The British in Malaya broke the back of the communist insurgency there not between 1952-1954 under the hearts and minds campaign of Templer, but with the use of brute military force combined with Briggs's resettlement program between 1949-1951. Once the insurgency's back was broken, Templer in charge was able to use persuasion of hearts and minds to further things along. This explanation is real and is truthful and has been put forward by a number of leading British scholars over the past few years, most recently in a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies that challenges the Malaya Coin Paradigm.
I agree with logic you first beat and kill the enemy, then you deal in hearts and minds in a major way for the civil affairs follow up. But I do not agree you can expect to do both simultaneously, that just creates "scrambled eggs" which is what we have been doing and results in blowing up new schools, housing, roads, bridges, etc. when we have not first and foremost defeated the terrorists and established long term security control...which security needs to be provided more by national forces and less and less by NATO/allied forces.

My two cents and I think all histories of warfare at all levels support my "view."