Thoughts on a possible "surge" in Iraq

[marct]

What about actually using and incorporating the legions of contractors operating in Iraq today? They are there, many / most are already on our dime.

We've talked a bit about contractors in various threads, and there are a few observations that are worth bringing out in order to answer your question.

1. Contractors fulfill a variety of roles, not all of which are "combat".
2. Contractors are brought into Iraq under specific contracts that strictly define what they may and may not do.
3. Contractors, regardless of their nationality or who pays them, are "mercenaries" in the broad sense of the term (no pejorative intended). As such, their loyalty must be to their contracts.

- Incorporating this 100-150k 'private army' is essential and not blue sky unless you haven't been paying attention.

- These men must be 'deputized', in some form or another, and brought inside the mission as direct agents of the United State government. They need to be integrated into the command structure to work with and not 'coincidently near' counterinsurgency and reconstruction efforts as a whole.

This would certainly have been a possibility IFF their contracts had stated it in the first place. As for deputizing or integrating them into the command structure, that is, in many cases, a radical change in their contracts. Trying to change them now, on the fly, would be a major disaster. BTW, that is a PR disaster since there would be a large number of legal cases in civilian courts, and AQ and the MB would treat this as a gift from God.

- Their accountability to the mission, not the law, is essential. Further changing UCMJ and MEJA are unnecessary, but helpful. These firms are there on USG’s dime and command officers and down need to work closely with contract officers to make sure adherence to the mission, not the letter, is understood and monitored. Bad behavior must be clearly punished (techniques used to bring contractors inline include threats of exposing personal information to local IP, not recommended but effective). If the Administration believes it can open mail and listen to phone calls it can cut and enforce smart contracts in Iraq.

I have to disagree with your first statement - mercenaries must be accountable to the law, not the "mission". A smart employer of mercenaries will understand this and will set their contracts such that the mission is a component of them. I certainly agree that "bad behaviour must be clearly punished, but under what code? I believe that there was a recent change that now allows the UCMJ to be applied to contractors. Individual blackmail attempts, such as outing them to the IP, may "work" in the short run but, as a policy, they will backfire on the employer.

- Flooding Iraq with contractors, security and civil and everything else, who will work with Iraqis is essential to garner Iraqi buy-in, establish their own stake in the venture, and build an Iraqi desire to succeed. This desire cannot be imposed and it cannot be assumed.

I agree that the desire to succeed cannot be either imposed or assumed. This makes me wonder why the contractors were hired in the first place under the contracts they are under. What does it say about a nation or coalition of nations that they have to outsource basic services such as transport? I really don't like the idea of contractors for any of the basic conflict oriented services; I think it sends the message that "we" don't believe in our own propaganda. On a more pragmatic note, how much use could the money that has been paid to contractors be put in strengthening the regular forces? Personally, I think it would have been better to sink that money into force expansion, training and,if an immediate manpower push was required (which it was) in developing the concept of "auxilliaries".

Some (all?) is pie in the sky, but not only am I eager to hear input from this board but I'm fascinated how the contractors are largely ignored.

This is step #4 in something I put together over the weekend:
http://mountainrunner.us/2007/01/ele...s_in_iraq.html

I just finished reading it, and I think you have put your finger on a number of problem areas. I especially liked your last point .

Marc