Ken: I don't know how to insert parts of quotes so I will answer as best I can.

Mission of course is the first thing. What concerns me about "war is war" is that if killing becomes the prime requirement, that will lead to sort of an industrial view. If killing is the prime mission, then efficient killing is a good thing. If efficiency is defined as your losses vs. bad guys killed that leads to a lot of heavy weapons use which is bad for the locals. COIN theory as I understand it stresses that killing isn't the ONLY thing, and in some circumstances it is much less important. It tends to change the view of the mission which would change behavior.

That a defeated insurgency ultimately benefits the big power involved just confirms the wisdom of the big power.

Sometimes the opposition irritates the locals more than our guys. AQI really irritated the locals. But if AQI hadn't been there, would our guys have irritated the locals more than the nationalist insurgents? Did the VC in their hey day irritate the locals more than the ARVN? I don't think it is always a wash and our guys are more likely to trained not to step on toes if COIN has some influence.

As far as technical means go, we have that advantage in Afghan and I wonder how far it is getting us.

Having to apply COIN is the result of a mistake made before, granted. But those mistakes are going to be and have been made and we must use the best tool to deal with it.

Sometimes, as you said the enemy is as decent and logical as your side. If COIN teaches you that, that is good. It is always good when you realize the enemy can be as good, bad, smart or stupid as you.

I don't think COIN says that war is nice, quite the opposite. I read about decades long, frustrating operations where close combat by infantry is preferred over heavy weapons. That does not sound clean to me. That sounds grim and bloody.

Fixing failed states is as you said. In our two current cases though, as Powell said, we broke it so we bought it.