Blog Post Critique of FM 3.07

[Bob's World]

Warning: I have not yet read this manual, and have only briefly scanned the comments in this thread, but a couple of quick comments:

1. [B]"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world." [/B]

This is actually the essence of the "Indirect Approach" as presented by SOCOM and should be the main effort of any sound counterinsurgency effort; ideally executed by-with and through the host nation (they do the COIN, we do the FID). This should also be supported by a solid effort to go after the insurgent himself (direct approach) and establish security; again, executed ideally by-with-and through the Host nation.

(note to all who think "indirect approach" means using HN forces to kill rogue members of his populace -- it's not. That is still the direct approach, and still focused at the symptom of the true problem.)

2. I suspect the Army's approach to "root causes" is probably way way too focused on producing effectiveness of government. This is where I see us often making a multi-billion, multi-year, mistake. Insurgency is neither caused nor cured by ineffective governmental services per se. I stand by the much simpler standard of addressing "poorness" of governance. BW defined as some grievance, real or perceived, held by some significant segment of the populace that they feel so strongly about as to rise to violence; that they also perceive they have no legitmate means to address.

This means:
Leave the Battalions of foreign civilian workers at home; set your bag of effectiveness metrics down; and simply get out among the people and conduct some polling to identify and map these core issues. Then implement a program to help the HN to address these issues (which may well cause significant changes of that same government) concurrent with driving the devlopment of a reliable system for the populace to address such issues in the future short of conflict.

We make this harder than it needs to be; and meddling in another country's internal conflicts is hard enough as it is. Also, taking this leaner, less US-Centric approach also helps minimize the perception of US legitimacy over the HN government, and that should always be our primary goal of any engagement, be it with friend or foe.

[John T. Fishel]

worked pretty well in El Salvador (FID/COIN - we do former they do latter), Panama (simple intervention followed by FID) but it didn't work and won't work in Haiti - a failed state in 1915, 1994, 2004, and today. The choice there is keeping the lid on and mitigating the worst effects of state failure for a very long time of finding the "root causes" of that failure and fixing them which may be mission impossible or at least mission too costly. I haven't mentioned the Balkan cases or Somalia but the latter has some similarities with Haiti made more urgent by piracy.... FM 3.07 attempts to tell the Army how to address all of these cases and remains a start point not not an end point.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

FM 3.07 attempts to tell the Army how to address all of these cases and remains a start point not not an end point.

A start point? IMO, if the Army has to implement the provisions of that manual in any degree, you've entered at a mid point if not a near end point. If the start point is usually predicted --and it is -- then failure of the US government to act in its interest to preclude deploying forces is a significant abrogation of responsibility and a potential error of great magnitude. That's for the future.

For the past, Viet Nam, Iraq and Afghanistan are exceptions, respectively due to a treaty (which should not have been signed); the need to send a strong message (made so by the failure to act of four previous administrations from both major parties. In the event, better timing and execution would've been nice); and a necessary response to undue provocation (which need not have entailed us saying we would stay and fix it -- but we did). Other smaller interventions on a low key basis have been much more successful; witness 1st SFG in the Philippines today. Even the exceptions noted prove the point that getting smarter up front is beneficial.

Bob's World is correct, the "Indirect Approach" encouraged by SOCOM should be the main effort of any sound counterinsurgency effort; ideally executed by-with and through the host nation and early enough to avoid a major troop commitment which is in no ones interest. He adds "they do the COIN, we do the FID". True but better to preempt that need if possible; if that's not possible as will occasionally be the case then the manual is adequate if over wordy. Like me

It is true that Haiti and Somalia are for various reasons particularly intractable and problematic. So is Afghanistan. Entry into the problems of such nations can be seen in advance as particularly onerous and should be avoided other than as one member of a large coalition -- in which we are NOT the largest contributor of money or troops (because the more we do, the less others will do). For that and other reasons, the use of large bodies of US Armed Forces in most of Africa should be diligently avoided. There are a lot of our non-friends just salivating over the idea we will be that foolish...

[Ron Humphrey]

For that and other reasons, the use of large bodies of US Armed Forces in most of Africa should be diligently avoided. There are a lot of our non-friends just salivating over the idea we will be that foolish...

Something that the new command would have been set up to help avoid.

[Ken White]

only hope...

[William F. Owen]

1. [B]"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world." [/B]

This is actually the essence of the "Indirect Approach" as presented by SOCOM and should be the main effort of any sound counterinsurgency effort; ideally executed by-with and through the host nation (they do the COIN, we do the FID).

I submit that this not "an approach" but a statement of political intent, or at best a statement of personal belief, born of political opinions. Armies do not exist to address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. They are instruments of policy. They are not the makers of the policy.

[Bob's World]

I submit that this not "an approach" but a statement of political intent, or at best a statement of personal belief, born of political opinions. Armies do not exist to address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. They are instruments of policy. They are not the makers of the policy.

The essence of SF is deal with root causes, and this has little to do with making policy, as we don't pick where we go or determine what our missions are when we get there.

It is far more a recognition of the old saying that "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

As big Army searches for validation for sustaining itself into the next QDR timeframe they are drilling hard into how to be such a prevention force as part of "Irregular Warfare" and "Security Force Assistance"... Certainly there is a role they can play as they possess so much tremendous capacity and talent, but as a whole are far better at "pounding out a cure" than subtlely preventing the problem in the first place; which probably gets to the heart of WILF's concern.

[Ken White]

As big Army searches for validation for sustaining itself into the next QDR timeframe they are drilling hard into how to be such a prevention force as part of "Irregular Warfare" and "Security Force Assistance"...

Stupid argument. We're all supposed to be on the same side...

And don't cite 'reality' -- it is reality only because people who should know better and care more continue to perpetrate and encourage it for their own ends. Parochialism is as or more deadly than politics...

[William F. Owen]

It is far more a recognition of the old saying that "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

OK, but that's not a decision SOCOM or anyone else in the Armed Forces can make. Military engagement is an entirely political decision driven by party politics that underpin the US foreign policy.

You guys do what the politicians tell you. Helping the disenfranchised is a party political decision.

[John T. Fishel]

Don't mistake the US political system for a European style party system. The 1920s - 30s Oklahoma cowboy humorist, Will Rogers, put it well when he said, "I'm not a member of an organized political party, I'm a Democrat!" While our political parties are the single best predictors of how our Congressmen and Senators vote, the correlation is far from perfect. When Senator Arlen Spector changed parties from Republican to Democrat his new party was well aware that he would vote against them whenever he chose to do so - unlike when Winston Churchill crossed the aisle to become a Conservative again after many years as a Liberal.
Remember too, that there is as much battle between the institutions of government - Pres v Congress - as between the parties. Mr Obama has appointed a couple of Republicans to his Cabinet - most prominent is SECDEF Bob Gates - as his predecessor had appointed at least one Democrat. American policies are not party policies, although party preferences do have an effect on shaping them. They are the product of institutional and personal experiences, education, and training tempered somewhat by party.
So, the American military responds to its political masters far more on an institutional basis than on a party basis. Moreover, by our law - the National Security Act of 1947 as amended - and through 62 years of practice, the American military in the form of the CJCS is very much involved in the deliberations that establish Presidential policy. While the CJCS is a "statutory advisor" to the Pres, SECDEF, and the NSC, he is a full member of the policymaking Principals Committtee, the VCJCS is a full member of the Deputies Committee, and Joint Staff officers are full members of the intergency working groups/committees (by whatever name they currently have) that make defense and foreign policy under the NSC.
In short, our system is unlike that of the UK, any other English speaking democracy, or that of Israel, or any other country for that matter. Indeed, our process is simply messier than most others.

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

In short, our system is unlike that of the UK, any other English speaking democracy, or that of Israel, or any other country for that matter. Indeed, our process is simply messier than most others.

Understood, and thanks. However, I think my broad point is still valid. The military does not choose the strategy to which they contribute.

Nor, for the most part can they usefully predict what that strategy maybe, unless they can predict political developments world wide - which history shows, none of us can!