it. (Keeping in mind that if the central gov't, ANP and other forces of order don't get their acts together, it won't make much difference.)

[Cavguy]

Along the lines Tom Odom and Cavguy have been following. The "terrain" of interest, where we win or lose, is the civilian population. The tactic of choice for AQ and the Taliban in this conflict is terror.

Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?

Last fall I was at a training event and a former MARSOC member told me a story along the following lines (can't remember all the details):

Afghanistan, 2007 (ish). MARSOC unit is participating in cordon of several villages in Afghanistan during an operation. Intelligence intercepts confirm that the AQ/Talib in the area plan to engage the overwatch position as soon as the procession gets close. It would then be filmed and used to illustrate Americans attacking peaceful civilians. Suddenly a funeral party emerges from the town, casket an all, headed directly for the Marines' position. As the procession emerges, the Marines send a rep forward to tell the procession they can't proceed. They protest it is a funeral and they must. The marines then offer them a separate route to the local cemetery not crossing their over watch position, but are told they cannot come that way. The villagers return to the village and do not re-emerge. Later, intelligence sources report frustration the Taliban were unable to provoke an incident.

So yes, he absolutely wants to create these "no-win" situations, knowing, as Slap indicated, we tend to escalate rather than de-escalate.

Niel

[Steve Blair]

So yes, he absolutely wants to create these "no-win" situations, knowing, as Slap indicated, we tend to escalate rather than de-escalate.

Niel

Which makes total sense from their perspective. VC/NVA elements used to do that quite often in Vietnam. Fire from village at passing US patrol, knowing full well that the US grunts would call in fire support. Then fade away and let the village get plastered.

[Blackjack]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

40mm Stingball

These could work too. You know, I come from an extremely agressive military culture that is not risk adverse. Even I can see the benefits of these LE tools applied to military operations.

LE does not by any means have all the answers, but they sure have the market cornered in LTL products and their application. Also, these sting balls would probably leave some serious welts. It could be a good way to identify suspected Taliban later on, and aprehend them. The exploding dye packs of the battlefield if you will.

[Cavguy]

I would love the ability to use non-lethal rounds.

When I was last in Iraq 2006-2007 we were prohibited from using them by the lawyers. The legal reasoning was that sometimes these rounds can kill. Therefore, you can only use them in situations where you would have justification to use lethal force. In said situation, better to use the lethal force than use a non-lethal round that accidentally kills.

I didn't agree then and don't now, but that was the reasoning. Love the lawyers.

[carl]

We need a 5 pound grenade that can be dropped from 30,000 feet and hit just where we want it to.

Has anybody made a GPS guided 120mm mortar shell yet? That would be about the same and you could mount it on almost anything.

Echo what Slap says, just keep pumping gas in there and wait. Is there any way to get around prohibitions on that? If local police were present could they do it?

[jmm99]

The legal advice is exactly on point given the ROEs that were in effect. The lawyer was protecting you from a possible manslaughter charge.

I'd prefer ROEs that would leave decisions like that to the field commander (you). Then I could say that your legal options are A, B and C. Which one you select is a military decision, not a legal decision.

But, as you have already said, field commanders were calling in too much heavy stuff; so, top-down ironclad rules are laid down which try to fit everything into neat little boxes.

[slapout9]

Now you guys understand why LE feels the way we do about lawyers
Soldiers should be looking at counter lawsuits because they were denied appropriate capabilities to do there job thus having to escalate to deadly force.

Dye marking has a lot of potential, there are a lot of options with stuff like that

Also I would want lots of snipers (precision guided bullets) and the surveillance ability they have.

Also need the ability to take of your uniform OFF and grow some HAIR like plain clothes officers. If you have to blend with the environment and the environment is the people......You know real camouflage.

Which you know..... we keep talking about a new kind of warfare,hybrid,4GW,etc. but nobody is looking at the RULE set we force our military to fight under that could be changed to help level the field some.

[slapout9]

Has anybody made a GPS guided 120mm mortar shell yet? That would be about the same and you could mount it on almost anything.

Echo what Slap says, just keep pumping gas in there and wait. Is there any way to get around prohibitions on that? If local police were present could they do it?

Colonel Warden told me that the Air Force should concentrate on the capabailtiy to put a loaf of bread (or whatever) right into the hands of people/soldiers on the ground from the Air Precison Effects!

[J Wolfsberger]

... precision guided bullets...

We could do that.

What's your budget?

[Ken White]

Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?

Excellent question -- and I submit they'll try and thereby dissuade us from action on occasion. However, as Old Eagle pointed out and I said earlier:"Could be conjecture; could be a ploy, could be a misstatement of intent (accidental or deliberate). We'll have to wait and see..."

Tom:

Ken, I will disagree with you on this one.

We can disagree, that's okay -- but just as a point of interest, here are the two points I made:

"...Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels... "

"...I suspect the civilians who are nominally innocent will get more visitation by various bad guys and said civilians will not really appreciate the extra attention (nor will they be happy that a small source of income, claiming non-existent casualties, has been removed)."

Note I said not smart on several levels -- not that it was wrong -- and the only level I spelled out was the second quoted paragraph above. Do you disagree with that? What are your other disagreements? (my other concerns are below)

You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.

Wilf said:

"No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see."

To my mind that's the gist of this; the thread has been mutated into a COIN best practice tutorial and I don't think anyone is questioning what best practice is -- and killing ANY excess civilians -- even 1, une, ee, fagat yek, hannah, ichi, mot, ein, uno solamente -- is to be avoided. Tactical efforts to preclude harm to civilians should be constant, no question. I see no one above disputing that.

That's not the issue -- the issue is the possible guidance which none of us has apparently seen and its potential effect on the effort of units in Afghanistan. I specifically raised the issue of second order effects and unintended consequences. I have seen such orders before and have seen them fail and be allowed to die, unenforced. The problem: As Cav Guy said, the US Army habitually significantly overreacts to every order...

The Afghan attitude toward fighting differs from the Arab attitude. What effect will the order have on the population it is designed to aid?

I go back to Wilf's comment: ""...rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.""

We need to see the order but when we do whatever we say will have little to no effect -- however, the issue to me is the tone of the order and potential adverse effects; the positive effects and the possible need go without saying. With a kid likely to be there again soon, I got one a them there vested int'rests...

Oh and Tom, on this

This has been overdue and we have been dancing with the effects for several years now.

I have to ask WHY have we been dancing with a problem like that -- and it is one -- for several years; why has it not been fixed before this?

I know the answer and it's not pretty and that really needs to be fixed. I doubt this order will fix it, it is attacking the symptom...

That said, I understand that need, really do -- but rather than "this," I would have greatly preferred better training. That would have, should have, meant no need for "this."

[carl]

Also need the ability to take of your uniform OFF and grow some HAIR like plain clothes officers. If you have to blend with the environment and the environment is the people......You know real camouflage.

That sounds like what Frank Kitson did in Kenya long ago.

[tankersteve]

your use of me as an example was a bit too kind, and apples & oranges - for one, I didn't have a guy wounded, which CAN definitely affect your decisions, and two, we really didn't have a plan to get the guy if he didn't come out soon (other than get ready to go get him, just like you).

I really think Blackjack hit the nail on the head when you look at the actual language - air power is the big stick. It discredits us with the locals to use air power because of the likely CDE and the risk-averse nature of using it in close quarters. If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.

Perhaps the criteria for air power needs to be raised - troops in heavy contact on their own base, or an enemy isolated and trying to break contact, etc.

I know there are some who think this is too restrictive, but I think the real intent is for troops to really measure the gain (couple of knuckleheads dead, who will likely be replaced tomorrow) versus the loss (an entire village committed to supporting AQ, due to exceptional losses, especially among women/children).

Oh and Niel, I am at Leavenworth, give me a ping.

Tankersteve

[IntelTrooper]

That sounds like what Frank Kitson did in Kenya long ago.

When your troops are tactically and morally disciplined, uniforms are overrated.

[Ken White]

...It discredits us with the locals to use air power because of the likely CDE and the risk-averse nature of using it in close quarters. If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.

Perhaps the criteria for air power needs to be raised - troops in heavy contact on their own base, or an enemy isolated and trying to break contact, etc.

Well said. Afghans understand and accept bullets; 'Be Omeidi Xodah.' Arty and Air not so much...

[Blackjack]

You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.

We have a winner! That is exactly what I was trying to get at.

If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.

Exactly, that is why I compared an airstrike in COIN to a thermonuclear warhead in large wars. Sure, we could use it, but imagine the political, sociological fallout from it. We end up losing the high ground in the battle of hearts and minds a little more with every 155 HE round, or JDAM we drop. How do we get it back? Put one foot in front of the other, chamber a round and start hunting. Let the people know that they will not be robbed by bandits, they will not have to worry about their children going to school only to be slaughtered. They will not have to endure public beatings by madmen, and a hundred other things.

[jcustis]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

Haha..they hurt...a lot .

[jcustis]

Haha..they hurt...a lot .

so, top-down ironclad rules are laid down which try to fit everything into neat little boxes.

I don't view ROE as ironclad, nor do I view them aa restrictive. Fail to train your troops properly in their execution, and they can be. For the most part they are permissive from my experience.

I will admit that in my prearation for three deployments in support of OIF, the option of fixing, cordoning, and waiting out has NEVER been discussed, trained to, or published as a potential solution.

That commanders have employed it as a tool in the toolbox is a testament to that individual's ability to think on their feet, becauseI for sure haven't seen it ever as a bullet on a training slide. I can't speak for the JRTCs, however.