Afghanistan ROE Change

[Ron Humphrey]

Possibly due to the fact that Urban ops,CT,IW strengths don't a "good" COIN force make until they have about as good an understanding of the political piece as they do the DA piece. And can effectively move in, around, and through both in such a way as to achieve the mission

[carl]

Has the Air Force ever tried dropping inert munitions? As in Concrete Practice Bombs? They can be GPS guided but do not produce a Blast effect which generally causes the most injury and damage.

They have, apparently on a regular basis since the 90s. If you google "concrete bombs", many references come up.

[slapout9]

They have, apparently on a regular basis since the 90s. If you google "concrete bombs", many references come up.

Thanks for the tip.

[carl]

One of the things that has struck me about this thread is how the same things being discussed now, were being discussed, in almost the same ways, 30 and 40 years ago.

In post #45 Steve Blair spoke of the VC/NVA tactic of firing from a village at passing US troops in hopes of provoking artillery or an air strike, thereby creating more VC. When I was about 15 I saw a TV show where 3 VN vets were asked how they would have responded. One said we should get out of VN, one said he would call in the artillery and the third, the only enlisted man, said he would send in a patrol to see what was what. That seemed the only sensible course to me at the time. 40 years hence we are talking about the same thing in Afghanistan.

While in college in the 70s, I read of the folly of applying the "zero defect concept", something created for aerospace production lines, to evaluations of military leadership. Cavguy has refered to exactly this.

It was in the 80s when I first read that if Lt. Chester Nimitz had been judged as officers in the 80s were judged, there never would have been an Admiral Nimitz, just a Lt. Nimitz (ret.). In post #71, J. Wolfsberger spoke of careers being destroyed because honest mistakes are not tolerated.

Ken White has talked of the base problem being a culture that will not change (I hope I got that right Ken.) I could never quite figure out what he meant but now it is beginning to dawn on me.

[jmm99]

In considering use of deadly force in LE since Tennessee v. Garner, LE has generated some paper policies and hopefully a lot of training and lessons learned. Slap can speak to the education and training aspects required to implement these RUF-type rules.

I've picked out a few (short) example documents reflecting LE practice after Garner. What should be noted well is that all of these rules are based on the target's conduct, not on the target's status.

Deadly Force (by a Texas PD - a quick 2-page summary of the rules).

Use of Deadly Force (League of Minnesota Cities - besides the rules, provides examples - and a 6-point guide on what facts you need to stay innocent).

Use of Force and Deadly Force (same source as prior - again both rules and examples to cover Garner's expansion in Graham v. Connor).

Police Use of Deadly Force (we have to have a Powerpoint - not bad; it raises some questions for discussion).

----------------------------------
The SCOTUS opinions:

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

If anyone wants, I can dissect these cases, starting with their initial fallacy (that a homicide, whether justified or not, is a "seizure"). But, regardless of their logical validity, they are the gold standard for the present.

Here is an example upcoming workshop which considers these cases among other force issues in LE (Slap can critique it).

---------------------------------
Will LE RUF-like rules really work in the military ?

There has been debate on that question. Here is an example.

Deadly Force Is Authorized, but Also Trained (Army Lawyer 2001)

Which way do you vote on the question posed at p.15 of Martins' article ?

Here is Martins' bottom line: "Again, training rather than legal drafting is the key." That is also my "battlefield opinion" (Slap's words ).

[William F. Owen]

Oh dear.... see here.

And under the new rules of engagement, Taliban forces who move into houses and civilian compounds in the unprotected areas will in many cases be immune from coalition raids. It seems reasonable to wonder whether this course will result in as many or more Afghans turning away from the coalition as errant airstrikes.

One final observation. By effectively grounding the coalition's attack aircraft, the Taliban's information operations have revealed themselves to be perhaps the most effective anti-aircraft weapon in history.

Now there is no reason to suppose that the first paragraph is accurate, but if it is, it does seem that the second paragraph, though grossly simplistic, is not actually inaccurate.

[slapout9]

Oh dear.... see here.



Now there is no reason to suppose that the first paragraph is accurate, but if it is, it does seem that the second paragraph, though grossly simplistic, is not actually inaccurate.

Lawfare at it's finest, we are disarming ourselves didn't the dead German guy say that was the means of defeat?

[William F. Owen]

Lawfare at it's finest, we are disarming ourselves didn't the dead German guy say that was the means of defeat?

I think regardless of attribution to the dead Prussian, not doing profoundly stupid things based on a lack of understanding was always good advice, in any form of warfare.

Now, before all the emotional responses flow in, I am not saying the "new ROE" are stupid. I believe in ROE. ROE are essential but, they should not prevent you killing or capturing the enemy, - which is what Armed Forces should be doing.

Having said that, how come 5 years of the current ROE, has meant that US Forces have killed more civilians in 2 x COIN campaigns than Israel did 2 x State v State Wars, in the same time period, and nobody blinked?

[Ken White]

"The hybrid warfare challenge is complicated {1}. The 2010 QDR will be helpful only if it provides clear guidance in response. Planning documents that leave leaders unclear about what they are responsible for will result in confusion, not clarity{2}."{Notes added / kw}

While I really agree in principle, in practice I'm terribly afraid Note 1 negates any possibility of Note 2 being provided. Thus it has always been...

Clarity in military operations is always desirable but rarely provided, thus the requirement for people to THINK instead of merely reacting in a rote manner. He or she who does not rapidly adapt is likely to fail. Any attempt to provide excess clarity in doctrine or planning is also likely to fail -- and to breed further failure in the attempt...

You cannot completely teach adaptability and flexibility. You have to hire for them. As well as fire for the lack of them...

[jmm99]

from Wilf
Having said that, how come 5 years of the current ROE, has meant that US Forces have killed more civilians in 2 x COIN campaigns than Israel did 2 x State v State Wars, in the same time period, and nobody blinked?

is a profoundly intelligent question which should be answered - if the factual premise of the question is correct (I don't know one way or the other).

So, if you will consent to be the expert witness under barrister examination (), what are the statistics for the factual premise and the sources for those statistics ?

As we all know, the statistics for civilian casualities have been a matter of dispute as to the numbers and who caused the deaths; and have been spun, spindled and mutilated with reckless abandon.

The comparisons (hopefully leading to the answer to your question) could relate to the relative kinetics vice the opponents in each conflict, and to the relative kinetics vice the conflicts. But, first we have to have facts we can agree on.

[William F. Owen]

So, if you will consent to be the expert witness under barrister examination (), what are the statistics for the factual premise and the sources for those statistics ?

I would suggest folks research their own statistics, because...

As we all know, the statistics for civilian casualities have been a matter of dispute as to the numbers and who caused the deaths; and have been spun, spindled and mutilated with reckless abandon.

The comparisons (hopefully leading to the answer to your question) could relate to the relative kinetics vice the opponents in each conflict, and to the relative kinetics vice the conflicts. But, first we have to have facts we can agree on.

Actually, I don't really need an answer. Let's say the IDF killed 2,000 and NATO/US killed 1,800. So what? I'm not making a moral argument. It's political-operational point. 3 years after the US became "COIN"-aware F-18's are rolling in on targets, and civilian deaths by NATO are in excess of 500 a year (maybe 800). That to me, is symptomatic of a problem.

[jmm99]

with the comparable statistics going by the boards; and framing the question in your present terms:

from Wilf
It's political-operational point. [1] 3 years after the US became "COIN"-aware [2] F-18's are rolling in on targets, and [3] civilian deaths by NATO are in excess of 500 a year (maybe 800). That to me, is symptomatic of a problem.

1. Please define the problem; and the general solutions you posit.

2. As to which of the three symptoms does the IDF differ; and how could its experience assist in solving the problem you have defined in answering #1.

I believe your answers will be material to the question of what degrees of force should be used.

PS: This is direct (friendly witness) examination because the questions are totally open-ended - from your friendly barrister

[slapout9]

Child Smugglers are being used to support villages with food in order to survive!!!!

If this situation is accurate it is far worse than any errant Air Strikes. Not following up on situations like this will loose the War for you. If you expanded the influence among tribes like this you wouldn't need to worry about Air Strikes because you would be Winning IMHO.

http://therealnews.com/t/index.php?o...7+02%3A03%3A16

[Ken White]

What do you mean by "expanded the influence among tribes like this you wouldn't need to worry about Air Strikes because you would be Winning..."

I'm not sure what you expect the US to do???

[Blackjack]

From the report linked below.

Of the 2118 casualties reported in 2008, 1160 (55%) were attributed to antigovernment elements (AGEs) and 828 (39%) to pro-government forces. The remaining 130 (6%) could not be attributed to any of the conflicting parties since, for example, some civilians died as a result of cross-fire or were killed by unexploded ordinance.

Air-strikes remain responsible for the largest percentage of civilian deaths attributed to progovernment forces. UNAMA recorded 552 civilian casualties of this nature in 2008.

AGEs remain responsible for the largest proportion of civilian casualties. Civilian deaths reportedly caused by AGEs rose from 700 in 2007 to 1,160 in 2008 – an increase of over 65%.

PGF Civilian Casualties by type
Air-Strikes: 552
Force Protection: 41
Other PGF Tactics: 235
Total: 828

2007-2008 UNAMA Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict

I read this report a bit ago, and it has some solid metrics in it regarding civilian casualties. IE, who is doing it, what is causing it. I suggest we could learn a bit more from reading it as well. It may give us some insight as to the situation leading to these ROE/RUF changes.

[jmm99]

only one side of the story. The data required for a full LOAC analysis is probably not open source. You would need something like the following for each air strike:

Type (CAS, UAV, HAB - whatever other types there are)

No. PGF involved; KIA & WIA (any fratricide ?)

No. AGE involved; KIA & WIA

No. NC involved; KIA & WIA

Based on the report, a couple of events = a lot of KIA & WIA. How many airstrikes involved no NC casualties, for example. The idea is to get at the overall military necessity and proportionality.

The professionals here can improve on this by correcting the terminology, etc.

[carl]

jmm399

Here is a link for the executive summary of the CENTCOM report on the bombing in Farah in early May.

http://www.centcom.mil/en/press-rele...-province.html

It gives most of the info you would need but only for one incident. I thought it very interesting.

[jmm99]

thanks for the link. I'm downloading the report (9MB) and will read it tomorrow. The problem with one report of huge NC casualties is that it may (since I don't have the metrics) overwhelm the worth of a 100 airstrikes that killed only enemy and saved US lives. On the other hand, Tac Air may not be so important in this kind of armed conflict. I simply don't know.

Don't fly into any geese - and I remember the Blue Goose well.

[William F. Owen]

1. Please define the problem; and the general solutions you posit.

I can't define the problem. I'm not on the ground, but... if if the circumstances are as they are suggested, then a complete prohibition on air strikes against structures would have seemed sensible.... 4-5 years ago.

As to which of the three symptoms does the IDF differ; and how could its experience assist in solving the problem you have defined in answering #1.

The IDF is not doing "COIN". It's fighting a war. Without getting into a fairly pointless argument, about who did what and when, if the rocket team is in the building, you drop the building. All the evidence to date is that Human shields are simply not tolerated. I would strongly suggest that the IDF model is not copied. There is no similarity between the two conflicts.

[slapout9]

What do you mean by "expanded the influence among tribes like this you wouldn't need to worry about Air Strikes because you would be Winning..."

I'm not sure what you expect the US to do???

In the video I saw we promised the local tribal leader if he quit growing poppies he would receive some financial/economic support. Four years later he has received nothing and his village is starving. That is a good way to drive the village over to the opposition side thus creating as many if not more guerrillas than any Air Strike. If we promise something to somebody we should deliver on it.That is what I would expect the US to do.