Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
I said it is not a COIN operation for the simple reasons that: (1) the US is not the government with an Insurgent problem; It may be a COIN effort for the Government of Afghanistan, it is not for the US. That, as they say, is doctrine. We are engaged in FID LINK and SFA LINK (both links .pdf) (2) there are other armed and hostile players aside from the insurgents that are admittedly present thus while there may be insurgents, there are other -- and larger -- problems. If that were not true, we would likely not be there in the first place... (3) Facets of conventional and irregular warfare aside from COIN like efforts are imperative or the coalition casualty rate will climb rapidly.

More important is what's being done to bring it to a reasonably acceptable conclusion. You're doing your part, for which I thank you.
I put these two portions together because I think they are closely linked. The fact that we are engaged in SFA and FID should determine our way forward more than focusing on a COIN strategy, per se. Points number 2 and 3 should be heavily considered (and I believe they will be) with the "reasonably acceptable conclusion" always in mind.

In my experience with the Afghan government, honestly, there were times that I found myself empathizing with the Taliban. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is one of the major roadblocks to establishing lasting security and governance in Afghanistan.

As Shmedlap and others have pointed out, we have two competing insurgencies struggling for control. One of them is savvy, plays on the emotions and sympathies of the masses, has an effective IO campaign, and an extensive support network. The other is clumsy, dishonest, elitist, and insenstive with an ideology that resonates with few people. I'll let you figure out which is which.