I could phrase it differently but his point, Armies are not the right people for the job, is more than valid."More in sorrow than in anger, I see the utopian social engineering craze might affect actions of people with guns."
Blog Post Critique of FM 3.07
I found an interesting blog on International Aid that is hosted/written by Dr. William Easterly titled "Aid Watch". He's the author of the book “White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good”. There are a pair of posts on his blog that might be of particular interest to the SWJ Community; in one post titled "J'accuse: the US Army's Development Delusions" Dr. Easterly goes after FM 3-07 saying that "(m)ore in sorrow than in anger, I see the utopian social engineering craze might affect actions of people with guns. I am sad for Iraqis and Afghans that the U.S. Army is operating in their countries guided by such misguided ideas”. In a response to his critique, LTC Steve Leonard, from LTG Caldwell’s Commander’s Initiatives Group, argues that “the manual is not intended to serve as military solution to a much broader and more complex problem, but a guide for military leaders to better understand and execute their appropriate roles and responsibilities within the framework of national and international approaches to these operations”.
Dr. Easterly’ blog is a bit provocative, but I've found it interesting and the debate worth reading. Just thought I'd share in case it would interest anyone.
I don't think I'll follow his blog but he has a point with this:
I could phrase it differently but his point, Armies are not the right people for the job, is more than valid."More in sorrow than in anger, I see the utopian social engineering craze might affect actions of people with guns."
It sure makes the Obama Admin look weak, IMO, very weak and femmy when it comes to killing enemies - dragging ol' 'shotgun' Cheney into it, like a bunch of whining kids uncertain of themselves and needing a scapegoat in case something doesn't show well in the polls.
Correct me, if I'm wrong, but isn't that all about strategic aims?we will …defeat insurgency, assist fragile states, and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering. …. to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world….{with} a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.
Isn't this a bit above the pay grade of those associated with issue concerned? Stability Operations, should support the strategy. Not the other way around.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Answer: yes, certainly relates to lines of effortCorrect me, if I'm wrong, but isn't that all about strategic aims?
Answer: hardly, as they are inherent in stability operations to one degree or another, which are in support (hopefully) of a strategyIsn't this a bit above the pay grade of those associated with issue concerned?
Tom
OK, the content and purpose of the Manual is predicated, on explicitly stated strategic aims, such as,Originally Posted by Tom Odom
"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world."
Am I the only person uncomfortable with that? Sounds like a an entirely political statement to me.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf
It is an FM on stability operations; as such it is a user's manual for those handed such missions, not a guide to picking them.
Tom
Hi Folks,
Tom, while I agree with your point, I think that Wilf is raising an important issue that this is, broadly speaking, "political". As an analog, how well do you think DoS would do if they were told to use all means necessary (without DoD) to restore peace in Somalia?
Kidding aside, that phrase "address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world" bothers me. It assumes that
- those causes are known;
- the way to correct them is know;
- the corrections will end up serving US strategic purposes; and, finally,
- the "root cause(s)" are not the result of US operations.
It furthermore implies that any root causes leading to conflict amongst enfranchised populations are to be outside the scope of stability operations. In effect, it is mirroring the ontological position that assumes that if they are democracies they will be fine and our friends; a dangerous (and invalid) assumption.
I'll second Wilf and go a bit further: it is not only a political mission, it is a political mission with a very clear agenda ( a "mission with a mission" as it were
Now, having written that, and probably PO'd a fair number of people, let's flip it around. First off, I would hold that all military action is "political" is some sense. Second, all "political" action is local action (I'm showing my early readin in Alinsky here!). "Stability Operations", as currently conceived, is all about coming up with some type of satisficing behaviour, not about achieving Utopian results. Yes, it is "political", but it is political in the "knock there heads together until they can play nicely" type of schoolyard politics.
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
I fully agree with that statement, so why are the two introductions giving me clear political contexts and circumstances in which those operations will be applied.
Surely you aim to conduct stability operations "as and when required." Stability being relative and very context specific.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Again this is an Army FM--it is not an exclusionary document that says we will operate by ourselves (as in the Army and greater DoD). Yes it is political and it has to be: a stability operation is very political in all phases.Tom, while I agree with your point, I think that Wilf is raising an important issue that this is, broadly speaking, "political". As an analog, how well do you think DoS would do if they were told to use all means necessary (without DoD) to restore peace in Somalia ?
As for assuming that causes of instability can be identified etc etc, it has to assume those in non-specific terms because again it is a manual and as such provides a general approach versus a specific approach.
It is therefore making no specific assumptions; rather your argument assumes that it is.
Tom
Last edited by Tom Odom; 07-14-2009 at 01:45 PM.
Hi Tom,
Actually, I agree with most of your points (general vs. specific, political, etc.). I do, however, think that it is making certain specific assumptions some of which are generally valid (i.e. the basic need for "security") and others which aren't (i.e. broad assumptions about democracy). We can certainly agree to disagree on their existence.
Cheers,
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Marc and Wilf,Hi Tom,
Actually, I agree with most of your points (general vs. specific, political, etc.). I do, however, think that it is making certain specific assumptions some of which are generally valid (i.e. the basic need for "security") and others which aren't (i.e. broad assumptions about democracy). We can certainly agree to disagree on their existence
Cheers,
Marc
General equals broad. A need for security is broad as they get. The point being is that someone using this manual will at least consider those elements in connection with (hopefully) a joint (interservice), interagency, and combined (multinational) planning effort.
Overall the good professor is making the same argument that having a manual on stability operations creates stability operations. Thinking about something in advance is better than ignoring it until it bites our collective butts.
None of what I said so far is an argument for more stability operations or a pitch that military forces are the best tool in the toolbox. It is certainly not an argument that such efforts will succeed; each case is different and success (or failure) is equally relative.
But as I work right now in one--my third--I can attest that we do get picked when no one else can or will do the job. We do not get to pick or not pick our missions; our influence is on how we execute those we are picked to do and this manual addresses that issue.
No worries
Tom
Tom's right, you know!
Wilf, you don't have the good or misfortune to teach at a university but you are probably as aware as Marc or I of the lousy quality of the textbooks that often are used. Even some of the "good" ones have serious problems. Many of you are familiar with AMU. Here is an example from there:
I just finished teaching a grad course on International Political Systems. The textbook - there were numerous additional readings as well - was one of the standard undergraduate IR texts, this one by Chuck Kegley. Chuck is an excellent scholar and his text is one of the better ones. But as an overview of IR it leaves much to be desired - as do all the others.I see FMs as being the military's textbooks. They provide a place to start thinking about how to address the problems of their particular topic. In no way do they provide all the answers.
Marc, so do you support CvC or are you on some other side of the
issue?
Cheers
JohnT
To me, FMs, FSR, or any Manual is actually quite important. It's more than a text book. It's what you teach, or should be. It should provide the common text on which collective understanding and discussion takes place.
So an FM on "Jungle and Forest Operations" should layout all you need to know about operating/fighting in the jungle. It should cover both the Why and How. "Helicopters are important because..."
It should at no stage should it say, "We must operate in jungles to address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world." - which sounds like the Soviet Field Service Regulations!
It might say, "The Commander in chief requires the US Army to be proficient in conducting all forms of military operations in jungle and forest terrain."
I take your point about bad text books. Is the one under discussion an example?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hi John,
Love the textbook analogy!
"Support" him? In what way? CvC had his worldview based in Newtonian physics, while mine is based in quantum mechanics. There are definite points of overlap, but we aren't operating in the same universe of discourse.Marc, so do you support CvC or are you on some other side of the issue?
If you mean his "continuation of politics [actually, I think "policies" is a better translation] by other means", then the answer is "sort of". I view politics as the ecology of human interaction where that interaction takes place along a series of skewed probability vectors based on a) froms of social relations, b) cultural forms of interaction, and c) a co-operation-conflict continuum.
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Well I recently had a discussion about applying CvC's observations to the books of the Old Testament. It's all in there!!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
What, like this oneWell I recently had a discussion about applying CvC's observations to the books of the Old Testament. It's all in there!!
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Yep, all good stuff. Nothing much has changed. Annoying things still happen in Samaria and the Syrians are still as much a nuisance. However, I am pretty sure that the Book of the Maccabees does not form part of the old Testament... and just checking the copy above my desk, it does not.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
For some of us, it does.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
While I agree with all of you, really, I'll insert a few points for consideration.
True but I flat out object to mellifluous tone of a number of our manuals today. As Wilf mentioned this is scary:
""address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world.""
That's not remotely military and it lays the Army open to being misunderstood -- plus it's indicative of a mind set that says 'we can help the rest of you benighted clods.' Not a good message to send IMO.Understood and agreed -- I submit we are also guilty for various selfish reasons of encouraging that pick; that our influence could be better (for us and the nation) used to insure the best agencies get picked for jobs, not the one that is most available and that it would behoove us on some of these missions to be more honest and up front with our political masters.But as I work right now in one--my third--I can attest that we do get picked when no one else can or will do the job. We do not get to pick or not pick our missions; our influence is on how we execute those we are picked to do and this manual addresses that issue.
John T. makes a very cogent point:He, as usual, is correct. The problem is that we do not educate or train people to realize that; we tell 'em the book is the gospel -- mostly because it's easier on the trainers. That is IMO, more criminal than not telling the politicians all we know about what's likely to happen.I see FMs as being the military's textbooks. They provide a place to start thinking about how to address the problems of their particular topic. In no way do they provide all the answers.
MarcT's comment:Is correct I think and is more than pertinent because the probability of "skewed probability vectors" is significantly enhanced when force is introduced (no matter by whom). Put force in the equation and you really get very badly and dangerously skewed probability vectors. Add in the other two factors and you go from bad to worse. Those situations are not fun...If you mean his "continuation of politics [actually, I think "policies" is a better translation] by other means", then the answer is "sort of". I view politics as the ecology of human interaction where that interaction takes place along a series of skewed probability vectors based on a) froms of social relations, b) cultural forms of interaction, and c) a co-operation-conflict continuum.
That leads back to another accurate comment from Tom Odom:The Prof is mostly wrong on that but it does send a message that brilliant minds have considered this and it is feasible. It may not be -- Afghanistan being an example -- and it, unless you read the fine print (which Politicians are unlikely to do or understand even if they did) sends the message 'this can be done and we really know how.' IOW, the METT-TC problems are elided for the civilian policy maker who thus might make a flawed decision. I've noticed many of those do not trust folks in uniform and thus read our books to make their decisions...Overall the good professor is making the same argument that having a manual on stability operations creates stability operations. Thinking about something in advance is better than ignoring it until it bites our collective butts.
John's point also comes into play -- people believe the book, rightly or wrongly. If the book say this is good, people will believe that -- even if it's dumber than a box of rocks as a thing to do. Therefor, what is written in the books becomes terribly important in the armed forces...
As an aside, committees of scholars under time pressure and concerned with politically acceptable phraseology likely will not produce good books that can be read and applied by the inexperienced. Napoleon knew this (at least mythically).
Thinking about something in advance is emphatically better than ignoring it until too late. Wasn't there some idea of teaching people HOW to think instead of what to think? I believe thinking in advance is highly desirable -- but flawed thinking can send you on tangents and into doing things better done in other ways.
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