QDR and Strategy Changes

[Entropy]

I'm not going to get into this thread because arguing about the F-22 is now like arguing about abortion - no one's mind is getting changed. Besides, at this point I'm pretty ambivalent about it.

However, I thought this anti-F-22 video was hilarious. Only a program this controversial could result in something like this:

[Cliff]

I wasn't aware that we ever LOST air superiority over Vietnam. When exactly did this happen?

That said, I don't have a beef with the F-22 as a tech test bed, but I have yet to be convinced that anyone is going to send it into a SEAD environment where it might get shot down (and I mean a real war environment, not an exercise). Remember the fuss when one F-117 got knocked down? A-10s can manage to a great degree because they can take lots of physical damage. Stealth aircraft simply cannot. And as so much of procurement is political, that explains much of the white noise that emanates from congressional hearings. Congress has always liked airpower because it's sexy and (more to the point) because its most strident advocates always promise that it brings war on the cheap.

I don't think anyone's proposing the M-60A3 analogy, but I do think there is a growing sense that the F-22 might be a "bridge" aircraft between the F-15 and the F-35.

We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.

The F-22 is the only aircraft we'd send into such an environment... The F-117 was old enough that it was not survivable, hence why it got shot down. The F-22 actually has a number of survivability enhancements as well.

The F-22 is not a "bridge" to the F-35... the F-35 is inferior to the F-22 in many ways, especially in air-to-air and DEAD. Not as survivable against SAMs either - the F-35 needs the F-22 to be a viable platform in the face of any adversary with double digit SAMs.

And yes, I know, I should follow Entropy's lead and just accept that I am not changing anyone's mind. Guess I'm just too stubborn to give up.

V/R,

Cliff

[Cliff]

The combat experienced force of the next few years will still be capable of doing things no one else on the globe can do or will be able to do for certainly the next 10 to 15 and probably the next 20 to 30 years. Thus, worry about hardware for the period 15-20 years out is IMO appropriate; for today, it's not an issue...

Thus I'm not sure there is a problem. If there is, I'm having difficulty seeing it.

Sir-

Your last bullet is makes my point for me - the F-22 is the hardware for 15-20 years out. F-35 can't get the job done, and we won't have another fighter till 2040-2050 at best - if at all. Stopping the F-22 at an unsustainable 187 ties our hands for the next 30 years.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

Your last bullet is makes my point for me - the F-22 is the hardware for 15-20 years out.

A 1990 design will do the job in 2030? Okay, if you say so. Given that most Squadrons field 12-14 aircraft with a 90% OR, the implication is that six or more may be hangar queens but if you're cool with that, so am I...

F-35 can't get the job done

Against what?

and we won't have another fighter till 2040-2050 at best - if at all.

True -- that last. At all. highly possible.

Stopping the F-22 at an unsustainable 187 ties our hands for the next 30 years.

I doubt it but we'll certainly have to wait and see who's correct.

We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.

You can't use the total loss rate if you're going to talk the F-22, look at the air to air rate only. Adjust it for the fact that Thuds which had no business even being there but were all the AF had due to bad purchasing decisions got attacked by Mig 21s, SAMs, ADA and small arms. Defending them with a long range missile launcher of a big Fox 4 against an agile Mig took some adaptation. So to did the CAS mission performed by supersonic fighters which got knocked down in the south by small arms fire. You're comparing Apples and Mangoes. Even so, the VN loss rate was far better than that in Korea or WW II. A ratio of roughly 0.4 losses per 1,000 sorties compared favorably with a 2.0 rate in Korea and the 9.7 figure during World War II. LINK. Note the sheer number of aircraft types.

the F-35 is inferior to the F-22 in many ways, especially in air-to-air and DEAD. Not as survivable against SAMs either - the F-35 needs the F-22 to be a viable platform in the face of any adversary with double digit SAMs.

Doesn't the 'dead' bit remain to be seen from an aircraft still in design proof stage? Not as survivable against SAMs based on its lesser stealth characteristics and speed -- or its more modern avionic fit?

Where's John T.? He was the guy who first brought up the F22 on this thread.

In any event, Cliff, I appreciate your defense of the program but you and I are unlikely to agree. You're an airplane driver and I'm a gravel cruncher, so your opinion ought to count more...

Thus I cede the ground, er, air, to you and will stick to the thread henceforth.

[Steve Blair]

We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.

Loss rates in Vietnam are interesting things, and had a great deal more to do with politics (both in terms of the Johnson administration and the Air Force's own doctrinal preconceptions) than they did airframes. Ken already ran the numbers side, so I won't rehash that ground. But when you consider that SAC's own way of doing business had a large role in the losses suffered during the first phase of Linebacker II it gives you pause.

I'm well aware that the F-22 and the F-35 are not the same. But I'm also not willing to be convinced in the perfection of the F-22 based on exercise results. So we'll just have to agree to disagree.

[John T. Fishel]

I know when I'm out of my depth

Been wondering though, Cliff, are you an F 22 driver perchance?

Cheers

JohnT

[Cliff]

Loss rates in Vietnam are interesting things, and had a great deal more to do with politics (both in terms of the Johnson administration and the Air Force's own doctrinal preconceptions) than they did airframes. Ken already ran the numbers side, so I won't rehash that ground. But when you consider that SAC's own way of doing business had a large role in the losses suffered during the first phase of Linebacker II it gives you pause.

I'm well aware that the F-22 and the F-35 are not the same. But I'm also not willing to be convinced in the perfection of the F-22 based on exercise results. So we'll just have to agree to disagree.

Sir-

I agree that politics had a lot to do with the less than optimum execution of the air war in Vietnam.

SAC's micro-management of the BUFF tactics definitely had a lot to do with their losses in LBII.

However, I was referring to the pre-1968 bombing halt loss rates.

The SA-2 and the MiG-21 combined had a huge impact on our loss rates until we developed effective SEAD aircraft and jammers, as well as tactics.

We started Vietnam with poorly trained crews flying 15-20 year old tactics, with missiles that didn't work, and jets not designed for the roles they were fulfilling. Not knocking the F-4, but it was originally designed to shoot non-manuevring bombers prior to them attacking the carrier... not for OCA/DCA against fighters and SAMs...

What turned it around? Training was huge... Top Gun, USAF FWS, Red Flag all had a huge impact. Improved F-4s with systems and missiles that worked a lot better made a huge difference as well. EA pods, PGMs, etc were big for the A-G folks.

The new double digit SAMs and Flankers with EA are the equivalent of the SA-2 and MiG-21 of Vietnam. I don't think the F-22 is perfect... but it is the only airplane we have that will be able to go up against advanced SAMs.

There's a reason why the F-15C was 104-0... and it wasn't just training. Training was definitely a huge part of it, but superior airplanes with better training are even better.

It seems like all of this is going to be a moot point anyway... see here.

I sincerely hope that the folks on SWJ are right about the future of war in the next 20-30 years...

V/R,

Cliff

[Cliff]

A 1990 design will do the job in 2030? Okay, if you say so. Given that most Squadrons field 12-14 aircraft with a 90% OR, the implication is that six or more may be hangar queens but if you're cool with that, so am I...

The sad fact is that the lifetime of a fighter is probably going to be 30-40 years... our newest F-15Cs are 1986 models, most are 83-84 jets... 26 years old. So yes, the F-22 will do a good job in 2030. So the solution to this problem is to just not buy new fighters, and let anyone who wants to buy better ones from the Chinese or Russians?

F-22 squadrons are actually 18 PAA right now... supposed to be 24. What folks don't realize is the additional 60 F-22s would give each squadron 24 jets... OBTW, the MC (mission capable) rate is about 68%... which is about where it should be for a new jet. There will typically be 12-14 available per squadron.

You can't use the total loss rate if you're going to talk the F-22, look at the air to air rate only. Adjust it for the fact that Thuds which had no business even being there but were all the AF had due to bad purchasing decisions got attacked by Mig 21s, SAMs, ADA and small arms. Defending them with a long range missile launcher of a big Fox 4 against an agile Mig took some adaptation. So to did the CAS mission performed by supersonic fighters which got knocked down in the south by small arms fire. You're comparing Apples and Mangoes.

Unfortunately, I am talking A-A and SAM loss rates as well... because the main reason we need the F-22 over improved F-15Cs or the F-35 is the SAMs. Double digit SAMs are cheap, and fairly effective... and the F-15C can't go up against them. The F-35 isn't as effective against them either. Trust me, the SAMs worry the folks flying air-to-air fighters a lot more than the Flankers do.

So, the SAM loss rate has to be there. The Thuds were not bought due to bad purchasing decisions... the Thud was bought to drop nukes on the Soviets... period. Unfortunately we bought aircraft only in preparation for (total) nuclear war... and trained mostly for nuclear war. Training and buying for only one type of conflict.... hmm, sound familiar?

You make my point for me by illustrating how the F-4 wasn't suited to the role we had to use it for... just like the F-35 isn't suitable for air to air.

Anyway, I don't think looking at the effect of a new surface to air system on air-to-air combat is comparing apples and mangoes at all.

Even so, the VN loss rate was far better than that in Korea or WW II. A ratio of roughly 0.4 losses per 1,000 sorties compared favorably with a 2.0 rate in Korea and the 9.7 figure during World War II. LINK. Note the sheer number of aircraft types.

Valid. Then again, we were restricted ourselves to not flying over the most heavily defended areas... How many sorties in WWII were considered "Combat" when flown over (essentially) friendly territory?

Doesn't the 'dead' bit remain to be seen from an aircraft still in design proof stage? Not as survivable against SAMs based on its lesser stealth characteristics and speed -- or its more modern avionic fit?

The F-35 has much of the same avionics as the F-22 does. The F-35 does not have the same speed capability as the F-22... which is huge against SAMs. The F-22's DEAD capability is based on the JDAM... I think we've proven that JDAM is pretty effective. Or do you think the JDAM doesn't work?

Where's John T.? He was the guy who first brought up the F22 on this thread.

In any event, Cliff, I appreciate your defense of the program but you and I are unlikely to agree. You're an airplane driver and I'm a gravel cruncher, so your opinion ought to count more...

Thus I cede the ground, er, air, to you and will stick to the thread henceforth.

Sorry for replying, no I didn't want this thread to be about the F-22... but I still feel the need to clear the air since there's a lot of misconceptions. I am absolutely sick of "experts" who have never been up against the threats we're talking about telling the media that the F-22 isn't needed, and the F-35 will be so much better...

I appreciate everyone here at least listening to the AF guy's comments. I look forward to learning more from all of you.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

I am absolutely sick of "experts" who have never been up against the threats we're talking about telling the media that the F-22 isn't needed, and the F-35 will be so much better...

So am I. However, I don't think anyone on this thread has said or implied that. The policy discussion you started has essentially been on policy, not the technical merits.

The Thuds were not bought due to bad purchasing decisions... the Thud was bought to drop nukes on the Soviets... period. Unfortunately we bought aircraft only in preparation for (total) nuclear war... and trained mostly for nuclear war. Training and buying for only one type of conflict.... hmm, sound familiar?

The Thuds were bought for one war and used in another because the wrong war had been used to justify their purchase.

The announced strategy change, eliminating the myth of two war capability, will presumably be reflected in the QDR. If that reality is indeed reflected in the QDR and if what has been dribbling from most in the DoD heirarchy over the last few months is correct, the focus will be on the full spectrum of warfare and not just current fights. Thus I suggest you have been the one emphasizing training and buying for only one type of war, DoD does not appear to be doing that and no one else on this thread appears to be doing so.

That 'Full Spectrum' bit means that everything from dropping nukes to getting in the mud will be required / desired. We differ on what that means apparently. You see it as focusing on only one type of war, the current flavor thus producing a shortfall in a program you support. I see it as reflecting a realistic apportionment of funds among a number of needed programs -- to include curtailing purchase of one aircraft I've strongly supported as has been stated on this board numerous times.

That apportionment includes attempting to accelerate the purchase of an aircraft with less capability in some respects but which can be exported and for which agreements to buy from other nations exist thus lowering it's net cost to the US and enabling more of those aircraft to be purchased. As well as, of course, honoring those agreements, which may require added R&D or Engineering Change Proposal funding and thus impose unwanted but regrettably necessary unanticipated costs. That, as they say, is life...

[Entropy]

Cliff,

I hear what you're saying, but every procurement/force structure decision carries risk, especially since we have no real idea what the future holds in terms of conflicts (and anyone who claims to know is probably pushing an agenda). Rumsfeld, for all the criticism he got for it, was essentially correct when he said you go to war with the military you have. Certainly if we could set the wayback machine and make different decisions we could have better prepared for OIF and OEF - more ground forces, better vehicles, a lot more rotary-wing, satellite bandwidth, ISR, etc.

So yes, it's conceivable the F-22 decision could come back to bite us in the ass, but I think we have enough redundancy and other capabilities that the risk is not catastrophic. As one who participated in a lot of air planning, I'm confident that future leaders will be able to tailor the assets they have to the mission, even if they might not have as many assets as they'd like. Who knows, maybe Patriot will get the opportunity to shoot down an enemy aircraft for a change instead of friendly. Ok, I'm teasing, Patriot folks!

Anyway, at this point, after the recent senate vote, this is all OBE. Let's all hope the F-35 delivers as now our collective tactical aircraft eggs are in that basket. The Air Force will deal with the decision and adjust accordingly. The Air Force had originally planned to put one F-22 squadron in each of its AEF's, which is partly what drove the 381 number. Now the AF has to decide if/how to integrate fewer airframes into its force structure and how it will bridge the gap between the end of F-22 production and the beginning of F-35 production.

[Surferbeetle]

From today's FP by David J. Rothkopf: Great powers aren't what they used to be...

The United States is certainly at the moment a great power by any definition. We are the only country on earth capable of projecting force anywhere at any time. The U.S. GDP is almost three times that of the next biggest country, Japan and is roughly the equivalent of the next four added up (Japan, China, Germany and France.) To get a different perspective on the size of the U.S. economy relative to that of the world, take a look at this two-year old map comparing the size of the economies of U.S. states to those of other countries.

Are these "great" powers nonetheless still greater powers than the others of the world? Certainly. Most of the countries of the world are virtually powerless. Only 25 countries have the ability to field active armed services in excess of 200,000. Of these perhaps 17 would be considered very economically constrained and all but a tiny handful would be useless too far beyond their own borders. Only 25 countries have GDP's larger than the annual sales of the each of the world's 3 largest companies. (Not an apples to apples comparison, I know...but I offer it primarily to underscore the relative smallness of the rest of the world's economies. The 100th largest company in the world in sales, Target, has sales that total more than the GDPs of all but the 60 largest.) Most countries have precious little political influence and that influence tends to be diluted when it is channeled through low-functioning multilateral institutions. It is amplified via effective alliances but precious few of these exist on any global scale.

That said, as striking as the weaknesses of great powers may be, a parallel trend is that which gives the weakest access to powerful technologies (of mass destruction or political persuasion) that enable them to gain previously unavailable global stature and leverage. Twenty five countries are reportedly considering or planning nuclear power programs. Some of these will lead to nuclear weapons programs. Some of these will contribute to proliferation and making new threats available to weak states and non-state actors. And some of those big companies I mentioned earlier are now weighing in, using their global economic clout to influence everything from tax codes to trade regimes to who wins or loses big elections. So the ends are converging on the middle and the terms we are used to, great and small, powerful and weak, are coming to mean something entirely new.

[Cliff]

So am I. However, I don't think anyone on this thread has said or implied that. The policy discussion you started has essentially been on policy, not the technical merits.

Sir-

Agreed, I was referring to recent media coverage. There have been some suggestions here that F-35 is a follow on or more advanced than the F-22 as well.

The Thuds were bought for one war and used in another because the wrong war had been used to justify their purchase.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. The Thud was designed in 1955, entered service in 1958... what was the "wrong war"? Are you saying that the Cold War was the right war to be fighting in 1958... I'm not sure I understand. If you're talking about Vietnam, I agree that the Thud was not right for that... see my point on focusing on only one end of the spectrum.

The announced strategy change, eliminating the myth of two war capability, will presumably be reflected in the QDR. If that reality is indeed reflected in the QDR and if what has been dribbling from most in the DoD heirarchy over the last few months is correct, the focus will be on the full spectrum of warfare and not just current fights. Thus I suggest you have been the one emphasizing training and buying for only one type of war, DoD does not appear to be doing that and no one else on this thread appears to be doing so.

Not true! If I was arguing that we should not fund the increase in the size of the Army, or that we shouldn't buy MRAPs, etc, then I think you could say I was arguing for buying for only one type of war. I am saying that we need to have a minimum of MODERATE RISK force across the spectrum... IE, I believe this nation can afford to buy enough forces to allow us to have a moderate level of risk regardless of the level of conflict.

My point is that only the low end of conflict is being funded in the current budget... the USAF in particular is eliminating about about 10% of its fighters to get more ISR assets... while not buying enough new fighters. I think we can do both.

That 'Full Spectrum' bit means that everything from dropping nukes to getting in the mud will be required / desired. We differ on what that means apparently. You see it as focusing on only one type of war, the current flavor thus producing a shortfall in a program you support. I see it as reflecting a realistic apportionment of funds among a number of needed programs -- to include curtailing purchase of one aircraft I've strongly supported as has been stated on this board numerous times.

I'm not saying it focuses on only one type of war... I am simply saying that I think we are accepting a lot more risk than people think we are, and I think if folks truly understood the risks involved they would make different decisions. I don't think that while we are involved in two conflicts we should have an essentially flat topline, leading to what basically amounts to across the board cuts. Trying to pay for the entire war out of our regular budgets is crushing not only procurement, but the training that I think everyone here agrees is important.

That apportionment includes attempting to accelerate the purchase of an aircraft with less capability in some respects but which can be exported and for which agreements to buy from other nations exist thus lowering it's net cost to the US and enabling more of those aircraft to be purchased. As well as, of course, honoring those agreements, which may require added R&D or Engineering Change Proposal funding and thus impose unwanted but regrettably necessary unanticipated costs. That, as they say, is life...

The net cost to the US is not going to be that much lower for the F-35.... OBTW it is not anywhere near done with testing, and will almost certainly have many of the same problems the F-22 did. I'm not saying to not buy the F-35... we need it too. I am saying that we need both.

I think we are mostly in violent agreement, with the one exception being that I think we can afford to fund a moderate risk force at the high end of the spectrum.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

I'm not sure what you mean by this. The Thud was designed in 1955, entered service in 1958... what was the "wrong war"? Are you saying that the Cold War was the right war to be fighting in 1958... I'm not sure I understand. If you're talking about Vietnam, I agree that the Thud was not right for that... see my point on focusing on only one end of the spectrum.

I meant that the Thud (and the Fox 4) were bought to fight one war -- that with the USSR -- and did not adapt well to fighting another very different war. My point being that the F-22 is designed to fight one type of war and the probability is that particular type of combat will not be an issue for a good many years. History repeating...

Hopefully, we can approach air to air combat in the post 2040 period with an aircraft not designed in the early 90s. If the response to that is it takes 15+ years to field an advanced aircraft, my reply would be that is a systemic fault that can and should be rectified and that I believe we've long recognized that but are finally doing something to correct the problem. We'll see.

IE, I believe this nation can afford to buy enough forces to allow us to have a moderate level of risk regardless of the level of conflict.

I agree with that. Our difference is that I believe that is a goal of the apparent new NMS and this QDR while you seem to disagree -- at least with respect to one item. I understand your point, we just don't agree on that bird. I'd like to see more C-17s and the entire C-5 fleet re-engined; I'd re-engine the Buff fleet as well. I also agree with you that it would be nice to have more F-22s. I'm not getting any of that. That's the way it goes.

My point is that only the low end of conflict is being funded in the current budget... the USAF in particular is eliminating about about 10% of its fighters to get more ISR assets... while not buying enough new fighters. I think we can do both.

Er, not really, new SSNs and a development contract for a new SSBN aren't low end. There's a fair amount of high end stuff in there, only the fighter element takes a whack. You disagree as do others but apparently most of DoD doesn't think the added F-22 buy is a good option. I'm an old cynic, I do not accept what comes out of that five sided funny farm as being brilliant or even marginally good in most cases so I'm not saying they know best; they usually do not -- however, in the case of that bird, I suspect there's more to it than is published.

I think we are mostly in violent agreement, with the one exception being that I think we can afford to fund a moderate risk force at the high end of the spectrum.

True dat. We don't even disagree on what would comprise a 'moderate risk' force, just on whether the announced force is 'marginally acceptable' if not the one we'd design or even like to see.

Based on visiting China, fighting Chinese and North Koreans among others plus many years of being trained and being prepared to fight the USSR and dealing with the technology of those nations, none of them ever worried me much if it were to come to a fight, land, sea or air. They still don't -- at this time and for a good many years ahead. They have, ummm -- issues...

[John T. Fishel]

Ken, issues???? Now that is a new version of an intel estimate if I ever saw one!

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

Of course, in Oklahoma, you may not be aware of the latest trends...

(Actually, too lazy to spell out RAM/MQC and go into training problems. )

[Entropy]

Oh boy, it gets better and better. Excuse me while I get more popcorn:

The White House and some lawmakers who favor halting the production of any new F-22 warplanes say the F-35 will fill the gap and meet the nation’s combat aircraft needs.

Senators and aides now lament that the Pentagon oversight panel’s more pessimistic view on the F-35 program was not publicly released during the F-22 debate. They are calling for more open disclosure of the problems with the development of the F-35.

The Pentagon’s Joint Estimate Team (JET), which was established to independently evaluate the F-35 program, is at odds with the Joint Program Office, which runs the F-35 program, the aides said. The oversight panel’s calculations determined that the fighter won’t be able to move out of the development phase and into full production until 2016, rather than 2014, as the program office has said.

and this:

“They bet too much on the F-35. It’s too big to fail,” Bond said. “It’s like Citigroup.”

The procurement state of affairs is pretty sad and pathetic considering there are two wars going on. Ken, I suspect you will say that it's always been like this, but I wonder.

[Ken White]

See no sign of any change on the horizon, either...

That's all political smoke and mirrors though -- there has been little to no notice of the slippage in the mainstream media because they ain't too bright and stories like that won't sell ad space or time. For once the Pendragon spokes-squirrel is correct, that article is all old news and the Cabal -- that's what they are -- of affected Senators is simply trying to get traction because while the Authorization wallahs have spoken and said no more Raptures (bad choice for a fighter name, BTW, AF...), the Appropriation wallahs have not yet done so plus the conference to reconcile both Bills still offers hope. We can persuade 'em, think they. The Fat Lady has not yet warbled.

The Aviation and specialist press has been full of it for over two years. Aviation Week (I feared poor Bill Sweetman was gonna have a coronary over it...) and Flight as well as the defense pubs have all reported it. My Jane's Defence Weekly and IDR have something on it in almost every issue. So if those idiot Congroids say it was hidden and they didn't know it, they have just proven they pay no attention to reality and focus only on the pork aspects. I don't belong to the AFA and don't check Air Force very often but I'd be amazed if they had not covered the issue copiously. All that, BTW is easily Googled, I'm sure.

One of the comments on your linked article has words to the effect that the F35 program is filled with graft and corruption and lies. Possibly true. As was the F-22 program, the LPD-17 and LCS programs, the EEV, the various MRAP purchases similarly filled. Yet, all those are really pretty good and not so crooked programs. For far worse, see the The A-12, the various CGN Classes of nuke propelled cruisers, the P6M, MBT-70 / M1 debacle (GM had the better tank but Chrysler was going bankrupt after all...). There are more that are even worse. Even something as simple as the M-16 / M-4 has a sordid history.

This is just business as usual in our nation's capital.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

DoD doesn't produce the QDR because they want to, they do it because they have to. Title 10, Section 118 of the United States Code specifies: “The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a " quadrennial defense review") of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

QDR legislation was amended by the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, which stipulated that the due date for the report is “in the year following the year in which the review is conducted, but not later than the date on which the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress…”

The QDR acts not as a substitute for the UCP, NMS, GDF, GEF, and other strategic guidance documents. It is a statutorily mandated report to Congress, and thus it is viewed in that light.

[Ken White]

it's here; 10 USC §118.

It starts:

(a) Review Required.— The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a “quadrennial defense review”) of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Note the time period to be forecast.

Here's Congresses big issue:

. . .
(3) to identify
(A) the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and
(B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk; and
(4) to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to section 1105 of title 31. (emphasis added / kw)

The first highlight is their notice that they aren't going to fund everything everyone wants and 'they' are willing to accept some risk (nice of them...). The second highlighted item is their notice they're going to fund what they want...

The QDR sprang from the post Cold War Dividend mentality in the mind of then SecDef Les Aspin (not as bad as Louis Johnson but bad enough to make Rumsfeld look like a gentle genius) and his Bottom Up Review (BUR) looking for that peace dividend. The BUR was the first appearance of the idea that the US should be able to fight two “nearly simultaneous major theater wars,” a riff on the the two-big-war standard of the Cold War. The bottom line of the idea was to justify major defense spending and force structure cuts. The BUR was seized upon by Congress as a way to get more spending clout than they already had so the QDR was born. It is essentially a waste of money though some good comes of it. Not much, some. I'll also note that as I said before; they never funded DoD to fight two wars (the mid-Reagan years came close).

It's all DC smoke and mirrors...