Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
So what percentage of support are we talking about, and is that willing consent or coerced consent? If the premise of FM3-24 is as you describe then it is deeply flawed and has not read deeply into the history of irregular warfare. The very fact they call it "COIN" should act as a warning

Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other. Killing the right people enables that. Killing the wrong people is almost always counter-productive. Until you reduce the enemy's ability to constrain your freedom of action, you can't do any of the so called hearts and minds stuff, which should be focussed on creating a hostile environment for the enemy! - not just a nice environment for the locals!
I am new to this forum so if I speak brashly, I apologize for my inexperience. All my experience with irregular warfare or insurgency comes from one tour to Afghanistan as a platoon leader. In that tour, I definitely fought insurgents, but I also conducted humanitarian operations (the soft side or hearts and minds).

When reading the responses to my second comment, it seemed like the responders glossed over Mr. Owen's first thought: that insurgencies or irregular warfare DO NOT REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION. Mr. Owen then calls the US Army COIN manual deeply flawed. Many responders on this thread gave kudos to him for his definition of warfare while ignoring this comment. I have to ask the people reading this thread, how many people find the FM 3-24 flawed for its belief that insurgencies are supported by the population?

Second, Mr. Owens definition of warfare is a correct start, but leaves out the most important detail. Rank Amateur and Brandon were hinting at this specific deficiency. Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups using violence to achieve political ends. In warfare, the political motivation is everything; it is what separates warfare from criminality. Without politics, warfare would not exist.

Further, Mr. Owens provides the next point: "Killing the right people enables that." Killing is a method, but so is influencing them irregular forces to give up arms, convincing the leadership to join the government, or destroying their logistical support so that they cannot continue fighting. In Carl's link above, Thomas Ricks describes killing people as the least effective way to combat insurgents. I agree. You can kill insurgents or irregular forces, but that is only one method of overcoming an armed force. Convincing whole groups to quit fighting is much more effective and more beneficial in the long run.

Finally, saying "just kill the right people" is easy. On paper, that briefs really well. The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.

Unfortunately, for soldiers in the US Army and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan, counter-insurgency is never the simple decision between killing the enemy or population-centric counter-insurgency. Soldiers conduct humanitarian operations, build the local government, train local security forces all while conducting counter-force operations (killing the enemy). What the Rakkasans--to bring this back to the article "Kill Company"--really failed to do was conduct full-spectrum counter-insurgency, and that is why they are a cautionary tale to modern soldiers.

Michael C. at www.onviolence.com