Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
that insurgencies or irregular warfare DO NOT REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION. Mr. Owen then calls the US Army COIN manual deeply flawed. Many responders on this thread gave kudos to him for his definition of warfare while ignoring this comment. I have to ask the people reading this thread, how many people find the FM 3-24 flawed for its belief that insurgencies are supported by the population?
The statement that they do not require the support of the population is correct. Having the support of the population makes the insurgents job easier but such support is NOT required. I have read FM 3-24 (and 3-24.2 which is a slightly better document) and it is an overwordy academic tome that is better than nothing but is flawed, IMO, on several levlels.

Writing a 'counterinsurgency' manual and relying on a number of 'experts' whose experience was in insurgencies during which they were part of the government forces and who wrote in a time of ideological turmoil resulted in a skewed effort that place excessive emphasis on population control -- governments can do that; intervenors like the US in other nations (Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq to name three) cannot exercise such control -- and most 'host' governments are not likely to do so. The Roman, Mongol and even the British solutions are no longer practical. So you are NOT going to control the population.

If you aren't going to control it, the best you can hope for is to guide the population into not offering active support for the insurgency. You cannot prevent them from offering tacit support unless you're prepared to use the same techniques the opponent uses and scare them into it. If you aren't going to do that, your alternative is to make the opponent cease terrorizing the population to get tacit support. To do that, the best solution is to kill the opponents -- being very careful not to kill relatively innocent members of the population.

That requires telling the good guys from the bad guys. How do Americans do that in a culture the like of which most of them even after a couple of tours can barely comprehend? The answer is that with rare exceptions, who can and do 'go native,' you cannot. That means you have to have locals to tell who's on what side.

This in an area where Achmat, Elder in Sturm Walla will gleefully shop Abbas in the next valley because Abbas was toying with Achmat's cousin's third wife in 1976. So you need reliable locals, say a Political adviser and an Interpreter Walla (think a British RSM type) to keep all a Battalion's interpreters in line while the PolAd insure that he and the 'terps give the straight scoop. That can take three to five years to vet, build and staff. We're just getting around to something on that line and it'll work.Like the manual, better late than never.

Realize also that Afghanistan is not a COIN fight -- the Afghans may have some elements of one but we do not -- and that's not a semantic quibble, that's a critical difference. There are FID and SFA elements but for most troops, it's a war, pure but durn sure not simple...
...Without politics, warfare would not exist.
Do the Religious fanatics of the world, past and present know that? Loaded question, I know -- religion is political in many senses. However, while your statement is basically correct it has little to do with the reality on the ground. Side trips into Hamas et.al. do not change the fact that Wilf's comment was, as J Wolfsberger noted, a value neutral statement on warfare. It did not address the political aspects, nor is that an Army's job.
Finally, saying "just kill the right people" is easy. On paper, that briefs really well. The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.
Absolutely correct for openers, agree with you wholeheartedly until the last clause -- you are not ever going to win anyone's heart or mind. What you can do is convince most people that you do consider their interests and that you can clobber the bad guys anytime you can locate them and that you are trying to do this without being counter productive by killing the wrong people.

Realize that all most of the population in such a situation wants is for everyone to go away and leave them alone. If you or the bad guys offer any benefits, they'll take 'em. If you pose a threat, they'll do what you want them to -- as long as you're watching. If the bad guys do a better and more constant job of watching than you do (and they almost always will), then you need to destroy their ability to do that or negate it in some other way.

Since they really do not like being visited in the night by Afghan Talibs, Pakistani Talibs, AQ and allies, Smugglers, Opium Traders and other tribes with a grudge and the odd batch of just plain old border Banditti or Crooks (all called 'insurgents' for simplicity's sake... ) in various combinations and with unpleasant ramifications; if you can look like you're going to remove that unpleasantness, you will not win a single heart or mind but they will cease active if coerced support to the bad guys and as you reduce the number of said miscreants and the night visits decline in number and intensity, they will cease fear driven tacit support to them and give it to you -- not out of fear (or gratitude -- all our projects are seen as partial compensation for our presences, no more) but simply because you can reduce the fear quotient. You can remove the violence.

Thanks for the job you do and keep on keepin' on...