Everything You Know About Counterinsurgency History Is (possibly) Wrong!

[Bob's World]

A lot of great discussion taking place in this thread.

A couple points to consider that may help:

First, GWOT is not COIN; and really isn't GWOT either. We know that, yet struggle to devise a smarter approach the new range of security challenges we face today.

When President Bush left office he stated as his one metric of success that "we have not been attacked." Two comments on that:
1. A very poor metric of success, as one's opponents have their own agenda and schedules for how they pursue their ends, and if no attacks are necessary, why launch them and risk messing with success? So I don't credit it much as to our larger effectiveness in the GWOT. It may or may not mean our efforts are working.
2. HOWEVER: It does clearly indicate that the Commander in Chief saw the primary purpose of the GWOT campaign under his watch as one of Deterring such terrorist attacks from happening again.
This got me thinking, as I have been discussing Deterrence with a broader conventional community and attempting to highlight some of the new challenges in deterrence today than back in the good old days when all we had to worry about was MAD.

If our current campaign is primarily about deterrence (this is what militaries do in times of peace); and it is not really GWOT, then what is it? The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

Many diverse organizations will employ terrorism as a tactic, and all require unique approaches. Weak(er) states; failed states (like Somalia); Quasi-state actors (like Hezbollah), non-state actors (like AQ), nationalist insurgencies (LET, MILF, etc etc etc), and the odd dissident individual (such as Mr. McVeigh). To lump them by their tacics leads to a dangerous conflation that contributes to approaches that are as likely to provoke some groups as they are to deter others. But by focusing on deterrence it forces one to break down the problem set and conduct a more sophisticated analysis and to better balance potential cost/benefit analysis by each category and major actors within those categories to various courses of deterrence or engagement that we plan to set out upon.

It also allows for a much more positive narrative that our allies and own non-DOD agencies can much more readily get on board with.

Now, before the "kill them all" gang gets too fired up, yes, any good deterrence campaign incorporates a balanced and appropriate LOO directed at bringing to justice those needing the same. Most will be in a court of the own HN; others will simply wake up knowing they are dead, yet wondering where all the virgins are. Such things are best done in low key fashion as a capable and certain supporting effort to a much larger and holistic campaign of deterrence.

[marct]

Hi BW,

If our current campaign is primarily about deterrence (this is what militaries do in times of peace); and it is not really GWOT, then what is it? The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats....

It also allows for a much more positive narrative that our allies and own non-DOD agencies can much more readily get on board with.

You know, I'm beginning to think that my mind is truly warped... I immediately translated this into the rhetorical meme of "armed etiquette instruction" !



Actually, and all silliness aside, I think you have a really good point here. Possibly more important that a potentially new narrative is the possibility for a reconstructed dialogue at the global level.

[goesh]

" If someone can show me that radio, telegraph, telephones or printing presses changed the essential nature of political and religious/political ideas, then I'll think again. I stand by writing and speaking as being mainly to blame!!
(Wf.O)
-I'd argue that we see a large hunk of our teen generation texting in code that gets made up and passed and more made up and passed all impacting behaviors rather quickly, almost a mutual mass understanding solely facilitated by a machine(s). I recall Howard Dean's Candidacy and the so-called Deaniacs who would rally almost instantly in key locations, the sole impetus being a technological prompt, backed by a simplistic idea of one man for President. All subsequent behaviors at the impromptu rallies can be as easily attributed to the machine as the imagination/idea of one man becoming President. Apples v Oranges ....?

[Greyhawk]

Back in April, 2007...

BASH: The phrase "the war is lost" really touched a nerve.

Do you stand by that -- that -- that comment?

REID: General Petraeus has said that only 20 percent of the war can be won militarily. He's the man on the ground there now. He said 80 percent of the war has to be won diplomatically, economically and politically. I agree with General Petraeus.

Now, that is clear and I certainly believe that.

BASH: But, sir, General Petraeus has not said the war is lost.

I just want to ask you again...

REID: General -- General Petraeus has said the war cannot be won militarily. He said that. And President Bush is doing nothing economically. He is doing nothing diplomatically. He is not doing even the minimal requested by the Iraq Study Group.

So I -- I stick with General Petraeus. I have no doubt that the war cannot be won militarily, and that's what I said last Thursday and I stick with that.

BASH: Arlen Specter, a Republican, but somebody who, in many ways, is like you, a critic of the president's Iraq policy. He said this. He said: "For men and women who are over in Iraq to have somebody of Senator Reid's stature say that the war is lost, it is just very, very demoralizing and not necessary."

Is there something to that, an 18- and 19-year-old person in the service in Iraq who is serving, risking their lives, in some cases losing their life, hearing somebody like you back in Washington saying that they're fighting for a lost cause?

REID: General Petraeus has told them that.

BASH: How has he said that?

REID: He said the war can't be won militarily. He said that. I mean he said it. He's the commander on the ground there.

"I do not think that means what you think that means" - to paraphrase Princess Bride.

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

If someone can show me that radio, telegraph, telephones or printing presses changed the essential nature of political and religious/political ideas, then I'll think again. I stand by writing and speaking as being mainly to blame!!

Okay....

On the printing press, consider the effect of cheap, mass produced copies of the Bible printed in the local languages. This invention led to massive increases spread of the breakup of the Roman Catholic hegemony in Western Europe during the late 15th through the end of the 17th centuries. It also directly led to an increase in the number of people involved in discussions surrounding science (with profound political implications), and the development of newspapers, broadsheets and yellow journalism that changed the nature of political debate, mobilization and control of political discourse. See, for example, Prophecy and Protest in Renaissance Italy.

On the political effects of radio, the telegraph and the telephone, see The Gutenburg Galaxy (Marshal McLuhan), The Soft Edge (Paul Levinson), and Technology in World Civilization (Arnold Pacey), Empire and Communications (Harold Inness), and Technology and Empire (George Grant) to name a few.

In (exceedingly) short form:

The telegraph extended basic written communications and, hence, the geographic span of control. This change specifically shifted how people reacted to central authorities, specifically decreasing the amount of local autonomy available. this allowed for the spread of a modern, centralized bureaucratic state organization, as well as producing a rapid spread of "news" over vast geographic areas 9thereby changing the content of local political discourse).

The radio, as a one-way communicative medium, greatly increased the centralizing power of state organizations through control of popular culture and political discourse. Consider, by way of example, the fact that almost all states moved rapidly to "license" radio broadcasting.

The telephone reconstructed two-way (or more) discussions at the local level but, also, increased the possibility of central control and monitoring, mainly in industries (Levinson's chapter on the telephone is quite interesting).

Cheers,

Marc

[Hacksaw]

I must first apologize for the ill-disciplined effort at levity at the beginning of the thread... it didn't contribute, but Gian is a good friend and the opportunity was one I couldn't resist...

BW... I'd respond in a thoughtful way, just still trying to digest... I can say - I think its one of the more helpful approaches I've heard discussed, I hope you/it are gaining traction in FLA...

As for the bumper stickers, and their potential harm... maybe I'm too optimistic, except in rare cases, I do see the community using these as a point of departure for discussion as opposed to absolutes... As someone else noted time will tell, but...

I too grew up in an Army with a rich tradition of small wars... and despite the fact that I attended the Army's "premier" school for developing military planners... I was never once asked to think about something beyond force on force until 2002 - that's 15 years... as Sec Gates says when discussing the 2010 budget -- this isn't a IW budget, it just gets IW a seat at the table -- if the nouveau COIN/COINistas provide for a small wars seat at the table -- its worth the risk

and I know that doesn't mean what he thinks that means

[William F. Owen]

Shalom Marc,

All fascinating - genuinely - but what correct me if I am wrong, but you are talking about these technologies, enabling behaviours. They are instruments. Radio changed warfare. It cannot change war. Same is true of I.P. technology.
None of them "created ideas." Protestants challenged the hegemony of the Roman Catholics, not the printing press.

Much the same is true of the observation that the motor car and the aeroplane symbolised, and inspired, Fascism but did not create it.

[William F. Owen]

I too grew up in an Army with a rich tradition of small wars... and despite the fact that I attended the Army's "premier" school for developing military planners... I was never once asked to think about something beyond force on force until 2002 - that's 15 years... as Sec Gates says when discussing the 2010 budget -- this isn't a IW budget, it just gets IW a seat at the table -- if the nouveau COIN/COINistas provide for a small wars seat at the table -- its worth the risk

You allude to a very interesting distinction here. I have always believed that the exclusion of "Small Wars" from military thought, training, equipment and doctrine, to be profoundly stupid.
I submit that the best way to prevent that is to nurture an "All Wars" approach.

This is why the Soap box, with the "Read Clausewitz" and "War is War" bumper stickers comes zooming out, ( much to Tom's annoyance! ) every time I sense the vibrations of those who see "COIN" as being something not grounded in War and Warfare. Small Wars and Irregular Warfare are not just about "COIN," and believing any warfare against an Irregular enemy is COIN and can be addressed by the "new thinking" that comes with that belief, may set you on the road to disaster.

So quote my more JEPY friends, "Love Small Wars. Love Irregular Warfare. Not so sure about the COIN, Darling."

[marct]

Shalom Marc,

Right back at you ....

All fascinating - genuinely - but what correct me if I am wrong, but you are talking about these technologies, enabling behaviours. They are instruments. Radio changed warfare. It cannot change war. Same is true of I.P. technology.
None of them "created ideas." Protestants challenged the hegemony of the Roman Catholics, not the printing press.

You're quite correct that i am talking about these technologies enabling behaviours. Actually, i would go further and say that they changed the selection criteria (both positive and negative) for certain behaviours. Where I suspect we disagree is on the nature of causality. I view "causality" in an inductive format, i.e. by changing the frequency distribution of a particular behaviour, that technology has "caused" that behaviour to change. The social understandings at the time of those changes are the "ideas" which, since they are embedded in the change themselves, are "created" by that change. I know, it sounds post-moderninst, but it actually isn't .

I agree that it was the protestants that challenged the Catholic hegemony in Europe. However, let me note that it had been challenged earlier by "reform" movements internally (e.g. the Fraticelli, etc.), and by groups that just plain out rejected their hegemony either spiritual (e.g. the Cathars) or temporal (e.g. the Stedingers). The Protestants, as a collection of groups, certainly weren't the first but they were successful and, IMHO, one of the main reasons why they were successful was because of the spread of the printing press.

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

Where I suspect we disagree is on the nature of causality. I view "causality" in an inductive format, i.e. by changing the frequency distribution of a particular behaviour, that technology has "caused" that behaviour to change.

OK, I can dig that, so the people make choices and act based on the information to hand. More information, more action. Makes sense, but how true is it today relatively?

A Few books to 1,000's of Books is a very great change - even with literacy at below 1%. No Radio to radio, is a big change, but less profound than books. Same for telephones. Has the Internet really changed human behaviour and politics in a decisive and profound way, as seen with books? - and books only really took off once literacy took hold.

Having said all that, my thinking has been profoundly and usefully effected by SWJ. I actually think 18 months here equates to 5 years on intense study in terms of getting from where I was to where I am, but I may be emotively overstating the case!

[Gian P Gentile]

I must first apologize for the ill-disciplined effort at levity at the beginning of the thread... it didn't contribute, but Gian is a good friend and the opportunity was one I couldn't resist...

Hack, I didn't take it that way at all; but dude, Lincoln Hall, even Schmedlap knows that History is in Thayer! In fact if you go to Schmed's cool post on the Wanat thread you will see me tacking my 95 theses on the door where Patton used to walk through to ride his horse (a bit of creative license here, allow me).

Of course I read it and provided encouragement along with some comments; but as Jonathan highlights in his acknowledgment section he received much help from our old Sams Obe Won, Professor Roger Spiller.

And by the way, if any of the council members want to read a classic of war history and literature, read Roger Spiller's 2005 "An Instinct for War." Nothing less than brilliant it is.

little g

[Hacksaw]

Just thought they had moved History to the high-end neighborhood As I said earlier, just an attempt at levity, I'm incoregible (SIC, I think)...

[marct]

OK, I can dig that, so the people make choices and act based on the information to hand. More information, more action. Makes sense, but how true is it today relatively?

It's really interesting - at least to me - how we react to changes in information systems. Let me pull that apart, 'cause otherwise I'll be using way too much academic shorthand....

Basically, I view information as a "difference that makes a difference" (Gregory Bateson's influence there....). All information is perceived via some form of sensory processing, which is inherently a communications loop - raw input comes from somewhere "out there", gets processed, decoded, processed against existing "meaning templates" for "difference" (amongst other things) and then stored/referenced against linguistic taxonomies. Where the technologies come into play, and where I see them as having a significant causal effect, is in the coding / decoding area, storage, and secondary communication.

A Few books to 1,000's of Books is a very great change - even with literacy at below 1%. No Radio to radio, is a big change, but less profound than books. Same for telephones. Has the Internet really changed human behaviour and politics in a decisive and profound way, as seen with books? - and books only really took off once literacy took hold.

Hmmm, let's think about this for a bit. When we look at early "literate" societies, say pre-1400, one of the things that becomes pretty clear is that the requirements for encoding / decoding (readin' and writin' in this case ), were originally really, REALLY, complex. It took about a decade to teach someone how to read and write in cuneiform, Egyptian hieroglyphics, traditional Chinese pictograms, etc. One of the effects of this, and it was probably partly due to the fact that most writing systems were developed in "temples", was that "writing" was viewed as "sacred" - consider the Hebrew alphabet for one example.

Even later on, say during the first centuiry ce or so, most "writing" was mean to be spoken (this, BTW, has been forgotten by a lot of people; BTW, Harris' Ancient Literacy is great for a systematic analysis of this situation after the development of alphabetic writing). Books didn't really take off until after the development of the Gutenburg press which allowed for the cheap, rapid production of large print runs. Literacy, at least in the sense we now use the term, didn't really take off until roughly the same time, but not because of books - it was because of broadsheets (sort of a 16th century version of the tabloid press). The two, books and literacy, didn't really tie together at the level of general, popular culture, until the development of both cheap books and cheap education systems.

I don't know if it's possible to quantify differences in levels of effect of mass publications and the radio. One point I'll note is that the process of decoding radio is much simpler that learning to read - a point well know to and used by the Taliban. You don't need a cheap education system in order to deploy radio while still communicating with large numbers of people. Afterall, providing people with cheap transitor radios is a lot less expensive than setting up an education system!

One other key difference between the two is that with radio, there really isn't much of a storage mechanism beyong, say, recorders. The "messages" are immediate, and it is really quite challenging to go back and critically examine those messages at a later date; something that is simple with books. This means that whatever group controls the broadcasting "centre" can control the message.

Has the 'net changed the nature of politics? I don't know - I could argue both sides of the question. Honestly, i don't think we have enough data yet to say that it has or hasn't. Let me toss out a few exemplars in the afirmative.

Are you familiar with the United Breaks Guitars case (story, 1st video, follow up)? The use of 'net 2.0 technologies forced a major corporation to give in to a single person. In another example, less well know and not covered on CNN , Rogers cablevision decided that they were not going to carry WPBS from Watertown NY in Ottawa any longer. A facebook group was setup to oppose this decision, which they took without consultation. Rogers has, as a result of that and other efforts, now reversed themselves.

Where I see the 'net effecting our politics is in the realm of temporal immediacy. Basically, I suspect that the frequency distribution of indiviual efforts and collective action is conditioning our political actors (corporations, politicians, etc.) to react quickly to popular groundswells and embarassment. That's at a minimun.

I think that we could also look at how is has and is changing the geographical scope of warfare. For example, fairly cheap and sophisticated use of 'net 2.0 technologies enhance the probability of homegrown terrorism both by indoctrination (those interpretive templates i was mentioning earlier) and by providing do it yourself methodologies. Are these having a political effect? Yup - we can see it in the creation of DHS and in recent suggestions that Americans should be taught to spy on each other.

Having said all that, my thinking has been profoundly and usefully effected by SWJ. I actually think 18 months here equates to 5 years on intense study in terms of getting from where I was to where I am, but I may be emotively overstating the case!

LOL - definitely!!!!!

[Bob's World]

Changes in the rate and availability of information drive changes in governance, often through violent uprisings of a newly empowered populace.

The invention of the printing press sparked in information age that led to the Renaissance (growth of art and science), the Age of Discovery (western colonization of the world), and the Reformation (Radical Christianity used as ideology to overthrow the Holy Roman Empire's chokehold on Europe). Powerful stuff when the government loses control of information.

The invention of electronic communications contributed to the demise of the British Empire and as cell phones and internet communications democratize information even more is serving to empower populaces to rise up to challenge similar governments that draw their sovereignty more from external sources than they do from the populace of the region.

Washington can draw lessons from what happens when sovereignty is attempted to be exerted from Rome or London in the face of a populace empowered by new tools of information and avoid their fate, or it can ignore those lessons and share in their fate.

Never underestimate the attractive force of freedom on man to motivate him to take on the greatest challenge, or the empowering effect of information, both to make him aware that better options exist and to facilitate his ability to organize his Resistence movement to achieve it.

This is why I believe that the number one priority of the US's GWOT efforts (or deterrence of irregular threats efforts) is to understand and address or avoid such perceptions of inappropriate US legitimacy over the governance of others. Track a "foreign fighter" back to his home and you will likely find just such perceptions.

This is the challenge of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as it is very difficult indeed to avoid such perceptions when one begins by taking down the existing government and replacing it with another. Sustained efforts to increase the effectiveness of those same governments only serves to increase the perception of US legitimacy over them. This not only makes them more susceptible to insurgency themselves, but the US more susceptible to attack from these insurgent forces who are apt to believe that phase one to any successful insurgency at home must be to break the source of this inappropriate external legitimacy.

A bit of a quandary, but to understand it is the first step in addressing it.

[Entropy]

BW,

I'd like to hear more about this deterrence of irregular threats. What kind of threats are you talking about specificially?

[Taiko]

If our current campaign is primarily about deterrence (this is what militaries do in times of peace); and it is not really GWOT, then what is it? The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats.It also allows for a much more positive narrative that our allies and own non-DOD agencies can much more readily get on board with.

Sounds good in theory:

1. How do you deter an individual or group of individuals with no fixed address?

2. How do you deter an individual or group of individual who a) are not afraid to die b) prefer the consequence/cost, and in some cases the reward of death, over inaction?

I've been having a look at this subject area for some time now and concur with David that this is very worthy of a thread of its own.

Where I suspect we disagree is on the nature of causality. I view "causality" in an inductive format, i.e. by changing the frequency distribution of a particular behaviour, that technology has "caused" that behaviour to change. The social understandings at the time of those changes are the "ideas" which, since they are embedded in the change themselves, are "created" by that change. I know, it sounds post-moderninst, but it actually isn't

I view causality deductively within the framework of power, in this case political power. Your ontological framework of preferencing behaviour is problematic in the sense that it is conditioned by the presence, or lack there of, of power, or the aspiration for power. Power, more specifically political power is the independent variable and behaviour is the dependent variable. All the technological innovations you have cited and the 'change in behaviour' they have created are examples of human's attempting to control the minds and actions of other humans, they are examples of aspirations for power. In short the exercise of power (the why) that has been a ongoing condition of human nature's struggle for power and, it will continue, despite the advances in technology (the how). You are correct in highlighting the variations in how this struggle for power takes place, but it does not change the struggle for power. There is no neo-marxist or liberal condition which will see technology as the route to the perfection of man and the end of history. The theoretical position itself, the belief that it will change behaviour, is an exercise in power! Rather than a linear progression of history there is an enduring cyclical quality based on the struggle for power at the domestic and international level. Hence, war, the use of violence, is the continuation of politics by other means. To draw on a poker analogy: I'll see your Alex Wendt and raise you one Hans Morgenthau

[goesh]

this section is turning me into a hippy again and I'm going to have to start wearing my ju-ju in order to attempt to evey try to keep up...

[marct]

Hi Taiko,

I view causality deductively within the framework of power, in this case political power.

And which framework would that be, since there are several that use that term?

Your ontological framework of preferencing behaviour is problematic in the sense that it is conditioned by the presence, or lack there of, of power, or the aspiration for power. Power, more specifically political power is the independent variable and behaviour is the dependent variable.

Behaviour is empirical - you can see it; "power" isn't, it has to be inferred. Also, at least as far as research methods are concerned, even within a nomonological-deductive framework in the social sciences, you can always exchange the dependant ind independant variables. A strict deductive methodology that doesn't allow that is usually called a theology .

All the technological innovations you have cited and the 'change in behaviour' they have created are examples of human's attempting to control the minds and actions of other humans, they are examples of aspirations for power.

That is certainly one interpretation, but it isn't the only one. I'm begining to suspect either a Marxian or Foucauldian framework, with a touch of Nietzsche.

In short the exercise of power (the why) that has been a ongoing condition of human nature's struggle for power and, it will continue, despite the advances in technology (the how).

Personally, I think you are confusing the potentiality for power (however that may be defined) with the socio-technical conditions that allow for or inhibit the practice of power. You might want to take a look at Stewart Clegg's Frameworks of Power.

You are correct in highlighting the variations in how this struggle for power takes place, but it does not change the struggle for power. There is no neo-marxist or liberal condition which will see technology as the route to the perfection of man and the end of history.

That sounds like one of your axiomatix assumptions. As to the teleological implications, I don't subscribe those implications - I'm more along the lines of a neo-Darwinian that a Teilhard de Chardin.

The theoretical position itself, the belief that it will change behaviour, is an exercise in power!

Sounds like another axiomatic assumption - did you want an "Amen, Brother" after it ?

More seriously, anyone who doesn't think that changes in technology will cause (in the inductive sense I described earlier) changes in behaviour needs to seriously rethink their position. Is that an "exercise in power"? Maybe... what is your definition of power?

Rather than a linear progression of history there is an enduring cyclical quality based on the struggle for power at the domestic and international level. Hence, war, the use of violence, is the continuation of politics by other means.

Neitzsche meets CvC, with Foucault hosting the lovefest!

To draw on a poker analogy: I'll see your Alex Wendt and raise you one Hans Morgenthau

I'll see your Morgenthau and raise you a Dilthey .

Cheers,

Marc

[slapout9]

Here is my theory..... we haven't done COIN since the Civil War and that is the only way it can be done...the failing government fights back against the rebelling forces and either wins or gets overthrown. What the US does a lot of is to use COIN TTP's in what I was taught in Law Enforcement as Karpman's triangle.

The triangle has an attacker...a victum....and a rescuer. The US often plays the role of rescuer with all the dangers that it involves including having the victim turn against you.
Apply this triangle consistently in the daily news and you will see it is the source of many if not all US problems.

Randy if you have time (being the psychologist and all) perhaps you could expand upon the triangle for SWC especially since you have an LE back round.

[Ken White]

had a Tu-tu?