More killing. Less good deeds

[Tom Odom]

Started this thread, because I think this is spot on the money.

I like it because I think it is essentially correct. I hate it because this guy is saying everything I, and quite few other SWJ folks, have been saying for a long time, but just says it better. Plus being a Brigadier, can't hurt.
(I don't defer to rank, but the authoritarian tendency within most hierarchies does.)

I don't expect the "COIN-oil" folks to agree, but war is war, and winning wars hasn't really changed in 3,000 years.

You are right. I won't agree regardless of how many times you proclaim that war is war. Over simplifying is every bit as bad as over complicating.

The brigadier makes some good points and he make some doubtful ones. Most of the doubt comes with taking a point supposedly of the opposing view to its extreme and trying to paint it as middle of the road, as in

Hearts-and-minds is also a strategy of exhaustion but one in which the enemy’s will to resist is undermined by largesse.

Makes for a snappy read as in the 15 second sound bite to writing; does not reflect reality or COIN.

Tom

[kingo1rtr]

I agree that there is much to support and admire in this essay - however I fundamentally believe that we must maintain the 'hearts and minds' concept at the core of what we do out there. It is in essence the centre of gravity in this struggle; it provides coherence across the spectrum of operations, from tactical to strategic, from Kabul to Kandahar to the villages and huts in Helmand; equally it provides a neccessary constraint in the battle against the insurgent. There is too much evidence about to suggest that our inability to constrain collateral damage, right at the lowest level in village and mudhut, when we take a route to remorselessly hunt down the enemy, would lead us to a position where we take 1 step forwards and 2 steps back. We must continue to get 'among the people' with all the attendant costs in men's lives and materiel. I firmly believe that the people there still want to be liberated from the threat of the Taliban; that does not preclude their ability to live and exist as a Pashtun people - the coalition offers the people a greater chance of achieving that than anything the Taliban can match. I agree that military victory is something that is not on the agenda, it need not be, its not about that. We must have the Afghan's 'hearts and minds' at the forefront of what we do if we are ever going see Afghanistan as a stable state that represents their culture and their way.

[William F. Owen]

You are right. I won't agree regardless of how many times you proclaim that war is war. Over simplifying is every bit as bad as over complicating.

I concur that over simplifying something is not useful. I submit that usefully simplifying something is mostly necessary.

More to the point, my "proclamation" is aimed at attempting to illicit the views and perspectives of those who can accurately describe, what about the combating of irregular enemies makes the nature of war different?

Warfare does require different approaches. No one would contest that, but it is warfare none the less.

Makes for a snappy read as in the 15 second sound bite to writing; does not reflect reality or COIN.

I agree. The 15 second sound bites that jar with me are "heats and minds" "human terrain" "80% political, 20% military" "complex war-fighting" and "you need a network to fight a network."

[davidbfpo]

A lengthy commentary on the Afghan situation and whether it is really that vital a battleground; the author Rory Stewart has been a soldier, diplomat and academic and has travelled extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq. Living in Kabul in 2005: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...annot-win.html A slightly longer edition: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html

Worth reading through for its many pertinent comments and seems to fit here, even if killing is not the focus.

davidbfpo

[Gian P Gentile]

"Hearts and Minds" has always been a name, a label, a code applied in these kinds of small wars to ostensibly describe what folks wanted other folks to think were actually happening on the ground, and afterwards, what they wanted others to think did happen.

The British in Malaya broke the back of the communist insurgency there not between 1952-1954 under the hearts and minds campaign of Templer, but with the use of brute military force combined with Briggs's resettlement program between 1949-1951. Once the insurgency's back was broken, Templer in charge was able to use persuasion of hearts and minds to further things along. This explanation is real and is truthful and has been put forward by a number of leading British scholars over the past few years, most recently in a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies that challenges the Malaya Coin Paradigm.

Moreover, one can see the same thing being done by such high priests of population centric Coin like Gallieni and Lyautey in Madagascar and Morocco respectively. Lyautey especially would use the language of "peaceful penetration," of progressive development to better people's lives in order to soothe domestic tensions in France over imperial action and internal issues with the French Army. But again, these hearts and minds techniques were ostensible; actually Lyautey crushed resistance in Morocco by the more time honored process used by the French Army in that region: the Razzia. Historian Doug Porch's excellent campaign study of Lyautey in Morocco shows this to be the case.

Wilf is right, war is war, it is not "armed social science," and real war, not happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language involves killing and death. And in actuality the historical models that we use to prop up this ostensible notion of "hearts and minds" were won through killing and destruction that broke the back of the resistance.

It is time to get a clear view of what we think we are trying to do in places like Astan.

[Tom Odom]

"Hearts and Minds" has always been a name, a label, a code applied in these kinds of small wars to ostensibly describe what folks wanted other folks to think were actually happening on the ground, and afterwards, what they wanted others to think did happen.

Wilf is right, war is war, it is not "armed social science," and real war, not happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language involves killing and death. And in actuality the historical models that we use to prop up this ostensible notion of "hearts and minds" were won through killing and destruction that broke the back of the resistance.

It is time to get a clear view of what we think we are trying to do in places like Astan.

And neither are you, Gian. You both are offering reductionist viewpoints poised against a red herring reductionist view.

I agree that we need a clear view of Afghanistan. War is war is not a good start.

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

Wilf, Gian, are you two really advocating that we scrap any attempt to win the support of the populace and just engage in a “war is war” killing spree? In which case we tell the AF to unleash the B-1s and -2s to bomb A’stan until the rubble is bouncing in a depopulated wasteland.

I doubt that’s your position, but it reads that way.

From the article,

A hearts-and-minds approach is predicated on the proposition that we foreign, Western, culturally Christian, invaders can persuade a sizeable proportion of the Pashtun population to cut themselves off from their cultural roots; subject themselves to an equally foreign and incomprehensible form of government resting largely on the customs of the tribes of pre-Roman Germany; and abandon their cultural birthright of unrivalled hegemony over “Pashtunistan”. To do this we offer some new buildings, some cash and more reliable electricity—none of which have been important to them so far in their history.[8] Attendant on these “inducements” of course is the removal of their ability to generate cash by farming poppies and the destruction of cultural mores—the subjection of women and the application of traditional law for example—that define them as a cultural group.

Nice straw man. Not “hearts and minds” as I’ve ever understood the concept. It is, however, a reasonably accurate summary of “nation building.” Let’s make that distinction, and then we can all agree that “nation building” is, indeed, a load of crap.

We can also discuss what "hearts and minds" is, or should be, in the context of developing an effective strategy for ending the violence and turning the country over to its own people, with their own government rooted in their own cultural traditions and norms.

In that context, Wilf is dead on about killing the right people. Gian is dead on in his observation about "happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language." But I think that we'd better keep in mind that Wilf also pointed out that killing the wrong people is counterproductive, and that our goals in places like A'stan and Iraq should be:

1. Stop the violence.
2. Turn the country back over to its own people.
3. Leave.

I don't see that happening without, at least, the tacit support of the population. I don't see that minimal level of support emerging unless we address the concerns of the population, beginning with the safety of "me and mine," while we're engaged in killing the right people.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, Gian, are you two really advocating that we scrap any attempt to win the support of the populace and just engage in a “war is war” killing spree?

No. That is no what, or I guess Gian is saying. To whit...

In that context, Wilf is dead on about killing the right people. Gian is dead on in his observation about "happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language." But I think that we'd better keep in mind that Wilf also pointed out that killing the wrong people is counterproductive, and that our goals in places like A'stan and Iraq should be:

1. Stop the violence.
2. Turn the country back over to its own people.
3. Leave.

That is why I am coming from.
Stopping the violence means stopping the violent people.
Build all the schools, hospitals and community centres, once you have a secure environment and THEY can maintain it.

[Entropy]

The title of is very familiar one: "How to Win in Afghanistan." What is "win?"

From the conclusion:

In Afghanistan a strategy focusing on the annihilation of Taliban power is the only way to achieve broad political progress. Until that is done, Afghan institutions; political, bureaucratic, police and military, will be denied the time and space they need to achieve a robust maturity. There will be a time when reconstruction and other aid will begin to produce dividends and that time will be marked by the establishment of security which, in Afghanistan, requires the removal of the insurgent and the extension of the coercive authority of the Afghan state into Pashtun areas. Until then NATO must be prepared to act as the proxy for the Afghan state in establishing control over the Pashtun population.

I think we need to consider the possibility that we are rearranging deck chairs and that no operational strategy (annihilation of the Taliban, pop-centric COIN or whatever) will achieve success given the various limitations on what we can do. While there are some compelling arguments in the piece, I don't see annihilation of the Taliban as practically achievable. For many of the same reasons, I don't think the pop-centric COIN can "win" at the end. There are several reasons, but the main problem is Pakistan. One can't annihilate the Taliban nor protect the population when the enemy has a safe haven - a safe haven that happens to be in a country that, for its own reasons, does not wish to see a strong, independent Afghan state. It's also a country where we cannot operate openly and the government has both limited ability and desire to establish the kind of control over both territory and resources necessary to dismantle the safe-haven.

The author makes several good points about "exhaustion" but the problem I see is that with a safe-haven, exhaustion works against an annihilation strategy as well.

IMO our problems with Afghanistan rest at the policy level where the objectives are murky and appear to change with the winds. The result is that those engaging in debates on operational strategy for Afghanistan often operate under differing sets of assumptions. Until things at the policy level become coherent I don't think these debates, nor the war itself, are going to go anywhere.

[pjmunson]

was probably better said here:

And neither are you, Gian. You both are offering reductionist viewpoints poised against a red herring reductionist view.

I agree that we need a clear view of Afghanistan. War is war is not a good start.

Tom

The argument was framed in ways that seemingly reject a large body of thought and practice with some relatively smug comments that are equally simplistic and reductionist as that accused of the other camp:
""COIN-oil" folks"

Gian Gentile's post acknowledges that both killing and "hearts and minds" were used, but then states: "war is war, it is not "armed social science," and real war, not happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language involves killing and death. And in actuality the historical models that we use to prop up this ostensible notion of "hearts and minds" were won through killing and destruction that broke the back of the resistance." Again, his own post shows that it is not either-or, but he ends with a statement that makes it seem like "hearts and minds" is a crock. I'd agree that imagining that you can win a war through hearts and minds alone is insane, but who is really arguing that you can fight COIN by hearts and minds alone?

The article rejects hearts and minds as a pipe dream: "A hearts-and-minds approach is predicated on the proposition that we foreign, Western, culturally Christian, invaders can persuade a sizeable proportion of the Pashtun population to cut themselves off from their cultural roots; subject themselves to an equally foreign and incomprehensible form of government resting largely on the customs of the tribes of pre-Roman Germany; and abandon their cultural birthright of unrivalled hegemony over “Pashtunistan”. To do this we offer some new buildings, some cash and more reliable electricity—none of which have been important to them so far in their history." This is a strawman argument. The hearts and minds he describes is of course a failing proposition. Yet, securing the population by killing, then staying, and helping to rebuild, while working to show why it is good to have you around is a good "hearts and minds" campaign. You aren't going to get Pashtuns to be eager "little Americans" but you can show them why it is worth their while to have you around.

At the end, I guess I just don't understand who is advocating a purely hearts and minds approach that doesn't advocate killing the insurgents to secure the population as an integral and primary goal. Unless there are large bodies of military leaders and policymakers that think you can "win" without killing by "winning hearts and minds", it seems that Kelley's argument is framed against a straw man. And I'd also like to know what his vision of winning is since he labels his article as "How to Win in Afghanistan."

To me, it is disturbing that such a reductionist argument is still ongoing 8 years into this fight. I would think that people would be arguing more about details rather than whether "hearts-and-minds" snake oil salesmen or people properly focused on killing and war as war has been for 3000 years are right. You need both and need to properly integrate all of your means and that is where the discussion should be: integration and synergy of the different means and ways.

[Ken White]

Gian Gentile's post acknowledges that both killing and "hearts and minds" were used, but then states: "war is war, it is not "armed social science,"...but who is really arguing that you can fight COIN by hearts and minds alone?

No one here, really, not even Gian. He appears here from time to time and gets published in the Op-Ed pages of the NYT and other papers and has articles in the Armed Forces Journal among others. You will see occasional references to the 'Gentile-Nagl' due to the fact the Gian is Mr. Anti-COIN to the point of vehemence. Armor guy, had a Cav Squadron in I-rak , historian and now teaches that at West Point. His concern is that the Army overemphasizes 'the new COIN' (and as an active practitioner of the old COIN, it is new in many respects, not all improvements) to the detriment of it's primary mission which is war fighting. I tend to agree with him on all counts -- COIN elements are required; the Army should not go overboard as they are prone to do on the new COIN and so on. He's more vocal but then I'm shy and retiring.

That position is of course not shared with Dr. LTC Retired John Nagl, the author of "Eating Soup With A Knife." They've had some discussions back an forth here.

Neither Gian not I or any of the other 'war is war' folks who comment here deny there is a place for what is called COIN -- though it is really not that -- techniques. What we do say is that if you're committing Armed Forces to an effort there is or will be a war of some sort. War is war, unchanging but warfare is constantly mutating and shifting and COIN like TTP may be needed and the force must be able to apply them but don't lose sight of the larger effort -- preparation for the full spectrum of warfare.

Some say that COIN is the graduate level of warfare; I once contended that it is not -- it's like middle school with all the envy, cliques, in and out people and things, jealousies, backbiting and more. Stability operations can be psychologically demanding but they are not as challenging as major combat operations to any part of the force by several orders of magnitude. Gian agreed with that, John Nagl probably would not.

Wilf, BTW, is a consultant and author but he's also British -- when he was serving (during the Reign of George III...), they had a civil service that would fall in on any COIN effort and take care of the civil side leaving the Army to strictly military tasks -- as directed by said Civilians. Very different system. His 'war is war' mantra is 'cause he's a Clauswitz fan. That's all background. I knew all that and you didn't; it may or may not make any difference to your perceptions. Terribly long way of saying you can't tell the players without a program...

The article rejects hearts and minds as a pipe dream...Germany; and abandon their cultural birthright of unrivalled hegemony over “Pashtunistan”...You aren't going to get Pashtuns to be eager "little Americans" but you can show them why it is worth their while to have you around.

Only if you can convince them you can keep the Talibs and all the other bad guys from visiting the villages in the night will they believe you are worthwhile -- and as soon as you do that, they'll want you gone. Afghans are not Arabs; they share some cultural similarities but they don't like the Ferenghee a bit better. I doubt that NATO et.al. will ever have enough troops to do that. So the 'COIN' approach cannot be fully implemented in Afghanistan and we'll have a hybrid op.

At the end, I guess I just don't understand who is advocating a purely hearts and minds approach that doesn't advocate killing the insurgents to secure the population as an integral and primary goal.

No one to my knowledge; that's not the issue -- the issue is future strategy and force structure. Does the Army follow the Corps and go with some units tailored for stability ops? Does it adjust TOEs to provide units tailored for such ops. Brother Nagl is the President of CNAS and is presumed to have clout in high places; he and other think that's the way to go. Gian, me, others do not agree.

And I'd also like to know what his vision of winning is since he labels his article as "How to Win in Afghanistan."

I thought he was pretty clear:
...................
""The approaches taken to countering insurgencies in Malaya, Vietnam, Northern Ireland and Iraq all contain some aspects that are transferable to Afghanistan but most are *. The counter-insurgency in Afghanistan is more intractable than any of these others.[* Believe a 'not' was omitted here / kw]

In Afghanistan a strategy focusing on the annihilation of Taliban power is the only way to achieve broad political progress...Until then NATO must be prepared to act as the proxy for the Afghan state in establishing control over the Pashtun population.

Without security there is nothing.""(all emphasis added /kw)
...................
My take on that is that he says more whittling down of the Taliban (and friends) or removal in some of way their ability to affect localities is required before the rebuilding can commence. My sensing from friends and all open sources is that is very much correct. Afghanistan is not an insurgency though there are aspects of one in place. It's a war with COIN like digressions.

To me, it is disturbing that such a reductionist argument is still ongoing 8 years into this fight.

Me too. Though I'm not sure it's reductionist -- it is an effort to make sense out of a very chaotic situation that has been exacerbated over a period of eight years -- or, actually, over a period of eight or more one year or less tours with a number of people going in different directions and no unity of command.

I would think that people would be arguing more about details rather than whether "hearts-and-minds" snake oil salesmen or people properly focused on killing and war as war has been for 3000 years are right. You need both and need to properly integrate all of your means and that is where the discussion should be: integration and synergy of the different means and ways.

True. That particular argument is not directed at Afghanistan other than peripherally. That argument is principally directed at FUTURE US Government policy, strategies and direction plus future (now in development) doctrine and force structure...

Afghanistan is on auto pilot with a coalescing mix of TTP -- no one's devoting much effort to it because what will happen there is pretty well locked in for the next three plus years.

It is simply being used as a How Not To Do It Training Aid by people on both sides of the very real doctrinal divide to point out their ideas for 2020. It's a big fight, it's real and has power players on both sides.

Sorry for the delay, two finger typist, sorry for the length, didn't want to leave much out; obviously discard all you think irrelevant.

[marct]

Hi Gian,

Looks like it's time for a point by point deconstruction !

Wilf is right, war is war, it is not "armed social science,"

"War is war" is a tautology of the form X = X. It is also a logical fallacy that confuses the sign with the signified in that

if killing is involved, and
war is killing, therefore
this is war

By that logic, I would argue that the US is engaged in an ongoing COIN campaign in LA - one, I would note, that they appear to be loosing .

Second point, war is armed social science if, by social science, we mean an empirically grounded, predictive model of how a society operates in certain situations. The very concept of State-on-State, conventional warfare governed by "Laws" or "Rules" (e.g. Geneva Conventions, etc.) is predicated on the existence of a particular model that is both a) comprehensible to all involved and b) contains win, lose and draw positions (i.e. recognized end states in a recognized social process).

Taking the two together, "war is war" and "war is not armed social science", leaves us with a Hobbesian model of a war of all against all. If this is the case, and I would not argue that it has been at some times, then what are the limits of "war" if any?

and real war, not happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language involves killing and death.

Hmmm, nice rhetorical point, Gian . Yes, "real war" involves killing and death but let me also point out that all life involves death and all societies have killing; it is a matter of degree as to how much killing is acceptable in a society before it is called "war".

I do, however, totally agree with you about the dangers of selling a "happy war". That is a rhetorical trick used by the same people who are never willing to take responsibility for their actions and, IMO, is of the same ethical standards as the war as video game.

And in actuality the historical models that we use to prop up this ostensible notion of "hearts and minds" were won through killing and destruction that broke the back of the resistance.

I think we'll have to agree to disagree on this one. It's not that I disagree with you on the use of killing and destruction, I don't. What I disagree with is whether or not it "broke the back of the resistance". I would suggest that what it did was to establish, beyond an immediate doubt, that certain forms of "resistance" were currently "unacceptable" (and bloody dangerous to their advocates!). This doesn't change the likelihood of "resistance", it merely shifts the form of it.

It is time to get a clear view of what we think we are trying to do in places like Astan.

Absolutely, and that has been a problem for a long time. It is also why war must be armed social science. Without an empirical model grounded in historical patterns, we are left with, as Max Forte would say, an "ideological septic tank" as the definer of "what will be". Maybe something along the lines of "Oh, let's just get rid of the nasty dictator and they will all become good republicans/democrats".....

[William F. Owen]

"War is war" is a tautology of the form X = X. It is also a logical fallacy that confuses the sign with the signified in that [INDENT]if killing is involved, and
war is killing, therefore
this is war

.... but that is not what "War is War," has ever aimed to impart.
War is war is an aphorism that correctly observes that that war has an enduring and fundamental nature, that has not changed over time. Thucydides and Clausewitz wrote about it, and did so usefully and accurately.

As Clausewitz, Foch and many others have said, "beware the people who tell you that you can have war without killing."

If that is wrong, then please show me how?

That is also why war must be armed social science.

How can a social science be aimed primarily at breaking the will of the enemy?

Putting in place all the humanitarian and social programs aimed at the civilian population, probably is social science, but that it does not break the enemies will to endure, in the same way killing him does. No social science has ever been founded on telling someone "do what we tell you to improve your life or we will kill you."

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

.... but that is not what "War is War," has ever aimed to impart.
War is war is an aphorism that correctly observes that that war has an enduring and fundamental nature, that has not changed over time. Thucydides and Clausewitz wrote about it, and did so usefully and accurately.

As an aphorism, I don't have a problem with it. Unfortunately, too many people interpret it not as an aphorism but as a fundamental (axiomatic) "Truth" in the logical sense. I do disagree that it has a fundamental "nature" (I'm not really that much into Platonic essentialism), but I certainly agree that it does have fundamental boundary conditions (although they vary in time, space and culture).

As Clausewitz, Foch and many others have said, "beware the people who tell you that you can have war without killing."

I agree, although I would have phrased it slightly differently. I can conceive of such a war being fought but, to the best of my knowledge, it never has been. As far as the aim of that warning, however, I totally agree - it is right up there with Pie in the Sky.

How can a social science be aimed primarily at breaking the will of the enemy?

Well, a "science" is a body of empirical regularities that has been abstracted into formulas of some type. Those regularities are what you termed its "nature". War is a social activity and it is aimed at social opponents (i.e. a society rather than an individual). Social science is the sub-branch of science that studies regularities in human societies and the individuals who compose them. How can you study war without studying social science?

Having said that, I never said that there was a specific social science aimed primarily at breaking the will of the enemy; although PSYOPs fits the bill as a sub-discipline of both psychology and communications. As a note, it is a major mistake to equate "social science" with "social work" - the two are by no means synonymous .

Putting in place all the humanitarian and social programs aimed at the civilian population, probably is social science, but that it does not break the enemies will to endure, in the same way killing him does.

Wilf, that's social work or development work - it's a sub-set of social science. You're also switching levels of analysis again. I agree, humanitarian and social programs may not break an enemies will. If you kill him by itself, however, you create new enemies unless you take a delenda Cartago est tactic which, at the moment, is improbable in the extreme.

No social science has ever been founded on telling someone "do what we tell you to improve your life or we will kill you."

Hmmm, try Russian psychology during the 1930's - 1950's or modern theories of governance .

[MikeF]

By that logic, I would argue that the US is engaged in an ongoing COIN campaign in LA - one, I would note, that they appear to be loosing .

Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02).

Using the definitions of COIN found in JP 1-02 and FM 3-24, COIN is an action that a government takes to quell internal rebellion or strife. Along those lines, the only COIN that the US can accomplish is within our internal borders. When we intervene in another countries internal affairs, the matter is inherently difficult as we must pick a side. IMO, this distinction is important, and our failure to address the issue only muddies the waters. In effect, when we intervene, we are picking a side. In Iraq, we back the Shia-heavy government over the Sunnis. In Afghanistan, we back the Karzai-heavy government over the Taliban. Both governments were put in place through elections, and we are hoping that these governments will eventually stabalize internal strife AND share our collective national security interests.

Uboat suggests that those who rebel against the host governments do so out of ideology.

They have an ideology (actually a series of ideologies, there is more than one insurgency going on. But that doesn't change the central point). That ideology is what attracts people to support and/or fight for them.

. In some cases, particularly AQ, I believe he is correct. However, many other insurgents are simply fighting over an internal power struggle. In Iraq, the majority of Sunnis refused to vote during the last election, and they simply are not willing to accept a Shia government. Moreover, many Shia groups within the government view their newfound power as payback time for years of repression and neglect during Saddam's Baath party rule.

Along these lines, I concur with Tom's comments in other threads as far as the current state of Iraq goes. For a time, we defeated AQI and Shia extremist groups, we stabilized the country, we continue to help build the Iraqi Security Forces, and we attempting to afford the Iraqis the opportunity to elect a permanent government. But how did we get here? I would suggest that this is where Wilf, COL Gentile, and Ken's points come in.

1. Stop the violence.
2. Turn the country back over to its own people.
3. Leave.

Stopping the violence in Iraq was not simply population centric. Yes, in Baghdad, we secured the populace through urban reconstruction and secure neighborhoods, but in many other areas, we secured through blunt force trauma...i.e. killing bad guys.Rank amateur contends that

Irregulars can control their loss rate by hiding in the population. Something the Luffwaffe - for exampe - couldn't do. Therefore, if you strategy is "kill more insurgents," your strategy is easily defeated.

I disagree. This statement assumes that one cannot seperate the insurgent from the populace.

So how do you find the enemy and kill him? Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Human Collection, and Targeting. As a company commander,
60-70% of ALL operations were devoted to intelligence collection. This allowed us to find the enemy. Next, we you find him, you attempt to persuade him to either join the government or settle his grievances on the political level. If he is willing, fine. If not, then you must attack and destroy him. At this point in the game, it is really that simple. Otherwise, the conflict is protracted and civilian casualties continue to soar.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, many General Purpose Forces (GPF) are transitioning to Security Force Assistance (SFA). In another time, these actions were known as Foreign Internal Defense (FID). In theory, Coalition Forces will mentor, train, and combat advise Security Forces. A conversation with several NCO's deploying on that mission disturbed me:

"So, when the Afghan Army refuses to do a mission, how will you react?"

"C'mon sir, you damn well know that we will do it ourselves."

I know this post has been long and covered the gambit of COIN theory to SFA to tactical operations, but I suppose it covers the difficult questions that we must attempt to answer:

What are we doing?
What should we be doing?
What can we accomplish?

There are no easy answers here, but I can attest that winning the hearts and minds is not one of them. Regardless, as long as the soldiers and marines are deployed, they will continue to fight the best that they can.

v/r

Mike

[marct]

Hi Mike,

Using the definitions of COIN found in JP 1-02 and FM 3-24, COIN is an action that a government takes to quell internal rebellion or strife. Along those lines, the only COIN that the US can accomplish is within our internal borders. When we intervene in another countries internal affairs, the matter is inherently difficult as we must pick a side. IMO, this distinction is important, and our failure to address the issue only muddies the waters.

Yup. This is FID using COIN tactics. More on muddied waters in a minute...

In effect, when we intervene, we are picking a side. In Iraq, we back the Shia-heavy government over the Sunnis. In Afghanistan, we back the Karzai-heavy government over the Taliban. Both governments were put in place through elections, and we are hoping that these governments will eventually stabalize internal strife AND share our collective national security interests.

This is where I think semantics are crucial. In these instances, was it "picking" a side or "creating" a side? Both the Iraqi and Afghan governments were created by external force of arms and then "legitimated" through elections. I put "legitimated" in quotes, because the elections themselves did not allow the defeated governments to run (I doubt that SH would have won, but I'm not sure about the Taliban...), and the elections themselves were imposed.

Under one set of interpretations, it could be argued that what is being supported are a series of puppet regimes that were created by the US. Now, I'm not arguing for that particular interpretation (although I will mumble it ), but it does have some pretty serious implications. For example, the SOFA agreement with Iraq that led to the drawdown in troop commitments and the pulling out from the urban areas indicates, to me at least, that the GOI is being treated as if it were an independant, legitimate gov't. Good move.

Afghanistan, OTOH, is much more questionable. For example, the government of the Mayor of Kabul does not appear to have any control over the various foreign militaries, and many local, acting in his country (vide his repeated requests regarding the use of air strikes). Afghanistan is, IMO, the more interesting case, in part because the coalition is there acting under a UN mandate which includes rebuilding the government. It is less of an FID operation than a UN reconstruction operation (similar, at least in legal theory [yes, I'm waiting for JMM to jump in ] to the occupation of Germany and Japan after WW II, but without offical surrenders). So, is it FID? COIN? "War"? What?

My suspicion is that the semantic confusion as to exactly what is going on is at the heart of many of the problems we are facing there.

[Rank amateur]

what about the combating of irregular enemies makes the nature of war different?

Irregulars can control their loss rate by hiding in the population. Something the Luffwaffe - for exampe - couldn't do. Therefore, if you strategy is "kill more insurgents," your strategy is easily defeated.

Not sure why a Brigadier can't figure out that soldiers in Afghanistan can't kill insurgents who are hiding in Pakistan. I'm not that bright and it's obvious to me.

[Ken White]

Irregulars can control their loss rate by hiding in the population. Something the Luffwaffe - for exampe - couldn't do. Therefore, if you strategy is "kill more insurgents," your strategy is easily defeated.

Leaving the Luftwaffe out as an irrelevancy, the answer to your statement is that you have to weed them out with good intel; thus your strategy is not defeated; your job is simply made a lot harder harder and it will take longer. As we have seen...

Not sure why a Brigadier can't figure out that soldiers in Afghanistan can't kill insurgents who are hiding in Pakistan. I'm not that bright and it's obvious to me.

You're bright, so's he. How Pakistan is addressed and discussed is more subject to sensitivities in Commonwealth nations in general and in their Armed Forces in particular. You can safely bet large sums of money that any Coalition service member of any rank concerned with Afghanistan is painfully aware of that border and the R&R centers on the other side of it. They are also frustrated that they know where the nodes on the other side are but can do nothing except wait helplessly until the R&R is over and the bad guys head north and enter Afghanistan.

[carl]

Leaving the Luftwaffe out as an irrelevancy, the answer to your statement is that you have to weed them out with good intel; thus your strategy is not defeated; your job is simply made a lot harder harder and it will take longer.

The best intel to weed out the bad guys comes from the people in the village or the neighborhood. They are not likely provide intel if they are pissed off at having been dissed by troops, had their fields ruined by a tank or having some of their relatives, friends and neighbors, near or distant, killed or maimed by an airstrike. Another disadvantage of the above listed events is their excitable teenage sons might go off and join a war band to get some revenge.

The advantage of COINdinistada is that it tends to highlight the disadvantages of making the locals mad at you.

It seems to me that part of what this discussion is all about is how you kill the ones who need to be done away with when the miscreants are near or among the people. Do you get them mostly with rifles and try to eschew air strikes, which I imagine can complicate things and will almost certainly result in more friendly casualties; or do you use the heavy weapons more, even thought that will most likely (given the recent history in Afghan, certainly) increase casualties amongst the locals?

[Ken White]

The best intel to weed out the bad guys comes from the people in the village or the neighborhood...

All true -- for some, for others, not so much. Every thing you say also applies to the opposition. said opposition is far more likely to antagonize the locals than are most western armies who take classes in how to be nice and usually don't steal the goats and chickens. So that aspect is about a wash. The issue then becomes who pays more...

Then, those western hunters also have several other means of intel gathering that do not rely on locals. Net advantage, the hunters.

The advantage of COINdinistada is that it tends to highlight the disadvantages of making the locals mad at you.

True. So too do common sense and human decency let halfway decently trained troops behave properly with no COIN knowledge at all. What COIN also does is convince you that human decency and logic are possessed by your opponents. That is not always true. COIN will also 'convince' you that you can fix things that you really cannot...

Or that you have a way to fix things that either don't really need to be fixed or for which you should not be the one to attempt the fix.

It seems to me that part of what this discussion is all about is how you kill the ones who need to be done away with when the miscreants are near or among the people...

There is no one size fits all, every war and every situation are different; one has to know and apply the principle of METT-TC. All day, every day.

COIN warfare is not the answer to any problem; it is a problem applied to correct another problem. Usually wrongly and usually too late -- almost invariably at great cost for little lasting change. The COIN fans are fond of telling us of insurgencies defeated. Name me one that has 20 or more years later proven to be a net benefit the major power involved. *

What started this whole thread was Wilf's very accurate statement that war is war. May irritate some but you can't sugar coat it and make it less than it is -- trying to do so has put us in deep Yogurt four times in my lifetime; the first two were tied games; the second two have yet to be determined but all four indubitably cost this nation a great deal in many respects. The inane belief that you can fight war 'nicely' is stupid and dangerous; we have killed a good many people because of that idiocy. War is war -- and COIN doesn't make it nice. Quite the contrary. 'Fixing' failed states is super arrogant and prone to failure.

If you have to engage in a stability op, do you need to use 'COIN principles?' Certainly -- and you have to apply them as UBoat said while you're trying to tamp down the insurgents. But you need to get the max number of insurgents dead quickly in order to let the civil sector take over the aid effort that the military force began. If you do not do that, you are headed for a very long slog and a rocky effort.


Wilf posted this: LINK. That caused Coldstreamer to post this: LINK. Exactly.

If you did it right, you wouldn't have to do COIN.