QDR and Strategy Changes

[Cliff]

That's what's always been true about it -- it is the exercise to divide the pot and strategy has little or nothing to do with it. Actually, the Strategy should drive the QDR to produce an unconstrained requirement sheet and then Congress should make the hard calls on what gets funded. Since Congress really does that but does not want to be seen doing so in case there's a screwup, they fob it off to DoD by statutorily requiring both a National Military Strategy and a QDR. Lights and mirrors, little more. Makes no difference in my view. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only guy in the world that can count. That is, most potential opponents have a reasonably good idea of what we can practically do and pay little attention to the rhetoric and news releases which are virtually meaningless.

Valid points sir. My point on the ambiguity was more aimed at allies or potential allies than enemies - will our allies believe our promises.

Provided there are opponents for them to be huge with. Who do you see that as being in it's design lifetime; with what and in what quantities? Second question; maintenance costs, OR rate? Missed WW II, did make the other two and in the early days of both -- there was no loss of Aerial Superiority in either though in both there were lapses caused by training deficiencies and logistic issues, not by the aircraft involved. There were, however, inadequate for task aircraft in both wars as aircraft designed for specific missions had to be used for other missions.

Unfortunately this thread has veered off onto the Raptor, which is a valid example of how our ways-ends-means discussion is a little off track at times it seems, but wasn't my objective in starting this thread.

I think the opponents potentially include Iran, North Korea (though this is more doable for the aircraft we have), some part of China, Venezuala, or any number of wildcards. Not to mention that the design life doesn't really mean much - the F-15Cs were supposed to be gone 10 years ago originally, they'll be flying (and falling apart) for at least 15-20 more years. We have been historically horrible at predicting the next war - hence the F-22 as a hedge.

MX costs and FMC (OR) rates for the F-22 are about where they should be for a fighter of its age. If you think it's bad now, wait till F-35... especially the V/STOL version. The WaPost article and some of the stuff put out by Sen McCain and Levin on the F-22 is false - they cherry picked data from 2-3 years ago, and spun it as facts. Senator Chambliss asked the AF to look at the claims made (purportedly based on AF data), they are refuted here.

Even Obama's pet AF 4-Star, Merrill McPeak, has said it is "real mistake". Article here.

FYI While I don't fly Raptors, I have flown with it a lot, and while it has had issues in the past, it is getting the job done now. Most recently, the PACAF IG gave Elmendorf AFB an ORI (full war dress rehersal) during which the F-22 did very well in all respects - resulting in an "outstanding" grade. Results talked about here. Oh by the way, the legacy aircraft aren't doing much better because they are simply wearing out - the cost of maintaining them is steadily increasing and their FMC (OR) rates are falling.

One could extract from that the quality of training is a more important discriminator than the quality of aircraft AND that using single role, sole purpose aircraft is not the best solution. That might particularly apply in a time of constrained budgets which are certainly going to be here very quickly. That last is almost certainly driving the F22 decision.

I agree training is most important, and if I have to choose I'll choose adequate flying hours over buying a new plane. I don't think we should have to choose- OBTW all the training in the world doesn't change physics- if they have SAMs and AAMs that can shoot me at/outside of the ranges I can employ at, all the training in the world won't help. We need new jets, period.

Again, the Raptor is not single mission. It already has air to ground capability and these capes are increasing, not being minimized.

I think some of the folks on Hawaii, Midway, Wake and the Philippines would disagree with the loss of air superiority. Much of our problem in both theaters was logistical, but it also stemmed from the fact that our frontline fighters (P-40, P-39 for the Air Corps, F4F for the Navy) were outclassed by their opponents. We eventually got there, but only later in the war. Our enemies now are at parity or better... and the last quick-acquisition fighter we made was the F-117 in 1982- that still took 5 years to field 59 of them....

Back to what I wanted to talk about on this thread, though, I think our ways/ends/means are out of whack with each other. If we want to truly fulfill our NMS, we need to buy the resources to make that happen, or change the strategy.

V/R,

Cliff