Maybe you're one of the few here who paid attention to me - you might then know that I'm the lost guy here, entirely wrong in a small wars forum because I'm no small wars guy. That's because I'm a "no small wars!" guy.

I'm still paying attention to major war theory, and one such work is Douglas MacGregor's "Breaking the Phalanx" of 1997.

I read it years ago and marked only three pages for useful quotes (and even those are mediocre).
It was basically a book about a brigade-centric army reorganization (an idea that was at that time at least 50-60 years old) with some remarks about air and sea power as well.

I was not impressed, and am still seeking an answer to this old question of mine:

Why did "Breaking the Phalanx" get so much (it seemed so to me) attention (till the next fashion, COIN)? What was so special or advanced about it?

I have absolutely no idea, as it looks to me like a quite orthodox re-labeling of the old brigade-centric army idea that was discussed as early as in the 60's (probably not in the U.S.).
Some meant to me that hew as thinking out of the box, but I have difficulties to accept that re-labeling of existing ideas should be considered as thinking out of the box. That would be a very damning statement about his army.

I hope that dozens military theory-interested Americans in one place might be able to finally answer this old question of mine.