The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Taiko]

I have a question for any students of CvC. CvC lists 6 or 7? ways (6 offensive and 1 defensive) that a military can use to defeat an enemy. One he called "operations against the political object"......what exactly did he mean by that? I don't think he ever brings it up again after listing it.

I would like to have a crack at this one using the Paret/Howard translation if I may. What CvC was referring to with "operations that have direct political repercussions" was the balance of power between the states of Europe. As such, operations were design to "disrupt the opposing alliances, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc". The operations are aimed at the opposing policy-makers calculations of probability in terms of the cost and benefits of the outcome of initiating or continuing military action in gaining a political objective, as it was at direct military action and defeating the opponents army.

Its very similar to Sun Tzu's observation that:

The superior military cuts down strategy
Its inferior cuts down alliances
Its inferior cuts down the military
The worst attacks walled cities

From my reading of the text, the passage you refer to specifically looks at how a state can bolster its military capacity via the formation of alliances. This will have a direct effect on the balance of power and would have to be taken into account before the first shot is fired (cutting down strategy). I am not sure why he calls them "operations", unless he was referring to the establishment of military ties with other nations via inter military exchanges. An alternative reading could interpret it to say that after the first shot has been fired, when conducting a campaign you choose who and when you fight carefully in order to defeat the weaker members of an alliance quickly, and propose terms for them to either join you or surrender (cutting down alliances). In many respects you could interpret this as a strategy of attrition (cutting down the military), in so far as you are trying to create a political outcome by first attacking your opponents allies, rather than direct confrontation with the opponents main, and one would assume larger, military (attacking walled cities). If you read some of the examples he gives of Napoleon's campaign he does talk about this particular style of operation. Specifically when Napoleon faces two or more armies fielded by different states. CvC goes into some detail as to which army should be engaged first and uses that passage to argue why. Although I can't cite were they are in the book off the top of my head.

As I stated in a previous post. I think this has direct implication in small wars, the Anbar Uprising is a good example of fostering alliances and using them against your opponent. From how I read it, the fact of the matter is A'Q is dependent on alliances in order to operate and survive. The same could be said of the Taliban and its need for developing military and political alliances with the Afghan population. So I think CvC has a valid point to make at the strategic level in regards to the current conflicts in Iran and Afghanistan, specifically when choosing who and when you fight, how and why. Which is what strategy is all about at the end of the day.

For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective.

Now this is an interesting argument in relation to CvC and his criticism of Napoleon's strategy against Russia. He was very critical in how Napoleon conducted the campaign. Specifically, the push to take the capital without defeating the army, and the subsequent 'asymmetrical campaign' the Russians conducted using both militias and regular army to push Napoleon out of Russia. There are a number of examples within this campaign of how a countries territory can provide the strategic depth to make time a decisive factor in defeating an opponent in my opinion. I think studying that campaign still has value today.

Nor do we kill our enemies in the sense you write. The Mothers of America, the Intelligentsia and the chattering classes generally do not approve of that approach today. Unfortunate IMO but that's the way it goes.

I agree with your point on principle. However, would it be fair to argue that if a conflict has a direct and lasting impact on the civilians quality of life then the situation would be radically different? The Cold War would be a good example in the context of the general US populations acceptance of the need to use or threaten to use force on a large scale. The point being, if the territory of the population is under direct threat then they would expect the government to do whatever it is in their means to safeguard it and the population.