Was Rep. Murtha right?

[DDilegge]

In a previous post I outlined what I believe are the flaws in Rep. Murtha’s plan. Most of the argument I presented centered on the ambiguity of his proposal, not a mention of this in the Mainstream Media (MSM) to date. Yet, the MSM was quick as lightening in claiming the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq was vague. Go figure…

All that said and with an attempt not to digress, I offer these bullets on what I would like to see referencing our efforts in Iraq.

• Tooth-to-Tail: Reduce non-essential support troops and staffs. Reduce overall troop commitment while increasing trigger-pullers and other essential BOS-related personnel – civil affairs and PYSOP comes to mind here.

• Combined Action Program: CAP-like program implemented (see previous posts and threads for discussion). What I add is the CAP personnel would be on a one-year staggered individual rotation to ensure continuity of relationships and avoid “abrupt turnovers” with Iraqi forces a particular CAP unit is embedded with. Offer a significant pay-bonus to high-performer CAP personnel who sign on for an extended tour. All CAP units must have the authority to conduct forward air-control.

• Quick Reaction Force: In-country combined arms QRF. Suitable to rapidly deploy and capable of conducting “precision” urban operations. Must be repeatedly / randomly employed in a “pre-emptive” manner to ensure operations are more than “reactive” and to get within the enemy’s decision-making cycle. Pre-emptive and “show of force” operations must be accompanied by significant information and humanitarian – good will actions.

• Border Security: Okay, okay, we can’t even secure our own southern border. Still, the Syrian and Iranian (Saudi Arabian too) borders must be policed to ensure free passage of legitimate traffic and blocked at all costs to terrorist transit and logistics-related activities. Most likely scenario is the preponderance of the ground forces are Iraqi (with US embeds) backed by US air assets in a reconnaissance / surveillance and strike capacity. UAVs are a must here.

• Information Operations: Drop the whole term (IO) and do it right. Be upfront and attempt to influence through media venues directly attributed to the US and yet popular with the local population. If Hollywood and Madison Avenue can get it right I opine the Department that invented the Internet (sorry Mr. Gore) can too. Getting the right and truthful word out must also extend to CONUS. We are being defeated by US and international press coverage in the sheer volume of “if it bleeds, it leads” articles and news spots. Moreover, the DoD must devote a significant effort to “fact checking” each and every MSM article that is blatantly false or implies a position that does not mirror “ground truth”. Right now it is ###-for-tat; DoD releases five or so positive articles to the hundreds released by the MSM. Now is the time to take the MSM to task. While some may think this extreme – many MSM articles, editorials and opinion pieces are indirectly (and with some - directly) “aiding and abetting” our nation’s enemies. Bottom-line – call them on this, often and prominently.

• “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy”: General Mattis’ guidance still holds true and needs to be ingrained at every level of command. That said, no worse enemy must be brutal and decisive. We aren’t in Kansas anymore and our actions, velvet glove and the stick, go a long way in at least aiding our information campaign. Operating in a tribal culture such as Iraq, the stick must sting and sting hard and the recipients of the sting must include those aiding and abetting our terrorist foes. The velvet glove must be extended after careful consideration, the alliances we make often seem to backfire in the long run. Still, we must reward our allies and punish our foes with consistency (everyone knows the score) and decisiveness.