Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[AnalyticType]

While it's true that lack of synchronized effort among the coalition nations tends to slow down forward progress, the U.S. decision is best.

Here's why:

The situation of the average Afghani farmer that grows poppy can be likened to that of the Depression Era coalminer... he owes his soul "to the company store." When it's time to plant poppies, most of the farmers have no money, and no food. They borrow money against the poppy crop from the local drug lord, so that they can feed themselves and their families.

When eradication teams come along and obliterate the crop, by dragging the fields with weighted sections of chainlink fence behind ATVs, or flailing it, or chemically killing it, the farmer is put in an untenable position which he cannot fix - that of not having a crop to pay his debt with, nor money to do so. Additionally, he watches the balance of the money he would have received at harvest (with which to sustain his family for the balance of the year) 'die on the vine' as well. It's a downward spiral that can only be slowed by growing more poppy. It's also far too late in the season, at the typical time that the eradication teams do their thing, for the farmers to recoup their losses in another fashion.

The often offered alternative that people in the US like to discuss, that of buying the crop and selling it to pharmeceutical companies for legitimate use, is not a realistic option simply because that market is already fully supplied. There is no demand to be filled, in the legal market, for Afghani opium.

Yes, the trafficking/processing/transportation elements must be dealt with, most often by lethal means. The corrupt provincial government officials, from the Governor down, must be jailed or otherwise removed, as Governor Atta did in the Balkh province. Truth be known, he also offered to replace the lost poppy crops with cannabis... But when he announced that Balkh was "poppy-free," he spoke the truth... Also, being in the Northern Plateau, where poppy was a very small percentage of the agricultural efforts, there wasn't much poppy production to deal with in the first place.

The bottom line with the southern poppy-growing regions is economics. An Afghani farmer who does not grow poppies will make approximately 300 USD per year. A farmer next door who grows poppies on a couple hectares (ha) of land will make 3,000 USD per year. When you look at it in real numbers, of course it makes sense that they're growing poppies! But you (meaning governments) cannot pay the farmers not to grow poppies. Unlike (in welfare states) the tendency of those with their hands out for money to be ruled by the law of inertia, Afghanis are fairly industrious people.

I spoke with former Minister of the Interior Ali Jalali in 2007 about this very issue. He said flat out that if farmers are paid not to grow poppy, they will tend to take the money and grow poppies rather than leaving the fields fallow. But Jalali was very specific; he said that this is pure economics. There is no longstanding tradition of opium use in the Afghani (et al) culture. The solution lies in replacing the poppy cultivation with either another high-value crop or jobs that will earn them at least as much as the poppy crop would. They need to be busy and productive.

So when I was researching alternative crops, I used 3,000 USD/2 ha as a benchmark to find economically advantageous alternatives. I also had a team member research non-agricultural industries which were likely to pay as well, while utilizing the agricultural products of the alternative crops. I found some very interesting and viable crop options.

The one at the top of the list: saffron. As the world's most costly spice (retail avg 300USD/oz), the economic benefit of cultivating saffron crocuses is clear. Granted, three stigma (the female part of the flower) per flower are the sole source of the spice, and it takes approximately 75,000 flowers to produce one pound of saffron threads. However, saffron crocuses are indigenous to the Iran/Afghanistan/Pakistan/Northern India swath, meaning that this is not a crop which would require specialized cultivation/fertilization. As with opium poppies, the key to economic benefit is the export value. Furthermore, being a late summer to fall crop, food crops can be cultivated on the same ground earlier in the spring and summer, effectively producing for the farmer both income and sustenance on the same piece of ground.

Another crop with high value is flax, which is already grown all over Afghanistan. However, it is only grown as an oil seed crop (linseed oil). One crop can produce two products if flax is also utilized for an indigenous textile industry.

Other high value export crops include pomegranates, grapes (exported as raisins and juice), nuts, and the 'animal husbandry piece de resistance'... cashmere. Though only 11% of Afghanistan's landmass is arable ground the total pasture grazing land available, exclusive of arable farmland, is approximately 45% or 291,375 km sq. But what of the market for cashmere?

Afghanistan is the third largest producer of this high value, renewable commodity, behind China and Mongolia. The importance of the cashmere industry to the Mongolian economy is clear: it provides income and employment for over a third of the population and raw cashmere and cashmere products are Mongolia’s third largest export. A vibrant cashmere industry has the potential to contribute to the growth of the economy, of the manufacturing sector, of employment at both the herder and the manufacturing levels, and of exports. It is important here to note that in Mongolia the herding sector and processing sectors are in deep trouble. In 2005, the herding sector surpassed the total herd size that can be sustained by Mongolia’s pasturelands, and overgrazing began to cause desertification. Many firms in the processing sector ceased to operate or downsized their operations over the past 10 years, yet processors still operate on average at less than 50% capacity.

This is to Afghanistan’s advantage. Despite being ranked third in cashmere production, Afghanistan’s share of the cashmere market is approximately 5%. As horticultural crop productivity increases, and irrigation systems are renovated, Afghanistan’s capability to sustain larger numbers of goats will increase. There is a growing market to be tapped by Afghan farmers who produce cashmere as Mongolian production continues to drop.

Contrary to the media-provided impression of agricultural sterility, Afghanistan is fully capable of sustaining regionally specialized agriculture. Afghanis have for millenia made effective use of their limited water resources for growing a wide variety of food crops. These include tree crops such as pomegranates, figs, mulberries, walnuts, pistachios, almonds and apricots; field crops such as cotton, peanuts, kidney beans, chickpeas, melons, herbs and grapes; and cereal grains such as wheat, barley, millet, rice and maize.

The key to success with any of these crops is the repair and revitalization of the surface irrigation and kareze systems which were demolished by the Soviets, and of which approximately 65% remain in disuse.

The more energy, money, and time that we pour into fixing the agricultural infrastructure (particularly the water supply systems) concurrently with interdiction efforts, the more quickly and easily we can wean the Afghani agricultural sector (85% of the whole) off of opium poppies and on to sustainable and economically feasible crops.