Sri Lanka was not so-called "COIN." It was combat operations conducted to inflict militarily defeat on an irregular force. The fact that this is not blinding obvious and clear high lights the problem that comes out of the very odd perception the US now has of what they think "counter-insurgency" is.
What is the "soft side of COIN." The political viability of inflicting military defeat on an irregular enemy resides in the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of force. There is no soft side.
In 3,000 years of recorded history, the vast majority (99%) of defeats inflicted upon of irregular forces have been as a direct result of killing and capturing them.Tztztztz, a daring statement.
For one, I doubt that anyone has done a reliable empirical study to back this up.
Without a clearer definition of terms, I'm not sure this is going to be a very productive debate. One can equally say that 99% of all military defeats inflicted on irregular forces have been the direct result of politics (that is, sustaining a state capable of extracting resources and projecting military power; developing ideologies and recruitment systems that place motivated soldiers on the battlefield; shaping a domestic political environment in which killing insurgents enjoys a degree of popular acceptance or support among vital constituencies, and doesn't destabilize the regime; etc.)
I do think Wilf is absolutely correct in suggesting, however, that Sri Lanka's ultimate success was not achieved through population-centric COIN. Partly this reflected a political context in which Tamils represented under 10% of the population, and their support is not necessary for either regime survival or military resources. In a more divided society, or a case where a relatively small number of external forces are undertaking a stability operation, things could be rather different. At the risk of channeling Ken, METT-TC(with an emphasis here on the C).
The Sri Lankans might also find that the Tamil insurgency returns again in the future if the Sinhalese majority doesn't address some Tamil grievances.
Actually Wilf, as I'm sure you know, we didn't do a lot of "capturing" against the 12th SS in June 1944, once dead Canadian PoWs started showing up.D-Day wouldn't have turned out too well if the Canadians had opted to kill and capture Americans, as well as the Germans. ....maybe....![]()
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