Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
I have noticed this trend occurring more frequently in recent months as Soldiers question whether the soft side of counterinsurgency is worth it. The argument being that if force alone seemed to work in dealing with the Tamil Tigers, why do we need counter-insurgency?
Sorry to say this, but that argument can only be symptomatic of a profound misunderstanding as to the nature of the issue.

Sri Lanka was not so-called "COIN." It was combat operations conducted to inflict militarily defeat on an irregular force. The fact that this is not blinding obvious and clear high lights the problem that comes out of the very odd perception the US now has of what they think "counter-insurgency" is.

What is the "soft side of COIN." The political viability of inflicting military defeat on an irregular enemy resides in the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of force. There is no soft side.

In 3,000 years of recorded history, the vast majority (99%) of defeats inflicted upon of irregular forces have been as a direct result of killing and capturing them.
Inherent to this killing and capturing, is killing the right people, and that applies to all forms of warfare.

D-Day wouldn't have turned out too well if the Canadians had opted to kill and capture Americans, as well as the Germans. ....maybe....