Pakistani internal security (catch all)

[George L. Singleton]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...l?hpid=topnews

In the above WASHINGTON POST story of Tuesday, July 14, 2009, you read in part at the conclusion of the article that both increased police manpower protection and a one year stationing of Pak Army forces throughout Swat will "fend off" return attempts by the Taliban.

President Zardari originally said that the Pak Army would establish permament military bases in Swat, without which I for one think Swat is going to remain unstable regarding Taliban reinfiltration.

The police forces formerly in Swat simply were killed, defeated, fled, or changed sides. Simply adding more police now is a weak gesture, unless they are defined as entire units of frontier forces/para-military doing the job of the collapsed police forces formerly there.

All of Northern Pakistan has to be permanently subdued and manned by the Army, otherwise you have another on again, off again mess forever there.

It is unhelpful that some but clearly not all Pakhtuns continue to agitate for secession from both Pakistan and Afghanistan, which plays into the hands of the Taliban and al Qaida.

There is no sound geopolitical basis for Pakhtun secession but overseas Pakhtuns in colleges and universities, and high schools in Canada, the US, the UK, Europe, Australia and related countries "wish" for secession and separation, while on the ground in country Pakthuns are less absurdly adamant but strongly distrustful of the ISI, Pak Army, and all prior Governments of Paksitan, in particular.

Hard to rebuild infrastructure and restore economic conditions while literal terrorist guerilla fighting goes on, with these damn stupid on again off again gyrations by the Pak Government and military. By now the President of Pakistan should know better than to keep changing his statements, and the Chief of Staff of the Pak Army needs to turn to a new recruiting program to bring more Pakhtuns into the military, which is a source of jobs for the poorest Pakhtuns in all parts of Pakistan.

[davidbfpo]

A short update:http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36037&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=888154a278

[davidbfpo]

This allegation comes as no surprise given the history of Pakistan and its military. Starts with:

The Pakistani army has allegedly committed hundreds of retaliatory killings and other ongoing human rights abuses in the Swat Valley since the end of its successful anti-Taliban offensive there in September, threatening billions of dollars in U.S. military and economic aid to a crucial ally in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban....The extrajudicial execution of up to 300 alleged Taliban supporters and sympathizers in the area around Mingora, the Swat capital, has been documented by New York-based Human Rights Watch...(Closes with)...the fact is that the engine of abuse is the military.

The HRW report is due to be published next month. Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...T2010040501618

If true it is easy to fear that winning 'hearts & minds' is not on the Pakistani Army's agenda. How will this affect the local population?

[davidbfpo]

hat tip to Abu M. Patrick Cockburn, a UK journalist, reports from Bajaur: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...n-1946387.html

The article ends with:

Peace has not returned to FATA. Local papers carry stories down-column of suspected Islamic militants' houses being burned, refugees in flight or returning, a girls' school destroyed by insurgents and many killed by American drone attacks. The army is in control, but it is not clear what would happen if it left. It may find it more difficult to get out of FATA than it was to get in.

More reports may follow as he's in a party of journalists hosted for a week by the Pakistani state.

[Jedburgh]

NAF, 19 April 2010: The Battle for Pakistan

Few places in the world have assumed as much importance for the United States and its allies since 2001 as Pakistan’s northwestern tribal regions, which have served as a base for the mix of militants seeking to attack the governments, militaries, and civilians of the United States, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others. In just over half of the serious plots against the West since 2004, alleged militants received training at camps in Pakistan.

On April 19, 2010, the New America Foundation’s Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative launched a unique series of policy papers, ‘The Battle for Pakistan,’ written by local Pakistani researchers and other experts on politics and militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict Across the FATA and NWFP

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in South Waziristan

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kurram

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Khyber

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Mohmand

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Bajaur

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Swat

Inside Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: The Political Landscape of the Insurgency

Al-Qaeda's Allies: Explaining the Relationship Between Al-Qaeda and Taliban Factions After 2001

Financing the Taliban: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Pakistan's COIN Flip: The Recent History of Pakistani Military Counterinsurgency Operations in the NWFP and FATA

[JMA]

This allegation comes as no surprise given the history of Pakistan and its military. Starts with:

The HRW report is due to be published next month. Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...T2010040501618

If true it is easy to fear that winning 'hearts & minds' is not on the Pakistani Army's agenda. How will this affect the local population?

Just so I can understand the context here how many extrajudicial killings did the Taliban carry out in Pakistan before the Swat Valley campaign?

[davidbfpo]

I am sure there are some stats on the Taliban's reign in the Swat Valley, but this recent report gives an indication albeit wider than one valley, 'Socio Economic Cost of Terrorism: A case study of Pakistan', by the Bradford University (UK) based Pakistan Security Research Unit (PRSU) which has tables on the human cost and from one for 2009: Civilians 2307 Security Forces 1011 Insurgents 8267 Total 11585.

Link:http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/downlo.../Brief+57B.pdf

PRSU website:http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Home

It was the grim reality of Taliban rule, including one You Tube video of a young girl being beaten by the Taliban, that was reported as giving the Army a popular mandate to take action (probably on one of the Pakistani threads here).

A quick response.

[davidbfpo]

Ahmed Rashid's latest comment for the BBC, which ends with:

The deteriorating security in North Waziristan is now having a global impact and creating a vast and multi-faceted militant hub. Meanwhile other areas are on the verge of falling back into the hands of the Taliban. Pakistan's civil and military need to formulate a coherent counter-insurgency strategy to provide security and an administration, so that development can reach the people and the militants can be isolated. Without such a strategy, an ad hoc approach is leading to an ever-worsening security situation.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8665657.stm

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 20 Jun 10: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

This document examines counterinsurgency efforts in Pakistan and asks several questions:

• What are the roots of the militant challenge in Pakistan?

• What have Pakistan’s primary operations against militants been?

• How effective have these operations been in achieving their goals?

• And what are the policy implications?

To answer these questions, the document combines field research in Pakistan with a review of the literature on counterinsurgency and other relevant areas. While there have been numerous policy reports on Pakistan and its militant challenges, there has been little effort to systematically analyze the effectiveness of Pakistan’s operations and to apply relevant theoretical lessons.