Afghanistan ROE Change

[jmm99]

the Captain's Journal (please read the About), which is linked from Greyhawk's Mudville (I've visited both sites before) and which has two commentaries on this topic, and many links in the commentaries:

Update on ROE Changes for Afghanistan (opinion piece)

Changes to the Rules of Engagement for Afghanistan (analysis piece, mostly; cites this thread )

Links to some sources (in latter link; and some caveats about the sources linked - "lesson learned" - check for updated sources)

standing rules of engagement (at fas; these are the 2000 version, completely revised in 2005 - especially as to SRUF, which is the basic issue here. So, these show what SROEs look like - that's it. Google up what has been released in 2005 and since; much of them are classified).

theater-specific rules of engagement for Iraq (from Wikileaks. Without getting too violent, classified should mean that - beyond the legalisms; and a leaked classified document has no good means of validation, anyway. End discussion; except to remind that discussion of specific ROE/RUF are potential OpSec man traps).

rules on the use of force (at dtic; again a 2000 version - this particular RUF, as revised, was part of the 2005 SRUFs package, of which Enclosure L was intentionally unclassified to provide a discussion point for LE input).

I haven't an online link to Enclosure L of the 2005 SRUFs - if someone has one, a link would be appreciated.

-----------------------------
Also from the Captain's Journal:

Concerning Snipers, Rules of Engagement and General Kearney (21 Sep 2007) - dealing with UCMJ (and potential War Crimes) charges vs Soldiers and Marines for alleged ROE/RUF violations. Many links (at bottom of page) to Mr Smith's commentaries (11 in all) on ROE/RUF issues.

For the most part, I've stayed with what JMM believes the "Law is", rather than what the "Law should be" - I think I've been doctrinal, but if not please correct me.

(start IMO)

We shoot ourselves in the foot ("suicide by Lawfare") when we turn ROE/RUFs into iron-clad, restrictive, legislative and legalistic tight boxes.

We also have to remember the source differences for ROEs (Laws of War aka LOAC, international law and relations) and RUFs (Rule of Law, domestic constitution and laws of some jurisdiction - ICONUS: US Constitution, Federal and state laws).

We also have to remember that the default under SROE/SRUF is based on the conduct, not status, of the target. Under SROE, NCA (or an authorized CCOM) can define a "hostile group" allowing its members to be killed or captured based on that status. So, in the sniper example (unarmed Taliban), a conduct-based rule = murder and war crime; a status-based rule = no charge.

So far as I know (please correct me, if I an doctrinally incorrect), SRUF themselves are solely conduct-based (classified portions and mixed ROE/RUF combos aside - which may be what the upcoming rules will turn out to be). So, the differences between ROEs and RUFs are more than semantic (as Niel stated), but also can have horrible consequences to the Soldier or Marine who gets on the wrong side of restrictive and legalistic rules.

In War Crimes (and elsewhere), I have commented on my preference for status-based rules in an armed conflict - as allowed by the 2001 AUMF and the GCs accepted by the US, as so far interpreted by SCOTUS and the lower Federal courts.

That is not to say that an unlimited "hunting license" should exist. Carefully defined command guidance should outline the parameters and provide for specific education and training in real-life situations on an on-going basis - training, training & training (and not reams of paper).

In short, they should be permissive, non-legislative and non-legalistic (the average shooter is not a U of Mich Law grad).

(end IMO).